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What is the relationship between cinema and ethics, especially an elusive ethics 
more concerned with responding to alterity than with establishing moral order?  Seeing and 
the Seen addresses this question by demonstrating how three seemingly unambiguous 
cinematic moments (from nations with totalitarian histories) are structured by ambiguity and 
aporia.  These uncertain structures evoke non-assimilative, non-totalizing ethical responses 
that counter monolithic interpretations of cinema.  Previously, skeptical approaches to 
cinema have not focused on ethics.  They have relied upon hermeneutic techniques to 
“interpret” elements and then discuss their relevance.  Their concerns have been 
ontological and epistemological.  Using the post-phenomenological thought of 
Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida, I argue, however, that skepticism connects 
cinema to an ethics of response.
Chapter One introduces the ideas of post-phenomenological ethics, skepticism, and 
cinema, to show how their interrelationship actually challenges traditional views, such as 
Levinas’s that see art as unethical.
Chapter Two analyzes narrative absence and the ethics of alienation in 
Michelangelo Antonioni’s L’avventura.  I compare ontological and ethical readings of this 
film to argue against interpreting it as tragic.  The final caress between the film’s 
protagonists is a metaphor for cinematic representations of ethical response.
Chapter Three discusses the ethics of pornography in films by Pedro Almodóvar, 
who shows how pornography and non-pornography remain interdependent.  Focusing on 
cinematic iterability, I demonstrate how pornographic and non-pornographic tropes oscillate 
between the two genres, rendering their borders uncertain.  This uncertainty makes 
pornography more related to skepticism and ethics than previously imagined.
Chapter Four outlines the “total criticism” of the ethics of law in Oshima Nagisa’s 
cinema.  Specifically, I examine how the freeze frame at the end of Merry Christmas, Mr. 
Lawrence evokes an ethics of the cinema that exposes the gaps of total criticism.  The freeze 
frame is the least discussed cinematic device; however, it provides the most concrete 
example of the elusive relation between skepticism, ethics, and cinema.
The Conclusion argues that these examples are only starting points toward further 
investigations of how filmic uncertainty highlights the relation between cinema and ethics.  
In the end, I emphasize this point by responding to instances from contemporary 
documentary filmmaking.
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When I began this study in 1992 two questions drove me toward a further 
investigation of what was beginning to be called “post-structuralist ethics,” “post-
phenomenological ethics,” or sometimes, “the ethics of deconstruction or 
deconstructive ethics.”  This was an ethics concerned with ethics as first philosophy.  
This was ethics concerned with consciousness of another, of consciousness brought 
about because of a responsibility toward another.
When I was teaching film and criticism at an historically black college on the 
Eastern Shore of Maryland, I was deeply immersed in Modern American literature, 
Marxist criticism, and Post-Structuralism.  My primary concern lay in negotiating the 
writings of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Luce Irigaray in the light of a 
Marxist concern for liberation and over-coming self-estrangement.  Politics and the 
relation between literature (mainly print) and alienation were the foundations of my 
scholarship and teaching.  The post-structuralism I was most powerfully drawn to,
though, seemed to fall short in regard to this final analysis.  It did not seem to be 
concerned enough with bridging this gap between the aesthetic and alienation.  What 
was post-structuralism not asking?
At the same time, I began to explore the cinema of Michelangelo Antonioni 
and kept returning to the question of the character of Anna in Antonioni’s 
L’avventura.  How can a character who disappears from a film not really disappear 
from a film, and how can she still be the motivational force behind the film when she 
remains absent from it?  I was reading and learning a tremendous amount from 
theorists associated with the journal Screen, especially Stephen Heath.  I was 
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learning from and teaching cognitivists such as David Bordwell and Kristin 
Thompson.  And, I was spending a good deal of time with Marxist and Materialist 
thought inspired by the work of Walter Benjamin.  However, the two themes running 
through the film theory and interpretation I was consulting most (Lacanian 
influenced psychoanalysis and Marxism) continued to leave me less than satisfied.  
What was film theory not asking?
In an unexpected way, Emmanuel Levinas’s earlier work on presence and 
absence and Derrida’s drawing on that work seemed to open new possibilities for 
answering both questions.  Reading the works they had written in response to one 
another, and to Heidegger (hence the term post-phenomenological), brought to light 
the ethical possibility within deconstruction and the deconstructive possibility within 
the ethical that seemed to address my concerns about relationships and the cinema.
At that time Levinas was well below the radar of most critical thinkers, to the 
point that some of his major works, including Otherwise Than Being or Beyond 
Existence, were out of print or being remaindered by their publishers.  (I still work 
from my photocopied version of Otherwise Than Being.)  Susan Handleman’s 
Fragments of Redemption: Jewish Thought and Literary Theory in Benjamin, 
Scholem, and Levinas had found an eager and respectful audience and marked out a 
small space for us to begin.  Seán Hand’s 1990 Levinas Reader gave those of us who 
did not read French a smart collection of basic excerpts from which to work.  
However, The Cambridge Companion to Levinas was nowhere on the map.  The 
major Levinas websites were not even a dream.  And, the over 27,000 hits I got from 
a Google search on “Emmanuel Levinas” this morning were unthinkable.  For the 
iv
most part, mentioning his name required more prefacing than I was often capable of 
providing.  Derrida was well known but little understood in an ethical light at this 
time, and the need to explain how Derrida had always been interested in post-
phenomenological ethics from the start seemed never-ending.
Now, after fourteen years of working on this project and studying post-
phenomenological ethics as a way to approach questions about ethics, cinema, and 
deconstruction, I have seen a good number of changes in the field.  Ethics linked to 
skepticism or uncertainty seems less strange for many writers.  The links between 
Derrida and Levinas now appear crucial for a lot of thinkers.  And, we Levinasians, 
as a large group of us took to calling ourselves after a conference in 1999, are a 
growing community that no longer works in isolation.  At least, not in regard to 
Levinas’s thought.
The challenge at the start of the Twenty-first century is that we Levinasians 
working in post-phenomenological ethics are very much from different fields.  We 
bring different questions to his texts on ethics and religion and walk away with new 
considerations we often still have difficulty relating, even to one another.  Isolation 
threatens yet.  Like other branches of post-phenomenology, studies of Levinasian 
ethics have grown considerably to include more feminist, performing arts, and 
political considerations.  Visual art still has a way to go in considering what ethics or 
the call to ethical subjectivity might mean in that realm, but I hope this study 
provides at least one way to start more conversations.
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How Do We Respond?
Before doubt ever becomes a system, skepsis
has to do with the eyes.
—Jacques Derrida
No Words
How do we respond to “NO WORDS”?  This is the essential question for a 
study of cinema and ethics where ethics is not about laws and morality but about our 
elusive relationship with the world.  It is important to note that this is not the way we 
usually think about ethics.  As strange as it may seem, this is the question we must 
consider when we ask about ethics and cinema in the light of a non-traditional ethics 
of response.  This ethics demands that we ask our questions differently from the start.  
Such an ethics radically changes our questions and our answers.
Near the end of Michelangelo Antonioni’s 1970 film Zabriskie Point the 
character, Mark, paints these words on the side of the borrowed airplane he intends to 
return to the air port in Los Angeles.  The story of student strikes, corporate real 
estate development, counter-culture, and institutional violence, Zabriskie Point is 
filled with intersecting stories marked almost more by questions than answers.1
1 In the midst of a highly charged but disorganized student meeting, Mark claims to be bored and 
walks out.  Meanwhile, at the Sunny Dunes Development Corporation headquarters, a young woman, 
Daria, tries to retrieve a book she has left behind while temping.  In the process, she is introduced to 
the company’s director, Lee Allen.  As the student strike progresses, police are called in to maintain 
order.  One of them is shot and killed.  Mark, carrying a revolver in his boot, is suspected.  He rides a 
bus out of town to the airport where he takes off toward the desert in a single-engine airplane.  In the 
desert, Mark and Daria meet, and they ride together to Zabriskie Point in Death Valley, where they 
have sex.  Their sex act is replicated in a fantasy scene of other couples and triples in the sand.  Mark, 
Daria, and an unnamed desert dweller paint the airplane to resemble a prehistoric bird with its genitals 
showing, and he flies back to Los Angeles.  Daria proceeds on toward the business meeting in Phoenix 
with Lee.  Along the way, she hears the radio news story that Mark was shot to death upon his return 
2
What is striking about this quickly passing image of NO WORDS on the side 
of the plane is its self-contradiction.  The use of words to declare a leaving off of 
words is paradoxical.  William Arrowsmith reads these words as Mark’s motto, 
explaining, “The character declares what he is by what he does, not what he says.  
NO WORDS says the motto on the painted airplane.  Character is destiny, but the 
destiny reveals itself as destiny by being subvocal and silently purposive.”2  These 
words are markers of another language, of the technique of ellipsis3 that pervades so 
much of the film narrative and traces of a story, which call spectators to respond to 
the points between the dots, to respond without being certain, how to respond.
These marks are not so readily reduced solely to a motto, especially one of 
subvocal or silent purposiveness, however.  Their very placement within the text puts 
them in a difficult spot.  Even if we see them as statements of ellipsis, then they are 
statements.  Therefore, they are both placeholders and erasers at the same time.  
Whether stated by the words “NO WORDS” or the three dots that mark out what is 
not present, these markers remain markers that work to bar another’s presence.  They 
hold the place of what has been marked out and in so doing take up the space.  
Ellipses remain on the page, and this image remains on the screen.  As much as these 
words may be a marker of some meaning, then, they are, also, an opening of 
to the airport.  She arrives at the desert “fortress” house, wanders its labyrinthine structure, and finds 
Lee, who laughs at her and then instructs her to go and change clothes.  Suddenly, she rushes from the 
house and drives away.  When she looks back, she imagines the house and all its contents exploding.  
As the film concludes, the audio track is filled with the sound of the explosions and the musical score, 
but there are no words except THE END.




cinematic expression that refuses decided meaning.  They are against monocular 
vision and a single point of view, challenging stasis and totality.  NO WORDS call 
for a more complex response—an ethics of the cinematic—which responds to 
uncertainty without making it certain, which responds to its complexity by Seeing 
between the Seens.  This cinematic instance challenging the logic of non-
contradiction calls spectators to regard (gaze upon and care for) NO WORDS and its 
undecidability otherwise than through a totalization that would reduce it to the same.4
It calls for an understanding while at the same time showing that no fixed answer can 
be the final one.  Since NO WORDS takes up space, nothing can take its place 
without replacing it with something (at least slightly) different.  Thus, it asks 
spectators to respond to it while not covering it with SOME WORDS.
My argument throughout this study is that such moments of interpretational 
blinking (with eyes closing and opening) call on spectators for an open and infinite 
response, Seeing, in the space of an interpretational closure, the Seen.  Here cinema 
is not a frame, window, or a mirror.  It is not even an address, but an other that calls 
me to respond by Seeing between the Seens.  These concepts, Seeing and the Seen, 
are grafted from the later post-phenomenological ethics of the French, Jewish 
philosopher Emmanuel Levinas and his attempts to describe a non-normative ethics 
of infinite responsiveness to the other (infinite responsibility toward the other) as the 
relation between Saying and the Said which makes human discourse possible.  This 
is an ethics of response, not a traditional ethics dogmatic absolutism, rational 
universalism, moral relativity, or even subjective reciprocity.  It is an ethics of 
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responding to the otherness of the other, without grasping and reducing the other to 
the same.  It is also linked to the “double gesture” of justice (and the ethics of justice) 
formulated by Jacques Derrida in his discussions of the law.  Like the double gesture 
of writing and erasing that Derrida reads behind the law and the unsaying of the said 
that Levinas argues makes ethics possible, the Seeing and the Seen of NO WORDS 
calls for a spectator response otherwise than certain and totalizing.
Regarding cinema is Seeing cinema against its Seen.5  It is a process opened 
by instances when films demand open responses of spectators.  This is not to say that 
such moments cannot be subsumed or even ignored in favor of interpretation, but 
that such moments open themselves to something other than interpretations alone.  
Screening Zabriskie Point involves many such instances because its elliptical 
narrative structure often displays situations without revealing their motivations or 
outcomes.  Indeed, it is a film filled with more questions than answers, a film which 
calls for Seeing between the Seen.
In the pages that follow, I argue that familiar filmic theories founded in 
concepts of the “gaze” and “look” or even the “glance” and “blush” fail in the light 
4  Throughout I will refer to the dual meaning of “regard” (to look/to care for).
5 The study which may come closest to my own in its concerns for reading philosophy and film side by 
side is, perhaps, Wilhelm S. Wurzer’s Filming and Judgment: Between Heidegger and Adorno (New 
Jersey: Humanities P, 1990).  “Filming,” according to Wuzer, is a judging that “exceeds the cinematic 
displacement of representation in transgressing the boundaries of a free imagination without 
abandoning thought’s relation to a tectonic of judgment” (xiv).  Filming is like regarding in its refusal 
to be tied to the ground of sameness or truth in its judging.  Both are bound to “unlimited narrative 
possibility” (xiv).  However, filming returns to a Heideggerian, rather than Levinasian, concern for 
freedom in its reverie in “the disinterested relation.”  Regarding remains always a non-
disinterestedness rather than a disinterestedness.  Filming, on the other hand, “at the limit of Ereignis, 
is no longer wedded to a discourse on truth.  From a metaphysical perspective, it is judgment gone 
astray; from the viewpoint of a new style of thought, it is judgment discerning its freedom” (3).  
Regarding, also, is no longer wedded to a discourse on truth, but is judgment discerning it 
responsibility.
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of such seriously perplexing moments.  They fail precisely for their completeness, 
their ability to reduce all they survey to the economy of the same.  Whether starting 
from concerns with misrecognition or false consciousness, they are unable to provide 
a description of the spectatorial movement between Seeing and the Seen because 
they eventually return to one side of regarding by covering over the other.  They can 
only care for something after having interpreted it and having assigned it a value.  In 
their stead, I propose a theory of “regarding,” that moves more toward a theory of 
spectatorship founded in the precise movement between caring for what is screened 
and understanding it.
To be clear, what I am writing about film spectatorship is not that the call of 
cinema as the other is the same as the call of the other person as Levinas or Derrida 
describe it.  It is related, but not the same.  Like Jill Robbins in Altered Reading: 
Levinas and Literature, I offer that “It is not my intention to propose that a text has 
alterity in the same way that the other person does.  My goal is to explore the ways in 
which reading alters—or interrupts—the very economy of the same that the other 
interrupts.”6  I am arguing that responses to film staked solely on agency and 
knowledge fail to respond at crucial moments to precise instances in cinematic 
experience.  Traditional interpretive strategies can assimilate but they cannot respond 
to the ways in which the alterity of cinema interrupts the economy of the same.  
Perhaps these instances are extraordinary and, thus, cannot merit the authority of 
6 Jill Robbins, Altered Reading: Levinas and Literature (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1999) xxiv.
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rewriting spectatorship away from the political and psychoanalytic theories backing 
prior theories.7
Perhaps, though, it is precisely the force of authority that is at stake in the 
bargain.  So much within film theory has relied upon discussions of authority, 
agency, and spectatorial recognition and identification.  The essential references have 
always been made to issues of control and desire, to apprehending the truth of the 
political and psychoanalytic situation.  Within film, agency has more often than not 
referred to characters attaining a goal, such as escaping to safety, liberating one’s 
comrades, or finding true love.  In terms of spectator theory, agency has most often 
applied to power over a text, to identification, voyeurism and fetishism, and the 
production of meaning.8  All of these have their place and remain crucial to the 
understanding of cinematic encounters.  However, these theories are concerned with 
a return to a unified and stable identity.  Lacanian psychoanalytic theories based on 
misrecognition find their mastery in explanations of recognition.  Marxist theories of 
false consciousness find their mastery in explanations of true consciousness.  In the 
end, both return to stasis, and both function through a disavowal of an ethics of 
responding with an infinite openness that cannot be reduced in the process of 
knowledge production.  What does not fit the process of knowledge production is 
7 The most influential of these studies remain Walter Benjamin’s “The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction,” Jean-Louis Baudry’s “Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic 
Apparatus,” Jean-Luc Comolli an Jean Narboni’s “Cinema/Ideology/Criticism,” Christian Metz’s The 
Imaginary Signifier, Laura Mulvey’s “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” Kaja Silverman’s 
“Suture,” Stephen Heath’s Questions of Cinema, and Fredric Jameson’s The Geopolitical Aesthetic.
8 Of course, what is being considered here is the projected image and its relation with an audience, and 
not the recorded image and the work of the camera, which is outside the scope of this study.
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ejected or assimilated, made the same as what can be brought under the banner of an 
interpretation leading to stability.
This study picks up on the conversation between Emmanuel Levinas and 
Jacques Derrida surrounding the relation between ethics and visual art since the end 
of World War II.  Then, it turns this conversation toward three non-conformist 
filmmakers from previously totalitarian nations: Michelangelo Antonioni, Oshima 
Nagisa, and Pedro Almodóvar.  The goal here is to pick up the challenge laid out by 
Peter Brunette and David Wills in Screen / Play: Derrida and Film Theory and see 
responding to cinema without totalizing it, without eliding uncertainty, and without 
repressing my own theoretical consequences.  This is a study of the narrative ethics 
of alienation, the generic ethics of pornography, and the filmic ethics of the law.  The 
cinema discussed here especially opens itself to these concerns, making questions of 
ethics unavoidable.  From their earliest public responses to one another, Levinas and 
Derrida have struggled over the relation between aesthetics and ethics.  Levinas has 
often been quick to judge art unethical, but Derrida has almost always just as quickly 
opened the debate anew by questioning Levinas’s absolute judgments.  I hope to 
enter this debate precisely to further their considerations of the violence and ethics 
involved in cinema and spectatorship.
Cinema—Representation—Spectatorship
When Siegfried Kracauer condemns the released version of Das Cabinet des 
Dr. Caligari (dir. Robert Wiene, 1919) for its endorsement of totalitarian authority 
and repudiation of freedom and progressive ideas, his words serve as a preamble to 
the current study.
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Whether intentionally or not, Caligari exposes the soul wavering 
between tyranny and chaos, and facing a desperate situation: any 
escape from tyranny seems to throw it into a state of utter confusion.9
In Caligari, the soul is tossed into an either / or trauma between two poles: tyranny 
(authority) and chaos.  Any true alternative, according to Kracauer, is lost because 
the options are hedged from the start.  The two poles are presented as the only natural 
ones, and anyone who would choose chaos must be insane.  The game is over before 
it begins.  Kracauer is not speaking in terms of the ethical spectatorship at work in 
this study, yet his view of the relationship between film and the world shares many of 
the same concerns.  Kracauer’s disgust over the rise of Hitlerism in 1920s Germany 
and his concern over the reworking of what might have been a revolutionary film is 
parallel to this study’s consideration of ethical spectatorship and cinema’s relation to 
the world.  According to Kracauer, 
While the original story [by Janowitz and Mayer] exposed the 
madness inherent in authority, Wiene’s Caligari glorified authority 
and convicted its antagonist to madness.  A revolutionary film was 
thus turned into a conformist one—following the much-used pattern 
of declaring some normal but troublesome individual insane and 
sending him to a lunatic asylum.10
There is only one right answer, only one interpretation, only one final solution, and 
that one comes from the vested authority (tyranny) that opposes the chaos of 
9 Siegfried Kracauer, “The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari,” Film Theory and Criticism: Introductory 
Readings, 4th edition, eds. Gerald Mast, Marshall Cohen, Leo Braudy (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1992) 31.
9
uncertainty.  Freedom is never brought into the picture, according to Kracauer, 
because the two poles of the film, and the two poles of the film’s message remain 
only tyranny or chaos.
Kracauer’s principal consideration of Caligari lies in the connection between 
the political message of the film’s story and the political message of the film’s 
expressionism.  Rather than using expressive moments to challenge authority and 
univocal declarations, writes Kracauer, Caligari puts the force of expressionism into 
play precisely to make freedom look insane.  It is not a question of investigating the 
world for other possibilities, or even of Kracauer’s difficult realist response to the 
world that paradoxically lets the world in while penetrating it.  Rather, in this film, 
and the way we are meant to understand it, all the facets of the cinema are arranged 
to remove all doubt from our minds.  It becomes certain cinema, dictating our 
interpretations ahead of time.  Although Kracauer’s interpretation of Caligari denies 
the role of uncertainty in the film, it does open early considerations of the relation 
between cinema and ethics within film studies.
Later theorists, concerned primarily with film language and ideological or 
psychological theories of spectatorship, ignore much of what a post-
phenomenological ethics of the cinema argues.  In an interesting way such an ethics 
opens a discussion of the call of the cinema, of the fact that the cinema calls to 
spectators for a response.  It does not simply position spectators to identify with, gaze 
at, or fetishize the Seen.  As much as it may do this, it also hails or interpellates 
spectators as an interlocutor asks a question.  It asks spectators to respond, coming 
10 Kracauer 25.
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after the film, arriving late on the scene.  Seeing comes after cinema, in response to 
cinema.
Of course, spectators can and do make choices concerning the cinema.  
Regarding is between caring for and gazing at the cinema.  The cinema calls 
spectators to make sense of films while watching them.  It calls for epistemological 
certainty at times.  However, such epistemological certainty comes after the spectator 
is called to respond without knowing how or why to respond.  Epistemological 
certainty plays a secondary role to Seeing and responding.  Certain moments within 
films highlight this call, this hailing, this interlocution that constitutes a self 
responding to the other, but they are there from the start throughout cinema.
Such a discussion of the cinema is not unrelated to the social theories of 
Louis Althusser, especially interpellation.  In some basic ways, the ethical subject is 
interpellated into responsibility like the social subject.  According to Philip Rosen, 
within Althusserian social theories, “the human subject is a function of a social 
formation which assumes and thereby continually constructs it in practices, in 
institutions, and therefore through discourse, without which there cannot be social 
practices and institutions, as a universal category of ‘lived experience.’”11  Although 
there are vast conceptual differences between the call to respond and interpellation, 
they both work in a similar way to bring about a concept of responsibility in their 
subjects.  The radical difference is crucial, yet the comparison is telling.  On the one 
hand, interpellation works to create a subject who believes in the authority of the 
11 Philip Rosen, editor, Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology: A Film Theory Reader (New York: Columbia 
UP, 1986) 158.
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totalitarian state, or the authority of the individuated citizen of the neo-liberal state.  
Ideological apparatuses hail the subject into the false consciousness that he or she is 
responsible to such authority and must protect it at all costs.  On the other hand, the 
call to respond is an infinite, open call that can never be fulfilled.  The alterity of the 
other calls me toward the unique one before me and to the infinite giving for which 
one calls.  I am never more responsible toward the state, institutions, or myself.  
Rather, I become myself through this call.  In the end, they both call to their subjects.  
However, as much as interpellation reinvests us with a sense of authority by making 
us feel responsible for the state, our schools, or the success of ideology, post-
phenomenological ethics divests us of a belief in the final say of authority, especially 
in what appears to be our own authority.
Post-Phenomenological Ethics: Aesthetic Totality and Ethical Totality?
Emmanuel Levinas is highly suspicious of art.  He most often described it as 
objectifying and idolatrous.  In applying Levinas’s ideas to cinema, this study both 
extends his description of ethics and critiques his objection to visual art.  Levinas’s 
project has been to describe an ethics that precedes ontology and epistemology—to 
describe how ethics is possible without ethics being secondary to something else.  
Ethics is first philosophy.  His work from the late 1930s until his death in 1995 has 
been focused on the relation between the self and the other, and he has most often 
described ethics in terms of a responsibility that comes from the other person calling 
the self into question.  Referred to at times as “an Ethics of Ethics”12 Levinas’s 
12 Jacques Derrida, “Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas,” 
trans. Alan Bass, Writing and Difference (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1978) 111.
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project is not to establish a set of values and a moral compass.  He is not writing law 
or codes of conduct.  Rather, as Simon Critchley describes it, Levinas’s project seeks 
to delineate “the essence or meaning of the ethical in a way that disrupts traditional 
moral thinking and all claims to good conscience.”13  Ethics, in the Levinasian sense, 
is an opening toward the other (infinity) that calls the very construction of systems 
(totality) into question—while also being a grounding force in such procedural 
formulations.  His project is to describe how ethics (the unique relation of one person 
to another) calls general laws and codes of conduct into question.
Crudely, one path through Levinasian ethics runs as follows.  Levinasian 
ethics is an attempt to break with systems of thought founded in ontological 
categories and epistemological certainty that attempt to grasp the totality of being, 
reducing all difference to fit inside predetermined categories of sameness.  Levinas is 
a student of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology who questions the importance of 
intentionality while still testifying to the importance of that phenomenology.  Levinas 
agrees with Husserl that consciousness is consciousness of something, but asks what 
comes before that consciousness and how does it affect that consciousness?  Against 
the grain of comprehensive systems founded in consciousness, Levinas argues that 
the encounter with the other is an instant that can interrupt the totalizing violence in 
the system, opening a way for a “non-allergic relation”14 which overflows the 
predetermined compartmentalization and disturbs my being at rest within myself.  
The other calls for my response.  Thus, my very subjectivity is called into question as 
13 Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) 4.
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the other calls me to respond uniquely rather than categorically.  Being for the other 
exceeds being for oneself in responding to the other, as the call of the other interrupts 
the predetermined idea of the world constructed out of myself by bringing me “more 
than I can contain.”15
Relation is the key to knowledge and ethics.  As Susan Handelman explains 
it, knowledge, then, might not be thought of in reference to “a reflection of some 
essential independent substance” but “as always a relation to the other.”16
Handelman’s description here highlights the relational aspect of ethics over the 
systematic—blank template—mode of moral calculations and normative ethical 
systems.  For her, Levinas’s project “redefines ethics as the primary relation and 
binding to the other that precedes and conditions any epistemology.”17  Knowledge is 
not the basis for language.  Ethics is the basis for language.  Or, as Levinas describes 
ethics in terms of language, ethics is the interruption of the fixed articulation of the 
Said by Saying, what comes through from the other side of language, interrupts 
language, and is reabsorbed by language.
This is the more nuanced relation Levinas will draw out in his later work, 
such as in Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence, when he revisits the separation 
of totality from infinity and the relation between ethics and skepticism.  Near the end 
14 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP, 1969) 51.
15 Levinas, Totality 51.
16 Susan A. Handelman,  “The Torah of Criticism and the Criticism of Torah: Recuperating the 
Pedagogical Moment,” Interpreting Judaism in a Postmodern Age, ed. Steven Kepnes (New York: 
New York UP, 1996): 228.
17 Handelman 228.
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of Otherwise Than Being, he states that “Language is already skepticism,”18 when 
explaining the relationships between Saying and the Said and Reason and 
Skepticism.
The approach, or saying, is a relationship with what is not understood 
in the together, the out-of-the-series.  A subversion of essence, it 
overflows the theme it states, the “all together,” the “everything 
included” of the said.  Language is already skepticism.  Does not the 
coherent discourse, wholly absorbed in the said, owe its coherence to 
the State, which, violently excludes subversive discourse?  Coherence 
thus dissimulates a transcendence, a movement from the one to the 
other, a latent diachrony, uncertainty and a fine risk.19
Saying runs a fine risk.  It is a good risk, a subtle and nuanced risk.  It overflows, 
without holding to any metaphor of overflowing, the Said of ontological discourse.  
The State, the ultimate totalizing structure, allied with logic and a repression of the 
return of skepticism, stands in for all systems, for the economy of the same which 
must rule on the general and never on the specific and, thus, always fail ethically to 
respond to the uniqueness of the unique.  Yet, Saying remains and interrupts the Said 
while always immediately reabsorbed by the Said.  Saying calls to challenge the said 
as it makes the Said possible.  The unique case of the other person who calls me to 
respond calls the State into question by demanding, in a reversal of the standard 
mode of operations, that the universal answer to the unique.
18 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The 
Haugue: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981) 170.
15
Logic breaks down in the relationship between Saying and the Said as it does 
in the eternal couple of skepticism and its refutation.  Saying interrupts the Said and 
is, in turn, interrupted by the Said just as with philosophy and skepticism.  The 
skeptical is always refutable but still always returns and in returning shows the very 
diachrony in play.  According to Levinas, skepticism and its refutation cannot exist at 
the same time.  They refuse synchrony in the same way as do Saying and the Said.
Skepticism, at the dawn of philosophy, set forth and betrayed the 
diachrony of this very conveying and betraying.  To conceive the 
otherwise than being requires, perhaps, as much audacity as 
skepticism shows, when it does not hesitate to affirm the impossibility 
of statement while venturing to realize this impossibility by the very 
statement of this impossibility.20
The very synchrony of the logical is exposed, put under pressure, and released by the 
skeptical.  Skepticism, like Saying, calls philosophy into question.
For Levinas,
The periodic return of skepticism and of its refutation signify a 
temporality in which the instants refuse memory which recuperates 
and represents.  Skepticism, which traverses the rationality or logic of 
knowledge, is a refusal to synchronize the implicit affirmation 
contained in saying and the negation which this affirmation states in 
the said.
19 Levinas, Otherwise 170.
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Skepticism is a movement of radical doubt caught within itself.  In other words, its 
very existence is tied to its very impossibility in that to doubt radically is to doubt 
that one can doubt radically.  To proclaim that there is no truth is to proclaim at least 
one truth.  Skepticism must always be out of time with itself so that its own negation 
comes after it, founds it and confounds it, simultaneously, at different times.
Why does Levinas judge art unethical, though?  And how might ethics 
challenge Levinas’s own thoughts on the aesthetic?  How might this relationship 
between Saying and the Said, translate to responding to visual art: to Seeing and the 
Seen?  From very early on the Levinasian stance toward the visible and visual art in 
particular has been direct.  For Levinas, almost nothing (if anything) can redeem the 
image from its unethical nature.  The image is always immanent to my thought, as if 
it came from me only to return to me.  Its function, he argues in the early essay 
“Reality and Its Shadow,” is precisely to bring the infinite possibility of the relation 
between the self and the other into the finite, thematic system of the fixed, eternal 
present.  According to Levinas, “Every image is already a caricature.  But this 
caricature turns into something tragic.”21  The very creation of the aesthetic object is 
a freezing of time in that object.  All sculpture is locked into the instant.  The artist 
may very well breathe a certain life into his or her work of art, but that life is always 
only the life of an instant.  A permanent still life.  Still born.  “A statue realizes the 
paradox of an instant that endures without a future.”22
20 Levinas, Otherwise 7.
21 Emmanuel Levinas “Reality and Its Shadow,” trans. Alphonso Lingis, The Levinas Reader, ed. 
Seán Hand (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989) 138.
22 Levinas, “Reality” 138
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Within the life, or rather the death, of a statue, an instant endures 
infinitely: eternally Laocoon will be caught up in the grip of serpents; 
the Mona Lisa will smile eternally.  Eternally the future announced in 
the strained muscles of Laocoon will be unable to become present.  
Eternally, the smile of the Mona Lisa about to broaden will not 
broaden.23
The still life of art renders its subjects into objects, forever held in the in-between 
time of aesthetics that denies the ethical possibility.  Art is not between Saying and 
the Said, but trapped in-between, neither Saying nor the Said.  For Levinas, ethics is 
the temporal relation between the self and the other that opens toward infinite 
possibilities.  However,
Art brings about just this duration in the interval, in that sphere which 
a being is able to traverse, but in which its shadow is immobilized.  
The eternal duration of the interval in which a statue is immobilized 
differs radically from the eternity of a concept; it is the meanwhile 
never finished, still enduring—something inhuman and monstrous.24
Little could be left to question here.  Synchrony is at the heart of the work of art.  The 
temporal non-relation created by art is a monstrosity.  Levinas is in total opposition 
to the aesthetic totality and totally on the side of ethical infinity.
From his earliest writings in the 1940s, this has been the first and last word 
on aesthetics for Emmanuel Levinas.  For the most part, this has been his stance 
23 Levinas, “Reality” 138
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against the aesthetic.  I say “stance” here precisely to name the relationship Levinas 
maintains toward art.  Levinas does not respond to art in open terms; he confronts it.  
Levinas does not respond to the aesthetic.  He totalizes it.
The most obvious way to read Levinas’s interpretation of the aesthetic object 
and images is to place it within the context of his devout Orthodox Judaism and life-
long study of the Talmud.  In the simplest of terms, one might read the sentence from 
“Reality and Its Shadow” on the relationship between monotheism and iconoclasm 
and find the root of Levinas’s concerns.  “In a statue matter knows the death of idols.  
The proscription of images is truly the supreme command of monotheism, a doctrine 
that overcomes fate, that creation and revelation reverse.”25  Above all else, the 
ultimate commandment is found in the proscription of images.  Levinas’s stance is 
simply a religious rejection of idolatry.  That idolatry is seen as the most serious of 
sins is evident from even a passing reading of the foundation texts of Talmudic 
literature.
One could spend an eternity discussing the readings and rereadings 
throughout the literatures of all the religions of the book in order to come to some 
level of understanding the nuances of this proscription of images.  Between Jews, 
Christians, and Muslims of different ages and specific beliefs, the issues of idolatry 
and iconography have generated a vast amount of literature and debate.  Surprisingly, 
though, what we see in Levinas’s stance is a stoppage of these debates.  Rather than 
engaging in the full force of rigorous responses in regard to idolatry, Levinas falls 
24 Levinas, “Reality” 141
25 Levinas, “Reality” 141.
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within a tradition on one side alone.  Unlike so much of his work, dedicated to an 
infinite response to the other and toward the very pluralism at the heart of a difficult 
religion and ethics, his terms are absolutist here.  His own totality takes hold of the 
image he comprehends.  For Levinas the heart of Midrash and the rabbinic mode is a 
complex matter,
of designating being in its pluralism and in the relations which govern 
the terms of this plurality.  It concerns the various orders of the real in 
their coherence or in the ruptures which separate them.  It may even 
concern the diversity of human beings where each person constitutes a 
world.26
Yet, Levinas refuses to regard at least one facet of this world, the idol, in this 
pluralistic light.  “Idolatry consists in forgetting the fact that all these relative forces 
are due to Elohim in the originary meaning of the term.”27  Whatever the complex 
relation between Elohim and the universe, whatever pluralisms are at stake in this 
relationship between totality and infinity, there is no space for idolatry to move.  It 
stands always outside the system as a certain forgetting of the system itself.  
Aesthetics stands always outside ethics.
Interestingly, Levinas’s stance toward aesthetics mirrors his stance toward 
philosophy in his earliest writings.  There, for Levinas, ethics stands always outside 
philosophy.  At least, this is the concern Derrida raises in his response to Levinas’s 
earlier work, “Violence and Metaphysics.”  In this essay, Derrida charges Levinas 
26 Levinas, “Image” 155.
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with totalizing philosophy by placing philosophy inside Western tradition and ethics 
outside Western tradition.  Derrida asks how Levinas can claim to be writing against 
philosophy without still doing philosophy.  Although this debate between Derrida 
and Levinas is complex and challenges any simplification, it is at least possible to see 
a much-needed cautionary tale within Derrida’s essay.28  Derrida has always 
cautioned Levinas to see more to philosophy, to regard philosophy.  In a similar light, 
my study is as a cautionary tale against any easy stance against aesthetics.  I question 
Levinas’s ideas on art and ask how we might use those ideas to regard cinema.  I 
charge that, as Derrida charges he does with philosophy, Levinas totalizes art without 
responding to it.  Levinas pushes aesthetics outside ethics.  And, in the process, he 
fails to run the fine risk that constitutes the act of responding to art.  When it comes 
to art, Levinas has sped past a nuanced and good risk.
As much as the aesthetic always remains the ghost haunting Levinas’s ethics, 
the phenomena that continually challenges his post-phenomenology, Derrida’s 
Memoirs of the Blind shows just how much writing the aesthetic out of ethics is a 
drawing, or inscription, of the two together.
What guides the graphic point, the quill, pencil, or scalpel is the 
respectful observance of a commandment, the acknowledgement 
27 Levinas, “Image” 156.  Elohim is the name for God as Absolute, as Master of all the forces of 
divinity.
28 The most rigorous considerations of the relationship between Derrida and Levinas have been Simon 
Critchley’s The Ethics of Deconstruction, Very Little . . . Almost Nothing: Death, Philosophy, 
Literature, and Ethics—Politics—Subjectivity.
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before knowledge, the gratitude of the receiving before seeing, the 
blessing before the knowing.29
Before all else, the ethical has to do the eyes, with seeing and being caught between 
believing and not believing.  What guides visual art, Derrida shows us, is a response 
to a commandment that calls before knowing, prior to any response grounded in 
ontology or epistemology.  Art is uncertain in a way that reflects the uncertainty of 
ethics.
In Memoirs of the Blind and The Truth in Painting Derrida confronts art by 
way of a response to the Levinasian ejection of the aesthetic from the ethical.  Both 
texts see art as a response to the other, an engagement with otherness that commands 
a response, imposes a debt that cannot be repaid.  Never simply disagreeing with the 
Levinasian judgment and stance concerning aesthetics, Derrida rather shows how 
much the very parergon of the aesthetic functions with regard to the ergon of ethics.  
Derrida shows how aesthetics delimits ethics and makes ethics possible, how the 
aesthetic’s outside status has always been at the center of the ethical.
On page one of Memoirs of the Blind, Derrida reminds us of the (dis)juncture 
between skepticism and vision.
—But skepticism is precisely what I’ve been talking to you about: the 
difference between believing and seeing, between believing one sees 
[croire voir] and seeing between, catching a glimpse [entrevoir]—or 
not.  Before doubt ever becomes a system, skepsis has to do with the 
29 Jacques Derrida, Memoirs of the Blind: The Self-Portrait and Other Ruins, trans. Pascale-Anne 
Brault and Michael Naas (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1993) 29-30.
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eyes.  The word refers to a visual perception, to the observation, 
vigilance, and attention of the gaze [regard] during an examination.  
One is on the lookout, one reflects upon what one sees, reflects what 
one sees by delaying the moment of conclusion.  Keeping [gardant] 
the thing in sight, one keeps on looking at it [on la regarde].30
The role of skepticism in ethics is one of the key points of this book.  It closely 
follows how skepticism functions as a double gesture linking deconstruction and 
ethics as responses that conclude and suspend conclusions because they see 
conclusions linked to an uncertain future to come.  Levinas’s too quick dismissal of 
art fails to see how art both marks out the place of ethics and invokes the ethical 
through the skeptical, a concept always tied to the ethical in Levinas’s later thought.  
This gesture between art and ethics, between cinema and skepticism, is the post-
phenomenology of Derrida and Levinas in conversation.  In the broadest of terms, we 
can see two paths diverge from the phenomenology of Husserl.  One is taken up by 
Martin Heidegger.  The other by Levinas.  Derrida comes at the other end of those 
paths almost to reconnect them.  In the most important of ways, he asks Heidegger’s 
questions of Levinas and Levinas’s questions of Heidegger.  My project comes after 
to ask cinema’s questions of Derrida and Levinas.
Ethical Spectatorship
What links all the films in this study, and their three directors, is the call they 
place upon the spectator—one that is not identical to but does participate in the ethics 
of the call of the other person—to respond without fixing that response against a 
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future that is yet to come.  This study takes readers through three different cinema-
ethics encounters—the narrative ethics of alienation, the generic ethics of 
pornography, and the filmic ethics of the law—to show how ethics calls from across 
the cinema and not through only one aspect, genre, or address.
This study does not follow standard film studies divisions or categorizations.  
These films are not tied to one national or linguistic cinema, one historical period or 
movement.  They do not fall within an accepted generic or aesthetic category.  While 
I do use their directors’ names to categorize them, I do not argue that they are marked 
by their directors as examples of auteurist cinema.  They do not share ideological or
formalistic concerns.  In fact, the fact that they are so disparate (in traditional terms) 
is what links them as a small cross-section of cinema.  They are a sample of three 
non-conformist cinemas that highlight what I see as three key aspects of an ethics of 
the cinema.  They are neither inclusive not exhaustive, though.  They are connected, 
though, through a history that may tell us more about the rise of debates concerning 
ethics than anything else.  The primary films of this study originate in nations that 
reached a certain philosophical sophistication before being thrown into the darkness 
of totalitarian regime.  Totalitarian dictatorships lie behind all these films and open 
them even more to questions of the ethics of alienation, the ethics of pornography, 
and the ethics of law / justice.
Chapter Two, “Seeing the Ethics of Alienation in Levinas and Antonioni,” 
discusses the narrative ethics of alienation and absence in L’avventura, directed by 
Michelangelo Antonioni.  Heralded by many as the architect of film, for his 
30 Derrida, Memoirs 1.
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privileging the image over narrative, Antonioni is surprisingly connected to these 
thinkers by way of his insistence on positioning the filmic between the realms of the 
present and the absent.  The mystery of the main and missing character of Anna in 
L’avventura is a telling case.  Drawing upon the philosophical differences between 
Martin Heidegger and Levinas, the chapter compares and contrasts ontological and 
ethical readings of alienation in this film and the importance each philosophical 
position has for cinema.  In the end, this chapter argues against ontologically biased 
readings that consider the end of the film tragic.  Instead, the chapter locates a 
metaphor for cinematic representations of non-assimilative, non-totalizing ethical 
response in L’avventura’s final caress between the film’s two protagonists.
Pornography may be based on the most certain epistemology in cinema.  
However, Chapter Three, “On the Verge of the Pornographic,” discusses the ethics of 
the pornographic / non-pornographic oscillation in several films directed by Pedro 
Almodóvar to demonstrate how interdependent pornography and non-pornography 
remain. By subverting the seemingly steadfast divide between the pornographic and 
the non-pornographic, Almodóvar challenges generic separations and the cultural 
hierarchies that accompany them.  His context switching in reiterative techniques 
have opened instances for questioning the very foundations of generic (and social) 
divisions and classifications.  Using Derrida’s theory of tropes and their iterability 
and the relation between written iterability and filmic cinematicality, this chapter 
argues how easily pornographic and non-pornographic tropes move between the two 
genres, rendering borders between them uncertain.  This chapter then compares the 
relationship between the pornographic and the non-pornographic to the one between 
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skepticism and epistemology to show how pornography is more related to skepticism 
(and a related non-assimilating ethics) than we may have imagined.
Chapter Four, “Coda: Oshima Nagisa, Ethics, Justice, and the (Un)Frozen 
Face,” outlines the “total criticism” of the ethics of the law in the cinema of Oshima 
Nagisa and the particular use of the freeze frame at the end of Merry Christmas, Mr. 
Lawrence as an evocation of an ethics of the cinema that exposes the gaps of that 
total criticism.  Challenging structures of hierarchy, knowledge, and the law, 
Oshima’s films ask us to question the foundations of questioning and the traditions 
out of which we answer them.  From his earlier challenges to the sexual stasis of 
Japanese societal norms to his later pieces on militarism and legalistic investigations, 
he has made ample claims against the status quo of regimented decision-making 
processes.  The freeze frame, as a specific device in this film and in general, is the 
least discussed cinematic device, yet this chapter argues that it provides the most 
concrete example of how cinema teaches us about ethics and ethics, specifically 
Levinasian ethics and Derridean justice, teaches us about cinema by showing the 
non-totalizing possibility of ethics and cinema.
In the end, Seeing and the Seen concentrates on three specific instances of 
uncertainty in cinema to describe the relation between cinema and ethics.  However, 
its broadest claim is that these are not exhaustive instances but merely starting points 
toward a fuller examination of this relationship across a wider variety of cinema and 
a fuller survey of post-phenomenological ethics.  The Conclusion points the way to 
the stakes of this uncertain response to cinema.  Despite my choice of three high art 
auteurs at its center, I do not mean to exclude other possibilities from this study.  
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This project certainly could extend to Hollywood or independent productions in the
United States, to Bollywood or Hong Kong action films, to animated or documentary 
cinema.  In the end, such documentaries as Human Remains (dir. Jay Rosenblatt, 
1998) and Fahrenheit 9/11 (dir. Michael Moore, 2004) offer ever more specific calls 
for spectators, specific calls that ever sharpen the relation between post-
phenomenological ethics and cinema.
Regarding these films points not only toward their own oscillating instances, 
but also toward the larger realms of cinematic responsiveness.  These examples of 
undecidability and refused identifications open all of cinema to questions of the 
ethical, to responses that cannot rely upon assumed presences, graspable knowledge, 
or monocular apprehension, assimilation, division, or classification.
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Chapter Two:
Seeing the Ethics of Alienation in Levinas and Antonioni1
To see or not to see is the question.
—Michelangelo Antonioni
To be or not to be is exactly not the 
question.
—Emmanuel Levinas
Seeing the Adventure to Come
What can ethics teach us about cinema and cinema teach us about ethics?  
This chapter begins to answer this complex question by comparing and contrasting 
the ethics of Emmanuel Levinas and the cinema of Michelangelo Antonioni.  It 
concentrates on Antonioni’s 1960 film L’avventura—the film some have referred to 
as a “turning point” in “the search for a new cinematic language”—to illustrate the 
crisis Levinas describes in his discussions of the ethical aspects of existence.2  The 
goal here is to explore an example of the relation between ethics and cinema that 
does not rely upon first interpreting an aesthetic instance and then treating it 
according to that interpretation.  My own concerns for another way of approaching 
cinema began with this film, and with questions concerning the absence of Anna in 
1 A previous version of this chapter was presented as “Levinasian Investigations of Absence in 
Antonioni” at the Twenty-Second Annual Colloquium on Modern Literature and Film in 1997.
2 L’avventura was ravished by the audience upon its premiere at Cannes in 1960.  However, in the 
end, it was awarded a special jury prize at the event when Federico Fellini’s La dolce vita won the 
main prize, the Palme d’Or.  L’avventura was given a Special Prize by the jury, “for its remarkable 
contribution to the search for a new cinematic language.”
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this film.  What this chapter gets at is the call to respond before knowing how to 
respond, to regard Anna’s absence before understanding and categorizing it.
When Levinas writes about the ethics of alienated existence, he alludes to the 
drama of William Shakespeare, especially Hamlet and Macbeth, to illustrate how 
ontological or epistemological worldviews have failed to account for the complexity 
of human existence.3  Ontological and epistemological interpretations of these plays 
leave too many questions unanswered for Levinas.  Instead, he offers that there is a 
concern with ethics behind these plays that highlights more of what is at stake in 
them.  This chapter follows Levinas’s method of citing from aesthetic examples but 
moves from dramatic texts to the cinema to examine how the crisis of alienation at 
the heart of existence affects the relation between cinema and ethics.
As a general answer to the question of the relation between the ethical and the 
cinematic, this chapter argues that non-ethical (ontological and epistemological) 
answers to questions concerning cinema stop short of responding to the complexity 
of what they address.4  Non-ethical interpretations fail to respond to their targets 
precisely by turning them into targets of interpretation.  They return the difference of 
their targets to the same by making them correspond to pre-existing expectations, by 
altering them to correspond to a pre-existing expectation.  Simply put, non-ethical 
interpretations assimilate the alterity of their targets.  Ethical responses, by contrast, 
resist closing and assimilating the alterity of the other to the same by not returning 
3 See, for example, “Signature” from Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, trans. Seán Hand 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP, 1990) 291-295, where Levinas sketches the importance of 
literature for his work.  I will return to this consideration of Levinas’s use of Shakespeare in Chapter 
Four of this study, which considers the ethics of Oshima Nagisa’s cinema.
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the other to the confines of pre-existing expectations.  Ethical responses resist turning 
what they respond to into targets by resisting this return to the same.  They respond 
to the alterity of the other because at the same time as ethical responses answer to the 
call of the alterity of the other, ethical responses are themselves altered by responding 
to the call of the other.  Therefore, rather than laying an established, static rubric 
upon the cinema, as ontological or epistemological interpretations strive to do, 
ethical responses are themselves opened to unimagined possibilities by their 
encounter with the cinema.  According to Levinas, “Already of itself ethics is an 
‘optics.’”5  Traditionally, knowledge dictates action.  Understanding clears the way 
for activity, determines activity, by procuring a safe path for that activity to follow 
through subjugation, mastery.  Ethical response resists that subjugation and mastery 
by unclearing that path, by letting that path be uncleared, as it responds.  It risks a 
difficult freedom over a safe peace.  Ethics is already an optics because its Seeing is 
altered by what it sees.  Or, as Levinas states, “in unsaying the said.”6
In more visual terminology, ethics is an optics that is refocused by its 
encounter with what it regards.  Ethics regards cinema.7  Ontological and 
4 Initially, I oppose ethical responses and non-ethical interpretations.  However, as with all the 
pairings in this study, I later explore their necessary interconnectedness.
5 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP, 1969) 29.
6 Levinas, Totality 30.
7 In his Regarding Film: Criticism and Comment (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP, 2001), Stanley 
Kauffmann reminds us that “regard” has three meanings: (1) to look at attentively, observe closely, (2) 
to look upon or consider in a particular way, (3) to hold in esteem or respect.  Although Kauffmann 
makes only slight use of the full meaning of “regard” in this collection of his 1993-1998 movie 
reviews from The New Republic, I take his reminder seriously.  My use of “regard” comes from these 
three definitions and through the link between skepticism and regarding spelled out by Jacques 
Derrida in Memoirs of the Blind: The Self-Portrait and Other Ruins (trans. Pascale-Anne Brault 
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epistemological interpretations seek and find the Seen in their targets while ethical 
responses practice a more open-ended Seeing in response to their targets.  
Ontological and epistemological interpretations seek and find what they wanted to 
see in the first place, what they presupposed to be there in the first instance.  They 
return what they see to the same by limiting their interpretations to the Seen.  Ethical 
responses, similarly, begin by seeking the Seen, but then respond to the violence of 
their seeking by remaining open to Seeing what the Seen cannot encompass.  They 
resist resting with the Seen, the static interpretation that returns them to where they 
started, by asking after what the Seen does not see.  Seeing, as ethical response, 
opens to the tension between the Seen and the not Seen.  Seeing is the double vision 
between the Seen and the not Seen.
As a more specific answer to the question of the relation between the ethical 
and the cinematic, this chapter responds to the Existential questions of L’avventura
by seeing the dual possibilities of responding to this film in the light of Heideggerian 
and Levinasian responses to that Existentialism.  While it is possible (and necessary) 
to interpret Antonioni’s cinema in the light of a Heideggerian understanding of 
Existential crisis, it is also possible (and necessary) to see how ontological 
Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1993).  Here Derrida describes the duality inherent in “regarding,” 
especially in regarding art.  According to Derrida,
Before doubt ever becomes a system, skepsis has to do with the eyes.  The word refers to a 
visual perception, to the observation, vigilance, and attention of the gaze [regard] during an 
examination.  One is on the lookout, one reflects upon what one sees, reflects what one sees 
by delaying the moment of conclusion.  Keeping [gardant] the thing in sight, one keeps on 
looking at it [on la regarde].  The judgment depends on the hypothesis. (1)
Throughout Memoirs, Derrida demonstrates the relationship of delaying / judging between vision and
blindness, between reflecting on what one sees and reflecting what one sees, between what I have 
termed Seeing and the Seen.  He explains that the viewer must suspend her gaze when she judges just 
as the artist must look away from what she draws when drawing it (117).  Every Seen is an interruption 
of Seeing.  Every Seen is a moment of suspending Seeing, which suffers the tension of the Seen and 
the not Seen.
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interpretation fails in the light of a Levinasian response to that cinema.  While 
ontological and epistemological interpretations can answer presupposed questions 
about the cinema, they cannot respond to it.  This chapter shows how this response 
remains open to questions of the alienation of Anna and Claudia in L’avventura and 
how it resists conclusively centering either character so that the final moment of the 
film retains its complex display of character interaction.
Most critics of L’avventura interpret the film and investigate its display of the 
Existential crisis through the lens of what Fredric Jameson calls “Antonioni’s 
Heideggerian and metaphysical dimensions.”8  Some, like John Schliesser, overtly 
examine the film through this Heideggerian lens to explain its portrayal of freedom, 
self-assertion, and authenticity.  Others, such as William Arrowsmith, Pascal 
Bonitzer, Peter Brunette, Kevin Z. Moore, Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, and Gilberto 
Perez, also pursue these questions, although through less overt references to 
Heidegger’s ontological investigations of Existential crisis and his focus on the 
centrality of the death of the self.  The bulk of these readings argue that L’avventura
is the alienating story of an alienated world, filled with alienated characters, who end 
up just as alienated and unhappy at the finish as they were at the start because they 
fail to awaken to their authentic selves, even when confronted by the immanence of 
their own deaths.
Key interpretations of L’avventura and Antonioni’s subsequent films 
concentrate on the silence of the world portrayed, the lingering shots staged before 
8 Fredric Jameson, The Geopolitical Aesthetic: Cinema and Space in the World System (Bloomington:
Indiana UP, 1992) 20.
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the camera, and the alienated status of the characters inhabiting the films’ worlds.  
They examine the philosophical import of these films and concentrate on what 
Nowell-Smith refers to as their “moments of dead time in which the camera lingers 
somewhere while nothing appears to be happening, and [their concern] with the 
instability of feelings and relationships.”9  These interpretations connect these films 
and Existentialist thought.  As characters move through the universe of Antonioni’s 
films, they move through an environment they can never control.  They can react to 
these worlds, but they can never assert dominance over them.  They can and must 
learn to attend to each other, but never learn to do so fully.  Most of all, because 
these characters are thrown together in the world, to achieve a sense of self, they 
must “learn to live alone with the margin of freedom that is inescapably theirs and 
9 Nowell-Smith, L’avventura 57.
See, for example, Pascal Bonitzer’s comments in Seymour Chatman and Guido Fink, eds. 
L’avventura: Michelangelo Antonioni, Director, Rutgers Films in Print vol. 12 (News Brunswick: 
Rutgers UP, 1989).  According to Bonitzer, the empty space of the world of Antonioni’s films is 
crucial because it is not just empty space but, “that final point of being finally freed from negativity of 
intentions, of passions, of human existence” (218).  Non-authentic characters unthinkingly lost in 
crowds eventually free themselves from these crowds as they assert their authentic identities over the 
passions which entrap them in the crowd.
For additional comments on Bonitzer’s interpretations, as well as a different discussion of the 
importance of L’avventura as an Antonionian break from black and white filmmaking, see Gilles 
Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam 
(Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1997) 119-20.  Deleuze points here to the cinema’s long tradition of 
juxtaposing populated with unpopulated shots of a single space and Antonioni’s place in that tradition.  
For one comparison to Antonioni, he notes scenes from Josef von Sternberg’s Der blaue Engel (The 
Blue Angel, 1930).  In a different way, Deleuze’s section on “any-space-whatevers” is related to this 
study of Levinasian solitude because both thinkers allude to Henri Bergson and his conceptualizations 
of movement, the instant, and thinking time as time itself.  Levinas and Deleuze also cross paths in 
regard to what Deleuze calls the “fascinating idea . . . developed from Pascal to Kierkegaard: the 
alternative is not between terms but between the modes of existence of the one who chooses.”   See 
Delueze, pages 114-122.  For more on this concept of “any-space-whatevers,” their role as affection-
images which evoke an emotional response, and their relation to Antonioni see also Laura U. Marks, 
The Skin of the Film: Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment, and the Senses (Durham: Duke UP, 2000) 
and Gregory Flaxman, ed., The Brain is the Screen: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema
(Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2000).  To compare and contrast “the face” in the work of each 
would itself be a task of significant proportion, dealing as it would have to with Deleuze’s “face” I 
address and Levinas’s “face” that addresses me.
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theirs alone.”10  These interpretations, especially those of Nowell-Smith, Bonitzer, 
and Brunette, rigorously highlight important points to help spectators better 
understand the complexities of Antonioni’s cinema.  As powerful as these 
interpretations are, though, something has always remained to trouble these 
interpretations of the film.  Something in the film has always called for a response 
not founded in ontology or epistemology.  Even the best of these interpretations fail 
to respond to key moments in L’avventura and other Antonioni films precisely 
because the analyses come through a Heideggerian lens that fails to respond to the 
ethical dimensions displayed in the films.
Responding to alienation and what slips away from ontological discussions of 
L’avventura and related instances in Antonioni’s La Notte (1961), L’eclisse (1962) 
Blow Up (1966), Zabriskie Point (1970), and The Passenger (1975) means 
responding to a difficult hopefulness against the isolated unhappiness of alienation.  
Responding to this difficult hopefulness begins to answer the question: what can 
cinema teach ethics and ethics teach cinema?
Ontological Interpretations
Nowell-Smith aptly describes the draw of L’avventura when he writes that it
is a film whose self-presentation is quite modest.  It tells a simple 
story, with few flourishes and a minimum of authorial intrusion.  It 
does not seem to be setting out to do anything particularly original—
to question conventional morality, to subvert narrative, to erode the 
traditional concept of character or redefine the relationship of 
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character to landscape.  And yet it is a film which promotes reflection 
on all these things.11
L’avventura raises a large number of questions, precisely because it promotes 
reflecting on them rather than openly asking them.  He cautions that the intuition and 
skepticism of L’avventura and the rest of Antonioni’s cinema must be approached 
with care toward this modesty.  The film “makes no claims to know the 
unknowable,” but to go only as far as intuition can take spectators.12  He continues, 
“If it offers a statement it is a second-order one, a statement about the limits of what 
it is possible to say.  It speaks through silence.  It opens up a space for 
comprehension to enter, without saying (because it cannot) what that comprehension 
should be.”13  The most common understanding of the film, though, seems to need to 
assimilate the film and its prompting under established norms of cinematic 
experience, ignoring Nowell-Smith’s observation and denying the larger complexity 
of L’avventura as a turning point toward a new cinematic language.
The most common synopsis (interpretation) of the film is that L’avventura is 
the unadventurous adventure of a group of wealthy Romans on a four- or five-day 
sailing holiday around the Aeolian Islands.  When they stop at one island, the wholly 
disinterested Anna disappears—never to be found.  The others in the party, including 
10 Nowell-Smith, L’avventura 60.
11 Nowell-Smith, L’avventura 11-12.
12 Nowell-Smith, L’avventura 47.
13 47-50.  Although Nowell-Smith eventually also centers freedom and the individual in possession of 
that freedom in his readings of these films, he is careful to note how even that interpretation must be 
offered with some uncertainty.  As he states at the end of his study, L’avventura, “Most of all [these 
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Anna’s estranged lover Sandro and best friend Claudia, the only working-class 
member of the group, search the island in vain.  After most of the party agree to 
continue to their next stop and await word from the police, Sandro and Claudia 
decide to continue searching for Anna by following leads and rumors that have begun 
to surface.  While searching for Anna, Claudia and Sandro fall into a distracted affair 
that appears to mirror much of the estrangement Anna and Sandro shared.  In the end, 
all the party, except for Anna, reunites at a luxury hotel outside the Sicilian town of 
Taormina.  After unsuccessfully trying to fall asleep, Claudia leaves her hotel room 
in a panicked search for Sandro, whom she finds in the arms of another woman in the 
hotel lobby.  After running away from one another, Claudia and Sandro come 
together on a bench outside the hotel, realizing that this unhappy despair is the life to 
which they are doomed.
Almost all the critics argue that Anna disappears and that Claudia replaces 
her by the end of the film.  These critics see the process of replacement completed by 
the end of the film, when Claudia puts her hand on Sandro’s head in the final scene 
of the film, a gesture Anna does not make in a similar circumstance earlier on the 
island.  With their focus on the ontological interpretation of the film, they see this 
ending as the refusal of Claudia to heed the example of Anna and seize her freedom 
and authenticity by escaping the tethers of the crowd around her.  They argue that 
Claudia and Sandro relate along the same lines as did Anna and Sandro, and that, in 
the end, Claudia is trapped in her own Existential crisis.  Rather than recognizing the 
characters] learn to live alone with the margin of freedom that is inescapably theirs and theirs alone” 
(60).
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inevitability of her own death and the absurdity of her existence and seizing her own 
authenticity by freeing herself from responsibility, Claudia remains where we see her, 
trapped in the relation with Sandro, sacrificing her freedom so she can care for him.  
For the majority of critics, this is the ultimate warning of Antonioni’s cinema—if we 
fail to seek our own authenticity, we will sacrifice ourselves to the control of others 
around us.14
This is what Kevin Moore calls the “tragic ending” of L’avventura, where 
Claudia and Sandro reunite at the end of the film only to “retreat” into their former 
roles, surrounded by the “melancholia” of negative alienation.15  Moore’s thesis is 
precisely what this chapter challenges, not because Moore is inaccurate in what he 
argues, but because his argument is founded in an ontological understanding of 
alienation rather than an ethical response to it.  According to Moore,
Most critics would agree that alienation is the property of being which 
is the central aesthetic determiner of [Antonioni’s] presentations of 
modern life, although it is the negative or reclusive effects of this 
property that are more often than not cited as thematically significant 
14 William Arrowsmith describes this final situation as a warning from Antonioni and the key to 
understanding everything Antonioni shows us.  According to Arrowsmith in Antonioni: The Poet of 
Images, ed. and intro. Ted Perry (New York: Oxford UP, 1995),
In the mass world, Antonioni suggests, then, that individuality is fragile; 
incipient individuality…is difficult precisely because the world is organized to 
suppress individuality, to coerce each person back into the Game…to coerce those 
waking into individual life back into the ranks of the sleepers.  To play the Game is 
to live life in opposition to Reality and to avoid being an individual.  The group is 
powerful against the individual precisely because it is the group, because it can 
suggest that failure to conform to its norms is illness, neurosis, even madness.
I cannot stress the point too strongly.  There is no more persistent theme in 
Antonioni’s work than this intricate, culturally crucial diagnosis of the crisis of 
individual life. (33)
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to comprehending the ambiguities of his work.  To be alienated in an 
Antonioni film is to be resentfully situated in an overly industrialized, 
capital-intensive world that fails to provide a nurturing environment 
in which the emotions might flourish.16
Moore’s empiricist project questions how critics concentrate on the negative aspects 
of alienation and how alienation leads to the despair of character’s lives.  Linking the 
relation between characters in L’avventura and the later L’eclisse, Moore notes that 
the “adventure” of alienation begins in the tragedy of the earlier film and comes to its 
redemptive conclusion in the latter.  Unable to adjust to their real world circumstance 
in the first film, the characters eventually learn, through their alienation, to come to 
terms with their new selves by the latter film.  L’avventura starts the adventure which 
ends in L’eclisse.
Against the “tragic ending” of L’avventura, where Claudia and Sandro reunite 
only to “retreat” into their former roles, surrounded by the “melancholia” of negative 
alienation, Moore proposes the example of Vittoria and Piero at the end of L’eclisse.  
In the latter film, the characters disappear at the end of the film, recalling Anna’s 
disappearance from L’avventura, but in a different way.  Moore argues,
Vittoria’s disappearance, or alienation, from the familiar recalls 
Anna’s, and indeed Monica Vitti plays both Claudia, the woman who 
substitutes for Anna in Anna’s life, as well as Vittoria, who returns to 
15 Kevin Z. Moore, “Eclipsing the Commonplace: The Logic of Alienation in Antonioni’s Cinema,” 
Film Quarterly 48, No. 4 (1995) 30.
16 Moore 23.
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complete the quest as a victorious Anna, the woman who finds what 
she wants.17
The victorious character is the one who seizes her own authenticity, who comes to 
terms with her new self on the horizon of her own death.  According to Moore, 
Vittoria, following and improving upon Anna, “becomes a radical individual” 
because she refuses the crowd and sets off on her own path, for herself.18
Alienation has a positive effect, according to Moore, because alienation as 
negation functions as an “event promoting aesthetic progress in the face of novel 
experience.”19  Antonioni’s films show the transformative power of alienation to 
bring his characters closer to recognizing and registering the changes the world has 
brought about for them.  Negative alienation, what most critics have interpreted 
Antonioni’s films to show, leads to “individuality and contemplative isolation.”20
Positive alienation, the interpretation Moore asserts, leads to “correspondence and 
community.”21  Realizing their disjuncture with outdated modes of existing, through 
positive alienation, some characters are redeemed by refusing the outdated and by 
“keeping in touch with the nebulous, obscure, and actual character of reality which is 
the source of our historical novelty and renewal.”22  The new self escapes 







realization of what that alienation offers for the self, a more authentic being in 
community of correspondence.
This correspondence and community, though, is the most dangerous instance 
of totalization, of false response, according to Levinas.  It is most dangerous because 
it is the interpretation that most closely resembles a response on the surface yet fails 
because it returns the ethical relationship to a relationship with an outside term.  This 
emphasis on correspondence conquers the ethical relationship precisely because it 
makes the self and the other secondary to another term.  Such “correspondence and 
community” founded in a shared worldview or goal is precisely what L’avventura
shows leads to further alienation without response.
Being open to the other does not mean the self and the other co-exist.  In fact, 
they cannot.  The appearance that they do co-exist is the false community.  The fact 
that they do not co-exist is what allows for ethics to come into play because the 
difference between the self and the other is what makes ethics possible.  This 
difference between them is precisely what Levinas argues opens the self to the call of 
the other, the fact that the time and space between the self and the other creates in the 
self an obligation to respond to the other.
In a 1982 interview, Levinas stresses the importance of difference for ethics 
and the false connection of correspondence for ontology:
In Heidegger, the ethical relation, the Miteinandersein, the being-with-
another-person, is only one moment of our presence in the world.  It 
does not have the central place.  Mit is always being next to . . . it is 
22 Moore 29.
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not in the first instance the Face, it is zusammernsein [being-together], 
perhaps zusammenmarschieren [marching-together].23
Pointedly here, Levinas breaks with making ontology primary in two ways.  
First, he spells out his ethical and temporal separation from Heidegger.  Since 
Levinas will always talk about the relation with the other as one of being after or 
being-for-the-other, he rejects the “being with” that Heidegger posits as the first 
instance of existence which must be overcome.  For Levinas, the self and the other 
are never together.  They cannot co-exist.  Therefore, the first instance of being, mit
(with) with its denotation of reciprocity, which Heidegger proposes as a crisis to 
overcome, simply never occurs.  “Being with” is an existential impossibility for 
Levinas.  Beings are for themselves (sometimes in the guise of being for an outside 
term which returns them to themselves) or for the other.  Secondly, Levinas also 
spells out the ultimate consequence of this crucial separation.  Concerned as he is for 
responding to the links between philosophy and genocide, Levinas connects 
Heidegger’s martial metaphor of troops “marching” with what he sees as the 
inevitable outcome of ontological philosophy.  Levinas links the sound of soldiers 
marching with the oppressive rumble of being, both on a metaphorical and real-world 
level.  Because of this link, he cannot locate the consolation in mit that Heidegger 
does.  For Levinas, the first connection is always the ethical connection.  This 
connection without correspondence, without co-existence (and without the fascist 
23 Emmanuel Levinas, Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other, trans. Michael B. Smith and Barbara 
Harshav (New York: Columbia UP, 1998) 116.
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overtones), is what interrupts our anonymous existence and, therefore, is better than 
being.
A Levinasian Lens
L’avventura certainly establishes a world in Existential crisis.  Yet, it does not 
limit itself to displaying only one side of that crisis or one way of reacting to that 
crisis.  Characters are alienated from one another in crowds, in response to their 
surroundings, and in their inability to let nature be around them.  However, at the 
same time as the film displays this more Heideggerian understanding of the 
Existential crisis calling for characters to strive for their authentic being, it also 
displays a world in which solitude and further isolation do not lead to a way out of 
this crisis.  It does not stop at the level of critique, though.  While L’avventura
displays how this quest for authenticity fails, it also displays an alternative route that 
more fully responds to the alienation of Existential crisis.  At the same time as the 
film critiques this Heideggerian reaction to alienation, it also asks spectators to 
consider more carefully a Levinasian response to alienation.  Seeing L’avventura
through a Levinasian lens means seeing both paths and resisting centering either.
Anna and Claudia are characters who are thrown into similar circumstances, 
but who react to those circumstances in different ways.  In the final moments of 
L’avventura, the film asks spectators to see the full weight of Claudia’s open 
response to Sandro as an ethical response to the alienation of the situation.  The film 
juxtaposes this open response and its effect upon Claudia and Sandro with Anna’s 
earlier alienation and isolation.
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Schematically, the story of L’avventura as the story of Anna and Claudia can 
be sketched out as follows:
Opening of the film Close of the film
Anna is alienated on the yacht Anna disappears and
Traces of Anna haunt the film
The display of Anna The non-display of Anna
The display of Claudia
Claudia is 
alienated
in the hotel Claudia 
responds to 
Sandro
The full significance of these two story lines becomes clearer when spectators 
maintain the integrity of each one, when we see Anna’s role through the whole film.  
Spectators can more fully see the ethical in the film if they attend to the traces of 
Anna that continue to haunt the film and refuse to relinquish their place in it, and 
consider Claudia’s story alongside those traces.  In this light, Anna’s story is the 
cautionary tale, and Claudia’s is the detailed examination of that cautionary tale.24
L’avventura begins with Anna’s alienation and Existential crisis almost 
overwhelming her, and emphasizes her distress and final reaction to this alienation 
on board the yacht and on the island, just before she disappears from the film.  
24 In light of this cautionary tale concerning existence, it is also possible to read a secondary 
cautionary tale in regard to the film.  As much as we might simply like Claudia and dislike Anna from 
the start, we must remember that we do not meet them on equal footing.  Anna is already at the edge of 
the abyss and about to return to herself when we first meet her.  Claudia is far behind her and the 
abyss.  We only see Claudia closer to the abyss by the end of the film, and only for a few moments, 
before she turns away from the abyss.
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Spectators meet her at the opening of the film, when she disagreeably departs from 
her father to join the others on the late-summer holiday.  She leaves with Claudia to 
meet Sandro at his apartment and then proceed to the boat.  Anna and Sandro hardly 
speak to one another when they meet after having been apart for a month.  Instead, 
they ignore Claudia—who walks across the street to wait for them—and have sex.  
Afterwards, the three of them must rush to the dock to meet the boat in time.
The next morning everyone slowly awakens on the yacht, and spectators are 
introduced to the other couples onboard.  Except for Claudia, who is not in a 
romantic coupling, no one seems happy, and most of their time is spent trying to 
distract themselves from their boredom.  They flirt, argue, complain, and pontificate 
at one another.  Suddenly, near one island, the idea to go swimming strikes them, and 
Anna jumps in while everyone else is still debating whether or not it is a good idea.  
They stop the yacht and most of the other characters dive in after her while Corrado 
rows to the island in an inflatable dinghy.
Just as suddenly as she dived into the water, Anna begins to scream about an 
approaching shark.  Everyone else panics, hollers advice at her, or swims to her aid.  
All the swimmers return to the yacht, and Anna and Claudia go below deck to change 
out of their bathing suits.  There, Anna offers Claudia one of her shirts, but Claudia 
declines to accept it.  Anna begins to giggle and laugh.  Then, she tells Claudia that 
there never was a shark in the water.  Anna says she made it up.  After Claudia 
changes clothes and leaves, Anna slips the shirt into Claudia’s bag.
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Everyone disembarks onto the volcanic island, where some scout ancient 
ruins or sunbathe while Anna and Sandro walk to an isolated ledge to discuss their 
relationship and planned marriage.  It is here that Anna comes to the edge of the 
abyss of her Existential crisis.  It is here that spectators see her for the last time.
The discussion with Sandro is marked by Anna’s desire to talk, to be heard 
and understood, and by her desire to be alone.  The discussion, emblematic of Anna’s
situation, takes place on a ledge overhanging the sea and is composed primarily of 
medium and close-up shots or medium two-shots.  In these two-shots on the edge the 
characters barely make eye contact and more often look away from one another.  
They argue about the meaninglessness of their relationship and their impending 
marriage.  They speak but do not listen.  They stand at a distance, play with stones on 
the rocks, or stare out to sea or at the cliffs overhead.  They do not touch, at least not 
beyond Sandro’s fondling, clutching, and groping.  Anna does not touch Sandro.  
Near the end of the scene, two others from the party climb over some rocks in the 
background, without Anna and Sandro noticing them.  Eventually, Sandro lies down 
and falls asleep.  The scene dissolves, with Anna’s head disappearing more quickly 
than Sandro’s body, to a shot of the cliffs meeting the sea.  No one sees what 
happens to Anna.
This sequence displays Anna’s alienation and her desire to be alone.  As she 
says to Sandro on the cliffs, “I’d like to be by myself for a while.”  When he asks 
how long, she says days, two months, three years might not be enough.  From the 
moment she departs her house at the start of the film, Anna is on a quest to be alone, 
to escape from the crowd that puts demands on her.  She leaves her father, despite his 
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implication that he would like her to stay and keep him company.  She avoids eye 
contact with Sandro when they are in bed together.  She pulls away when he tries to 
lean on her on board the yacht.  Then, she tries to swim away from everyone and 
pushes Sandro away when he attempts to rescue her from the shark.  She asks 
everyone except Claudia to leave her alone when they are changing clothes, and is 
barely able to say a word even to her best friend after everyone else leaves the cabin.  
Finally, on the island she directly asks Sandro to let her be alone.  Anna is not 
physically cut off from all the others, as Claudia is in the later hotel scene, but she is 
already alienated from them and quickly isolating herself from them.
Two moments within this sequence appear to run counter to her desire to 
isolate herself, though.  When Anna attempts to give Claudia a shirt and when Anna 
tells Sandro they need to talk, she seems to be making contact and resisting her 
isolation.  However, although they do appear on the surface to counter her desire for 
further isolation, in the end, these two scenes show how far from responding she has 
already become.  When Anna tries to give Claudia the shirt, it is not as if she is 
sharing it or even giving it as a gift.  Rather, Anna’s facial expression and gestures in 
this instant make it plain that Anna is trying to disappear, trying to give herself away 
by giving remnants of herself away.  As well, when she tells Sandro they should 
discuss their relationship, she is not opening a conversation to hear what he is 
thinking or even to help him.  She tells him that she wants to end their relationship.  
Her statement that they should talk is a declaration and a way to begin disappearing 
from him and the others.
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From the start, she antagonistically interacts with others in what seems to be 
an attempt to shock herself out of her alienation.  When she meets with Sandro, she 
immediately has sex with him, ignoring Claudia, who is left to close the door to 
Sandro’s apartment.  She seems finally to express some tenderness toward Sandro 
when she tells him to sunbathe on the boat, but even then her suggestion becomes 
more an order—one that guarantees less interaction between them.  Then, without 
waiting for anyone to join her, she dives into the water and swims away from the 
boat.  She begins to scream about the shark attacking her in what seems more an 
invocation of the shark attack.  It is as if she were hoping for a shark attack at that 
moment so that she will be killed or so that others will stay out of the water and away 
from her.  She then tries to shock Claudia when she tells her about the shark.  Finally, 
she talks with Sandro until she realizes none of these tactics is addressing her 
isolation.  Her only recourse seems to be for her to turn completely away from the 
others and fully into herself, to strive toward her authentic self.
In many ways, Anna’s story in L’avventura is also the story of the alienation 
Claudia suffers.  However, after Anna disappears, L’avventura shows the 
consequences of Anna’s disappearance and more closely examines Claudia’s 
suffering as she nears the abyss Anna crossed over earlier.  The display of Claudia’s 
story up to the abyss not only parallels Anna’s, though; it also delves into more detail 
about the Existential crisis underlying the story.  Claudia’s story is Anna’s story seen 
under a magnifying glass.
Near the end of L’avventura, there is a sequence that begins in Claudia’s 
room at the luxury hotel, where she is unable to sleep, and ends just before Claudia 
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discovers Sandro on a couch with another woman, Gloria Perkins.25  This display of 
Claudia connects with the display of Anna before she disappears because both 
sequences display a cinematic illustration of the Levinasian perspective toward the 
Existential crisis.  Most of all, this sequence involving Claudia best illustrates the 
Levinasian perspective toward being which he calls the “horror and panic” of the 
anonymous existence of “il y a”—the “horror and panic” of the existence without 
existent of “there is.”  Because of this, the sequence repeats much of what happens 
with Anna but explores the crisis of alienation as it works below the surface, bringing 
much of what’s below the surface to the screen.
The sequence in the hotel is particularly marked by its silence, a silence made 
even more noticeable by the echo that marks it against the muted background music, 
a silence that becomes almost audible as a rumbling.  In many ways, this emphasis on 
silence is a prominent example of the new cinematic language critics claim 
L’avventura inaugurated.  The silence highlights the cinematic “dead time” Nowell-
Smith mentions and Peter Brunette explains, “massively slows things down and 
makes the viewer attend to the resonance of visual and aural details that are usually 
lost in the sweep of the narrative.”26  The world of the film is emptied, except for the 
rumbling and the echo of footsteps and doors opening and closing in the hotel 
hallway.  This is the empty space of the film, the space where freedom is supposed to 
25 For another version of a similar hotel, consider L’année dernière à Marienbad, (dir. Alain Resnais, 
1961), which considers many of the same themes as L’avventura but from an almost opposite position 
as the focus is on characters who almost create the truth of themselves by narrating that truth.  They 
tell themselves into existence.  The characters in L’avventura speak less as the story progresses.  They 
do not narrate the truth of their existence but quietly become absorbed into the background, until the 
final moment when a gesture (not words) brings the two characters together at the end.
26 Brunette 29.
48
flourish as characters come to an awakening or authenticity apart from the noise of 
the crowd.  This silence, however, is also the field that the echo haunts.  The echo, 
the ultimate sound of a voice which returns to itself, to the economy of the same, 
comes to dominate the film and signals the threat of anonymous, alienated existence 
which pervades the film.  With each step Claudia takes down the hall, the sound of 
her footfalls returns to her.  At the same time as this space appears to open to freeing 
characters, this echo reminds spectators of the coercive return of the same inherent in 
the attempt to exit the Existential crisis.  The self becoming more free or more 
separate from the crowd only returns to the self like an echo returning down the 
emptied hall.
Claudia cannot fall asleep, so she passes the time walking the room, sitting at 
a desk, writing numbers on a magazine page while counting the seconds aloud, and 
staring into the distance from her window balconies as a train is heard somewhere off 
screen.  Time accumulates.  Isolation leads to further isolation.  With each 
accumulated second, Claudia’s Existential crisis grows more intense.  Visually, the 
space is emptied of people, but the soundtrack hints continuously of the outside 
world and people from whom she is separated.  Calls from the outside repeatedly 
prick at the silent rumbling of her existence, but she does not respond to them.
Then, Claudia leaves her room and runs down a long, silent hallway; her 
footsteps and their echoes are the only sounds.  Reaching Patrizia’s room, she asks 
after Sandro, but no one has seen him.  To no avail, Claudia tries to explain her fear 
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and uncertainty to Patrizia.  However, Patrizia is also alone and can only think of 
herself; therefore, she accuses Claudia of acting “melodramatic.”
Finding no response to her situation and failing to respond to anyone else’s, 
Claudia returns to her self and runs back down the silent hallway to search several of 
the hotel’s open areas.  After looking through a lobby, a bar, and a dining room, 
Claudia discovers Sandro with another woman.  Shocked and unable to speak, 
Claudia runs from the room, making unintelligible sounds.27  This is the point in the 
film where Claudia most closely approaches Anna’s situation.  At this point in the 
hotel, Claudia faces the same alienation as Anna did after the discussion with Sandro 
on the island.  At this moment, Claudia returns to herself as Anna did earlier, and 
like the echo, Claudia returns only to her self.  At the end of the scene, Claudia 
returns to the solitude, to return, like the echo, to the self, like Anna on the island.  
From the Levinasian perspective, she returns to the search for epistemological 
certainty or ontological certainty.  She seeks to uncover the reason for her dissipated 
relationship with Sandro.  She seeks to extricate herself from the crowd of the world 
in search for a more authentic being in solitude, a solitude that can lead to her escape 
from the limits of society.
27 L’avventura refers here as well to Claudia’s anonymous existence in that her solitude impedes her 
ability to speak precisely because it impedes her ability to relate.  Levinas asserts, “Ethics occurs. . . 
across the hiatus of dialogue, not in the content of discourse, in the continuities or discontinuities of 
what is said, but in the demand for response” (Ethics and Infinity, 12).  Ethics founds discourse, makes 
it possible by acknowledging the remainders in dialogue which make dialogue possible.  Ethics is not 
the present meaning of the content, but the very pauses and remainders in conversation which make it 
possible and, eventually, intelligible.  Levinas is arguing here that dialogue signifies ethically here in 
the spaces between words, phrases, sentences, and statements, rather than in those words, phrases, 
sentences, and statements themselves.  This is the formula he will develop further in his later work on 
the relation between Saying and the Said, the interdependent relationship between the words and the 
pauses between them which signify ethically.
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This solitude, in Levinasian terms though, cannot lead to an escape.  It can 
only lead to a fuller alienation, as the non-display of Anna (or the display of the 
traces of Anna) reminds spectators of the film.  Anna may have fled, but the traces 
she leaves behind show that she has not escaped.  As Robert John Scheffler Manning 
explains, 
For Levinas, the self does not initially find in Being 
potentialities for itself either to actualize or to escape from.  
What the self finds in Being, according to Levinas, is its 
weight, the heaviness of Being that weighs upon the self and 
enchains the self to itself.28
Like the time accumulating on the page where Claudia writes the numbers and the 
waves of the echoes reverberating in the hallway, Claudia’s existence weighs upon 
her despite her attempt to run from the scene to escape her existence.  This escape is 
no escape without the force of responding to the call of the other to interrupt 
Claudia’s isolation.
Levinas argues that because being is a solitude and is not a gift but a burden, 
ontological thinking can only reach as far as this solitude but not respond beyond the 
self.  Because the death of the self is its focus, ontological thought cannot exceed the 
self.  This experience of existence as an inescapable solitude is what Levinas calls 
the experience of the “il y a”—the anonymous existence of “there is”—that is horror 
and panic rather than a gift.
28 Robert John Scheffler Manning, Interpreting Otherwise Than Heidegger: Emmanuel Levinas’s 
Ethics as First Philosophy, (Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP, 1993) 31.
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Levinas rejects Heidegger’s notion of the generosity of being which can be 
found in the German “es gibt” (“geben” means “to give”).  Levinas finds existence to 
be a horror and a panic rather than a gift.  For Levinas, the fact that the French “il y 
a” is not rooted in “giving” makes the “il y a,” a more appropriate description of 
existence.29  Levinas rejects what he sees as the German Idealism of Heidegger’s 
interpretation, condemning that Idealism’s failures with regards to both World War II 
and the Holocaust—a condemnation Antonioni might also share, considering 
Fascism’s destructive effect on Italy during World War II.30  Existence for Levinas is 
not generous but, rather, like an echo, “a noise returning after every negation of this 
noise.  Neither nothingness nor being.”31  For Levinas, “there is neither joy nor 
abundance” but, rather, “horror and panic” in anonymous existence.32  There is 
horror and panic over being and not anxiety over nothingness.  This horror and panic 
is “the impersonality of the ‘there is.’”  It is the fact that existence is impersonal, that 
it is an existence without existent.  The “there is” of existence, like the echo in the 
hallway or the non-display of Anna, is the “silent rumbling” of existence which 
29 For extended studies of the “Il y a” in Levinasian and other contemporary thought, see Jill Robbins, 
Altered Interpretation: Levinas and Literature (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1999), especially pages 91-
116 and Simon Critchley, Very Little . . . Almost Nothing: Death, Philosophy, Literature (London: 
Routledge, 1997), pages 31-83.  For Robbins and Critchley the question driving their investigations 
circulates around the very “ethico-metaphysical consequences” (Critchley 81) of radical alterity.  In 
these studies, the question over the good/bad, high/low dichotomies so crucial to Levinas remains 
central as both thinkers propose speculating after what this non-hierarchical Levinas might look like.
30 For a recent publication in English of one of Levinas’s statements linking National Socialism with 
Liberal Idealism, see his “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism.”  Originally published in Esprit
in 1934, the article was translated by Seán Hand and appeared in the 1990 issue of Critical Inquiry, 17 
(Autumn 1990).
31 Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations With Philippe Nemo, trans. Richard A. 
Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP, 1985) 48.
32 Levinas, Ethics 48-49.
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continually returns and which will not allow an exit.33  Responding to the call of the 
other interrupts alienation and anonymous existence.  Without responding to the call 
of the other, Claudia can only exist anonymously.  She can only become more 
isolated, more like Anna, because she refuses to be for-the-other in this scene.
According to Levinas, existence is a solitude precisely because the breakup of 
being into beings is what makes our experience of existence possible.  This is 
precisely why beings cannot co-exist and why, from the start, a community of 
correspondence is an ethical impossibility.34  Beings come into being through 
ruptures in being.  Or, more accurately, Beings are the ruptures in being.  The things 
that exist are not separate from existence.  There is not existence (like a billiards 
table) and then things that exist (like the billiards balls).  The things that exist are the 
folds or breaks within existence (like the pockets in the table).  The pockets in a 
billiards table are cut from the table itself.  Beings are not separate from being.  
Therefore, beings are, by definition, separated from one another because they are 
ruptures in being.  They cannot co-exist in space and time.  The mere presence of 
other beings, no matter how overwhelming, the very over-population of the planet, 
does not interrupt our solitude.  As Stone puts it, “Each conscious being is first alone, 
existing in solitude.  That so many other beings are also alone does not alter the 
33 Levinas, Ethics 48.
34 Such a community is possible and politically potent, of course, but not ethical.  Such a political 
community must be called to account to questions of ethics.  This is a major point for Levinas in such 
places as his essay “Politics After!” from In the Time of the Nations, trans. Michael B. Smith 
(Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1994).  The arrival of politics after ethics parallels Levinas’s argument that 
the self always arrives after the other.  Because the self and other do not co-exist, the other cannot 
become dictatorial or even coercive, along the lines of the Heideggerian mit.  
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solitude of each.”35  In Levinas’s words, “I touch an object, I see the other.  But I am
not the other.  I am all alone. . . .  One can exchange everything between beings 
except existing.  In this sense, to be is to be isolated by existing.”36  As spectators can 
hear and see, Claudia is alone in the visual and aural realms of the frame in this 
scene.
Claudia is alone in her room despite the noise outside.  She is alone because 
the door is closed and no one else is in the room with her.  This is not the solitude of 
existence, though.  Claudia is isolated because she exists.  Claudia is not isolated 
because she is alone in the room but because she exists separate from other human 
beings.  She cannot share the exact time and space of another person.  She may touch 
someone else or see someone else, but she cannot be someone else.  This is the 
solitude of existence.  Even in a crowd, she would be isolated, just as spectators see 
Anna throughout the first third of the film, and just as we see Claudia when she is 
threatened by the men in the town square in Noto.  Being surrounded is not 
necessarily being for anyone else.  Claudia is alone in her room and alone in her self.  
A change in Claudia’s being is necessary, not simply a change in location in the 
hotel.  She would remain isolated even in the full lobby of the hotel.  She remains 
alone when she encounters Sandro and Gloria and returns to her isolation down the 
hallway.  This is what, in a slightly different context, Levinas calls, “the tragedy of 
solitude,” the self “riveted to itself.”37
35 Stone 10.
36 Levinas, Time 42.
37 Levinas, Time 57.
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In the crowd or alone, a person remains isolated as long as she remains with 
or next to the other person in a situation of reciprocally being with one another.  This 
is the false community of being-with, the false community focused on the outside 
correspondence.  She cannot see the other and respond to the call of the other if she is 
standing side-by-side, marching straight ahead precisely because this correspondence 
is “an association of side by side, around something, around a common term and, 
more precisely, for Heidegger, around the truth.”38  The intermediary term, such as 
the truth, the Volk, or the commune, would interfere with responding to the other 
person because, rather than responding to that uniquely other person, both people 
would be trapped responding only to that intermediary term or else the community 
would break down.
Facing the other person and responding to the call of the other—not “with” 
the other but “for” the other—would interrupt Claudia’s anonymous being and 
interrupt her solitude.  In rough and almost Lacanian terms, it is as if turning toward 
the face of the other is what precisely gives a face to the being who turns.39  Turning 
toward the other, responding to the call of the other, is what puts a face on 
anonymous being.  This response, argues Levinas, would interrupt Claudia’s 
38 Levinas, Time 41.
39 As Simon Critchley argues, there is nothing to prevent us from seeing the formal connection 
between Levinasian and Lacanian ethics.  Both thinkers structure their ethics around an encounter with 
an other who defies my understanding while demanding my response.  However, Critchley warns, this 
shared structure has significantly different objects and outcomes.  He cautions against equating what 
they most seem to share—an ethics formed in relation to a desire for the other by reminding us of the 
differences between Levinas’s metaphysical desire and Lacan’s (Freudian) sexual desire.  (“Das Ding: 
Lacan and Levinas,” Research in Phenomenology, 1998, Vol. 28, 72-90.)  Furthermore, because the 
other does not order me to respond but calls me to respond, to be-for and not to follow along with, any 
analogy between these desires fails to take the full weight of Levinas’s disagreement with Heidegger 
into account.
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isolation and call her into being-for-another rather than being isolated in the horror 
and panic of existence, of alienated existence concerned only for its own being-
toward-death.
Perhaps the most incriminating instance of correspondence or mit (being 
with) in L’avventura takes place when Claudia and Anna are changing clothes on 
board the yacht.  Side-by-side in the act of changing, with their backs toward 
spectators, the two women change from their swimsuits.  Despite repeated attempts 
by these friends to talk with one another, no conversation ensues.  They start and stop 
questions; they stammer through explanations; they fail to respond to one another 
despite their spatial and assumed emotional proximity.  There is even a moment 
when Anna reaches toward Claudia, as if to caress her, to open toward Claudia, but 
Anna reaches out in a halting gesture and withdraws her hand at the last instant.  
Anna does not touch Claudia.  She returns to herself, sitting alone for a moment after 
Claudia leaves the cabin.
From a Levinasian perspective, spectators see both Anna and Claudia in their 
Existential crisis here.  And, we see their paths running parallel after Anna 
disappears from the screen.  At the same time as spectators see Claudia’s experience 
of anonymous existence, we experience the traces of Anna’s experience.  Anna’s 
disappearance from the screen allows for the film to depict, through non-display, the 
first instance of her existence, the anonymous existence of the “il y a” for the other 
characters and the spectators of the film to experience.  Through this non-display, 
L’avventura challenges cinematic expectations by emphasizing the active role of 
what is absent and yet able to affect the story more than what is present.  The traces 
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of Anna signal the anonymous existence in which all the characters exist.  These 
traces are the display of the isolation any of the characters could fall into, should they 
fall into the quest for authentic being.
The display of Claudia and the non-display of Anna allow the film to show 
the outward appearance of the world of anonymous existence within the Existential 
crisis and the anonymous existence that lies behind it.  Against so many traditional 
interpretations of L’avventura, Claudia does not replace Anna.  She cannot.  Anna 
still exists, even if she has died.  This is the most difficult uncertainty to leave 
unanswered in the world of this film.  The film repeatedly calls on characters and 
spectators to guess at Anna’s situation.  Nevertheless, whatever Anna has done or 
whatever has happened to Anna, no one can tell.  Yet, she cannot fail to exist in this 
Umwelt.  The traces she has left behind are the motivating factor behind the 
remainder of the film because the search for her drives the film forward, even if only 
tangentially.  As much as Anna would remove herself from the crowd to strive for a 
more authentic existence, she cannot escape her anonymous existence.  Her 
anonymous existence remains because authenticity cannot overcome anonymous 
existence, as the traces Anna leaves behind signal through the remainder of the film.  
Claudia does not replace Anna because Anna disappears, but Anna’s traces remain to 
signal her first, anonymous existence that remains.
The Noise of Absence
The crisis of anonymous existence and alienation Anna and Claudia 
experience is represented, in part, by the sequence on board the boat and island and 
then again by the sequence in the hotel.  L’avventura shows the two women in 
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parallel situations.  It also shows how they react differently to those situations.  On 
the one hand, Anna argues at the beginning of the film that she wants to get away.  
More time away from Sandro, her father, her circle of acquaintances, and the 
encroaching world would allow her to achieve her authentic self.  She pursues the 
Heideggerian route.  On the other hand, Claudia, at first, seeks to join in the crowd, 
to be accepted by the acquaintances and correspond.  After she is in an affair with 
Sandro and spending more time with the yachting party, she sees that this 
corresponding fails to interrupt her isolation.  In the hotel, she comes to the edge of 
the abyss, about to follow Anna’s steps.  At the last moment, though, she turns to 
respond to someone, despite his betrayal, and pursues a different route.  She pursues 
the Levinasian route.  She goes beyond the crowd, and beyond the self, toward being 
for-the-other.
Whereas spectators see Claudia’s experience of anonymous existence, we see 
only traces of Anna’s anonymous existence.  Significantly, though, all of the other 
characters are the same as Anna.  Were any of them to take the same route as Anna, 
the route of separation in search of the free and freely acting authentic self, they 
would also suffer the same fate as Anna.  Seeking their authentic being would further 
isolate and alienate them in their anonymous existence.  This non-display is the 
absolute force of L’avventura.  A character who disappears early on in the film 
remains the central reference point of the film.  Anna remains the central “character” 
of the film as traces of her haunt the rest of the film.  This oscillation between the 
display of Claudia and non-display of Anna, this Seeing between the Seen and the 
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not Seen shows the relevance of a Levinasian lens.  L’avventura shows us how 
seeing is responding.
Through her disappearance from the screen, her depositioning, Anna becomes 
the traces through which the other characters must move and exist.40  Because she is 
deposed from the central position of the screen, she becomes the key witness against 
the quest for the authentic self.  In her attempt to remove herself from the narrative 
and its influences, her traces become the motivating factor of the narrative for the 
others.  Her disappearance provokes their search and the subsequent abandonment of 
their search.  They follow rumors of her to the police.  They follow headlines about 
her or chase after women who resemble her.  They even avoid each other, once they 
have grown to fear her return.  Certain point-of-view shots in the film, especially in 
the empty town Sandro and Anna visit, even hint to spectators that she may be the 
eyes through which we are watching the film.  The further she is from the crowd, the 
deeper she falls into it.
In this way, whether or not her removing herself from this story is a conscious 
act, her disappearance serves only to deepen her existence within it rather than 
bringing about her authentic existence outside of it.  Because spectators cannot verify 
her fate outside of the film, we cannot establish with certainty Anna’s intentions or 
predicaments.  We cannot know, even if we were to concoct some far-flung fantasy, 
if she has stolen away on a boat, for example, and landed in a new life in Southern 
California, now completely removed in every thought and deed from her past.  What 
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we are left with are traces of Anna, and it is precisely this lack of a verifiable answer, 
of any verifiability in regard to Anna, for spectators that bears witness to the fear and 
anxiety of the character of Anna in the film.  Being deposed from the screen space, 
she gives a deposition to the other characters and spectators.  She is the witness in 
absentia.  She witnesses to the fact that the horizon of her own death fails to free her 
from her isolation.  Even if she were dead, her traces would continue to exist.  Seeing 
Anna’s failed attempts and the traces she leaves behind, whether she is conscious of 
them or not, reminds spectators of the very traces they would leave behind should 
they attempt to remove themselves from the community of the world.  At the very 
least, seeing that she cannot know if she has broken free, reminds spectators of the 
very impossibility of breaking free.  Or, we are at least reminded of the uncertainty 
we would have of ever knowing if we could break free.  We might even believe 
ourselves free of a certain life and yet leave behind as many traces of ourselves in 
that rejected world as Anna does.  Like her, we would become the very center of the 
world from which we had intended to free ourselves.  This is the dilemma that 
confronts Claudia in the hotel, suspended at the abyss, at the point of her turn toward 
further isolation or response.
With Claudia, the difference between anxiety and fear is key.  Anxiety retains 
an existentially primary status because reactions to it remain unverifiable.  In 
contrast, fear offers the possibility of escape because we can either evade or defeat 
what we fear.  In the film, all the characters fear the shark in the early swimming 
40 To be deposed is to be removed from high office and to give testimony under oath.  The deposed 
queen is one who is removed from her throne and one who bears witness or delivers a written 
statement that bears witness.
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scene and leave the water.  They all fear the storm and the dangers of the island and 
seek shelter.  The shepherd reminds them to be fearful of the crevices on the island or 
they might fall to their deaths.  He asks if they have looked for Anna in the crevice 
behind his house, where he lost a sheep sometime earlier.  Claudia fears having an 
affair with Sandro and tries to put as much space and as many other people as she can 
between Sandro and herself.  In Taormina, the pharmacist’s wife fears her unreliable 
husband of three month’s infidelity, and guards against it.  Claudia fears the mob of 
men who leer at and surround her in Noto, and so she moves back toward the hotel 
entrance and the relative safety of Sandro’s company.  In that same scene, as she 
turns back toward the entrance of the hotel, though, she stops and runs into a paint 
shop across the piazza because she fears that Anna might be the woman following 
Sandro down the hotel stairs.
Heideggerian anxiety, like Levinasian anonymous existence and the “il y a,” 
because it does not come from an outside entity but is the experience of existing, 
does not offer the possibility of escape.  Anxiety is the anxiety over one’s self and the 
authenticity of one’s self, for Heidegger.  One can neither evade nor defeat one’s self.  
Thus, anxiety’s effects are more devastating.  For Heidegger, the quest for authentic 
being is a direct reaction against anxiety.  Because authentic beings confront their 
anxiety directly, they are liberated from their anxiety.  However, it is precisely at the 
level of anxiety that Anna remains even though she chooses to follow this route.  
Through the non-display of Anna trapped in her anxious alienation, then, 
L’avventura shows spectators how the return to interior anxiety can only remain 
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interior.  The interruption of anxiety, of the “il y a,” indeed, can only come from the 
outside, according to Levinas.  L’avventura’s non-display repeats this lesson.
Anna’s attempt to free herself returns her to the alienated isolation of being.  
It does not offer her a route outside and beyond existence.  It does not even offer an 
interruption of isolation precisely because she seeks her freedom from a wrong 
premise.  Because she seeks her freedom from the community she wrongly imagines 
herself too much with, her quest is doomed to failure from the start.  Traces of Anna 
haunt this film because this Umwelt cannot be undone so easily.  According to 
Levinas, escape is not a possibility because,
there is not “something.”  But this universal absence is in its 
turn a presence, an absolutely unavoidable presence.  It is not 
the dialectical counterpart of absence, and we do not grasp it 
through a thought.  It is immediately there.  There is no 
discourse.  Nothing responds to us, but this silence; the voice 
of this silence is understood and frightens.41
Spectators and the other characters in the film experience traces of Anna as this 
absence that is unavoidably present.  She is the apparition (slightly more than a 
shadow even in the beginning of the film), which never quite materializes, never 
quite comes into view.  Eyewitnesses mistake many women for Anna, and 
eyewitnesses constantly point toward her just as she disappears from the camera and 
the searchers.  Anna’s presence is only in the past.  In the present she is always 
41 Emmanuel Levinas, “There is: Existence Without Existent,” The Levinas Reader, ed. Seán Hand 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1989) 30.
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already absent.  Defying even the spectatorial apparatus of cinema and the 
preconceived notions of the cinematic experience, her existence in the film is as a 
boat engine, an echo, a rumor, contradictions, a Palermo newspaper headline, vague 
clues, a pharmacist’s fantasy, a pharmacist’s wife’s nightmare, or the possible 
attachment we might make for a point-of-view shot, as in the “deserted” village.
Claudia is precisely at this point of divergence, at this interstice in the hotel 
scene.  Her own fears are revealed to be her own anxieties.  Will a further isolation 
remedy either?  Anna fears the crowd and retreats.  Claudia at first fears the crowd 
and retreats as she runs back to her hotel room.  However, in her retreat the silence of 
the hallway echoes the silence of Anna’s absence, and Claudia returns to the crowd, 
returns to Sandro and opens herself toward him.  Her response interrupts her 
isolation at this moment.  Responding to Sandro by opening herself to Sandro at the 
end of the film interrupts her fears and anxieties.
Wakefulness
Claudia is at the edge of the abyss in the hotel.  Like Anna, she is fully within 
her solitude and about to turn away from the horror of the anonymous existence only 
to find herself more fully within it.  The horror of this moment recalls Levinas’s 
writings on Hamlet and Macbeth and his allusions to Shakespeare throughout his 
career, allusions which he says are motivated by his belief that “sometimes it seems 
to me that the whole of philosophy is only a meditation on Shakespeare.”42  At this 
edge of the abyss, Claudia is like both Hamlet and Macbeth in that she realizes, in the 
42 Levinas, Time 72.
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end, the horizon of her own death fails to provide more than a return to anonymous 
existence.  Further isolation would only lead her to Anna’s situation.
In his own discussions of Shakespeare’s Hamlet and Macbeth, Levinas 
comments that the playwright’s use of ghosts and other hauntings has not only been a 
tribute to his time or to the original material of the tragedies.43  According to 
Levinas, the ghosts allow Shakespeare 
to move constantly toward this limit between being and 
nothingness where being insinuates itself even in nothingness, 
like bubbles of the earth (“the Earth hath bubbles”).  Hamlet 
recoils before the “not to be” because he has a foreboding of 
the return of being (“to dye, to sleepe, perchance to 
Dreame”).44  (33)
As Hamlet says in act three, scene one, lines sixty-three through sixty-eight:
To die, to sleep—
To sleep, perchance to dream—ay there’s the rub,
For in that sleep of death what dreams may come,
When we have shuffled off this mortal coil,
Must give us pause; there’s the respect
That makes calamity of so long life:45
43 For extended interpretations of Levinas’s use of Shakespeare (especially Hamlet) see Robbins, op. 
cit. and Rob Eaglestone, Ethical Criticism: Interpretation After Levinas (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 
1997).  See also Chapter Four of this study for more on Levinas’s use of Shakespeare and the ethics of 
Oshima Nagisa’s cinema.
44 Levinas, Time 33.
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“To be or not to be” is exactly not the question for Levinas because it is impossible 
to experience the “not-to-be.”  Anna cannot not exist.  Anna can never experience her 
own death, only the death of someone else.  One’s own death is not the problem.  
Rather, the question is the return of being, the haunting that will come after the death 
and the sleep.  The rub is the dream (nightmare) that returns after death.  The Prince 
of Denmark fears this return, after death, of anonymous existence.  Despite Hamlet’s 
warning, Anna was only able to return herself to the realm of anonymous existence 
when she attempted to free herself from the crowd.  Anna may well have died; 
however, that death does not relieve Anna of the crowd.  This is what Claudia 
experiences throughout the film and where she finds herself once back in her room.  
Learning from Hamlet and Anna, Claudia realizes that her own death will not mark 
her own exit from existence.  If she leaves the crowd or dies, Claudia will not be free 
of the crowd.  She will haunt the crowd just as Anna haunts the crowd.
The lesson is the same with Macbeth.  Levinas argues that,
In Macbeth, the apparition of Banquo’s ghost is also a 
decisive experience of the “no exit” from existence, its 
phantom return through the fissures through which one has 
driven it.  “The times have been, that when the Brains were 
out, the man would dye, and there an end; But now they rise 
45 William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Prince of the Danes, eds. G. Blakemore Evans, et al., The Riverside 
Shakespeare  2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997) 1183-1245.
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again . . . and push us from our stools.  This is more strange 
than such a murther is.”  “And it is over with” is impossible.46
Again, the horror does not come from the danger of death but rather from the return 
of being.  It is the return of being, the return from what was thought to be a possible 
escape from being, that “horrifies Macbeth.”  It is not that murder is horrible or that 
Macbeth’s own crime indicts him here.  Rather, Levinas is responding to the dead 
end of a self riveted to its own death as the horizon of its being.  As long as the 
horizon of being remains the death of the self, “and it is over with” remains 
impossible.  As with anxiety, interior reactions can only remain interior.  According 
to Levinas, the turn toward the death of the other, the only death we can experience, 
teaches us how responding to the other interrupts our isolation.
This horror of the anxiety over anonymous existence, over the return after 
death, as Levinas tries to illustrate it, is the wakefulness of the insomniac.  Like 
Claudia, the insomniac cannot fall asleep.  In the hotel, the wakefulness invades 
Claudia’s room and drives her from that room.  Whatever the cause of her 
wakefulness, once in it, she loses control of this wakefulness.  She is willing to count 
and record the numbers on a watch to try to overcome it.  Time passes.  It marches 
on, and Claudia exists.  Or, in a very awkward construction, time passes through, 
marches on; existence persists through Claudia, despite Claudia.  At this moment, 
Claudia turns toward the other person, responds to the other in a gesture that would 
interrupt her isolation.
46 Levinas, Time 33-34.
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The horror of this wakefulness drives Claudia from her room and down the 
hall toward Patrizia’s.  Once there, Claudia reveals her fear of Anna’s return, a fear 
not unlike Hamlet’s or Macbeth’s:
Claudia:  Patrizia, I’m afraid.
Patrizia:  You’re telling me.  I have nightmares . . . .
Claudia:  I’m afraid Anna has come back.  I feel that she has come 
back, that they’re [Anna and Sandro] together.
At first, her fear was that Anna would never return.  However, now her experience of 
Anna’s absence has turned into an experience of Anna’s anonymous existence.  
Claudia is not afraid of Anna’s return but of the impossibility of Anna ever leaving.47
At this point, the hotel scene fully displays the fear and dread Levinas 
describes coming from the experience of anonymous existing.  The “rumbling 
silence” of the “il y a” has returned despite Claudia’s best efforts to expel it.  The 
night of existence refuses to let up and admit a moment’s peace to Claudia.  She feels 
the very weight of her isolated existence like the sound of a seashell pressed against 
the ear.  The utter silence of the sequence and the constant return of that silence 
which pervades the aural space of the screen as Claudia runs down the hallway 
emphasize this weight.  This silence echoes, reverberates, rumbles, despite the fact 
that there is no sound beside her footsteps on the hard floor.  The longer the quiet of 
the scene continues, the louder the very absence of sound grows.48
47 A similar anxiety haunts Alfred Hitchcock’s films, especially Rebecca (1940), Vertigo (1958), and, 
especially, his film from the same year as L’avventura—Psycho (1960).
48 This treatment of silence, and of the relationship between silence and noise, is only one of the 
bridges between Antonioni and the Russian filmmaker Andrei Tarkovsky.  Many lines can and have 
been drawn between Antonioni’s and Tarkovsky’s work, especially Andrei Rublev (1966-1971), 
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Claudia is like the child Levinas speaks of, who is sent to her room but still 
hears the rumbling of the guests below, a rumbling like the sound of a shell placed 
over the ear.  She runs down the hall to Patrizia’s room and, in a tone recalling 
Macbeth’s, explains that,
A few days ago, I died at just the thought that Anna might be 
dead.  Now I don’t even cry.  I’m afraid she might be alive. . . .
Claudia no longer fears death.  Here, it has ceased to be the Heideggerian horizon of 
being—the totalizing event that gives human beings their authenticity.  Rather, it is 
the return after a possible death that holds the “horror and panic” for Claudia.  She 
faces the anonymous existence of Anna as an anonymous field of forces and states 
simply that she is “tired of being like this.”  As Levinas notes, arguing against a 
Heideggerian understanding of heroism in the face of death, “‘To be or not to be’ is a 
sudden awareness of this impossibility of annihilating oneself.”49  Despite her 
attempts to eliminate herself from the world, Anna’s actions only reinforced the very 
“too-much-with” of her existence.  They have also reinforced Claudia’s awareness of 
Solaris (1972), and Stalker (1979).  See, for example, Tarkovsky’s Sculpting in Time: Reflections on 
the Cinema, trans. Kitty Hunter-Blair (Austin: U of Texas P, 1996) as well as Donato Totaro’s review 
of Tarkovsky’s Sculpting in Film-Philosophy Internet Salon vol. 4 no. 4, February 2000, online 
<http://www.film-philosophy.com>.  Even more interesting are the points which can be drawn 
together between Levinas, Deleuze, Antonioni, and Tarkovsky via the philosophy of Bergson and his 
theories of time and space which haunt all these thinkers.
In addition, Antonioni’s cinema connects many issues of presence and absence to the filmic 
gender relations Kaja Silverman highlights in terms of the “‘auditory sphere’ or ‘aura’” (98) she 
discusses in The Acoustic Mirror: The Female Voice in Psychoanalysis and Cinema (Bloomington: 
Indiana UP).  Coming from a framework built in relation to Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan, 
Silverman is concerned with the aural filmic construction of discursive dependency and authority in 
terms of the inside / outside opposition and role of “a sonorous receptacle” made to seem necessary 
(and feminine) by the “dominant cinema” (99).  Working through the feminist psychoanalytic theories 
of Julia Kristeva, Silverman begins to unfold a challenge to this hierarchical binary which serves to 
subdue women’s voices via such tools as the maternal voice, Kristeva’s choric fantasy, and the leaving 
behind of words.
49 Levinas, Time 73.
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her own existence, and the similarity of their experiences.  Claudia, too, is too-much-
with.  Our experience of Anna’s absence illustrates the fear that Hamlet and Macbeth 
have of their own existence.  Like Hamlet, Macbeth, and Anna, Claudia experiences 
this Existential dread.
In the end, this is the world of L’avventura, the world of Anna and the non-
display of the traces of Anna, of her present absence.  This is the world of Claudia’s 
present absence as well, an experience of Anna’s absence and Claudia at the edge of 
this abyss.  In this world of the film is constituted “the dark background of existence” 
and “the monotonous presence that bears down on us.”50  This is the horror of 
existence—the horror of the inescapable field of the present absence.  By the end of 
the film, the horror of the traces of Anna frightens Sandro and Claudia almost to the 
point of inaction.
A First Gesture of Ethics
Contrary to most critics of L’avventura, I argue that the film does not end 
tragically but hopefully.51  However, this is a difficult hopefulness, an interrupted 
hopefulness, a hopefulness seeing the oscillations between hope and tragedy.  After 
she discovers Sandro on the couch with Gloria Perkins, Claudia stumbles from the 
room and flees the interior of the hotel.  After ashamedly hiding his face from 
Claudia and then acting with disgust toward Gloria, Sandro also flees the interior of 
the hotel.  We see Claudia and Sandro outside the hotel, separated (avoiding one 
50 Levinas, “There is” 32.
51 Nowell-Smith also argues against a negative interpretation of the ending of the film.  He states that 
it ends without a final judgment, and that this open ending makes the film a radical break from the 
expected cinematic language of the time.
69
another at first) and crying.  In the final moments of the film, Sandro approaches 
Claudia and sits on a bench near where she is standing.  We see a close up of his face 
and the intensity of his tears.  Then, we see Claudia move toward him, hold the 
corner of the bench, look at her own hand while she hesitantly opens and closes it.  
Suddenly, she reaches out and caresses the back of Sandro’s head.  A light note 
sounds on the soundtrack.  Then, the camera pulls back, and we see Sandro on the 
bench, with Claudia beside him, caressing his head, and a brick wall and Mount Etna 
in front of them.
In his earlier work, such as in Time and the Other, Levinas posits a relation 
with the other person which interrupts the anonymity of isolated being and the 
totality of knowledge: the caress.52  He points out that what he describes as the 
ethical relation brought out of alienation might be called “love” but that he fears too 
many misunderstandings of this term.  Instead, he proposes that the caress, the open-
handed response without reciprocity might be a gesture to interrupt the self’s 
isolation.  The caress, as opposed to the grasp, refuses to return the self to the self.  It 
opens itself to the suffering and death of the other because it does not secure anything 
for itself.  It goes out to the other without guarantee, without expecting the 
reciprocity of co-existence.  The caress is the self coming after the other, opening 
toward the future of the other, from a different time and space than the other, offering 
itself, if only for an instant, for the other.  For this reason, the caress is tied to the 
ethical as a hopeful opening toward the other person.  This is the hope at the end of 
52 For a powerful elaboration of the complexities of this metaphor, complexities Levinas himself notes 
but does not develop later in pages 89-90 of Time, see Luce Irigaray, “Questions to Emmanuel 
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L’avventura.  It is not final and totalizing in its openness to the other person.  Rather, 
it is an open-handed gesture connoting vulnerability and receptivity.  The self that 
caresses another person responds to the other without the security and horror of 
solitude.  The self that caresses “constitutes its essence by the fact that the caress 
does not know what it seeks” and, denying reciprocity, is the “anticipation of this 
pure future [avenir], without content” that is the open relation with the other.53  In the 
final closing and opening of Claudia’s hand, spectators see her indecision at the 
brink.  Then, as she opens her hand and touches Sandro, she turns toward him.  
Claudia does not take Sandro’s hand.  They do not hold each other’s hand.  Rather, 
as she reaches out toward him, she exposes herself without knowing what will come 
of this caress.
As Susan Handelman points out, Levinas is different from other philosophers 
of alterity, in that his critique of metaphysics and ontology continues to carry with it 
“an-other reason.”  What he wishes to interrupt is not reason but a certain bias within 
reason, a bias of placing the self before the other and denying the very difference at 
the heart of reason.  In other words, according to Handelman, Levinas opens “reason 
to the command of the Other.”  Reason opens in the face of alterity.  “Already of 
itself ethics is an ‘optics.’”54  It is not an either / or here.  Ethics is already seeing.  It 
is a movement toward the better; it brings to light the good that is not yet, l’avenir.  
Seeing is not the opposite of the Seen.  Seeing comes from within the Seen, yet calls 
Levinas On the Divinity of Love,” Trans. Margaret Whitford, Re-Reading Levinas, eds. Robert 
Bernasconi and Simon Critchley (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1991) 109-118.
53 Levinas, Time 89.
54 Levinas, Totality 29, qtd. in Handelman 182.
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the Seen into question.  Seeing does not propose a new Seen to replace the old Seen.  
Rather, Seeing makes responding possible by Seeing between the Seen and the not 
Seen.
What comes, of course, is Claudia and Sandro’s return to the world and the 
interruption of the caress—the interruption of the interruption.  This is the very 
instant of the ethical that is always only instantaneous and always immediately 
reconsumed by the world, by ontology and epistemology.  Opening to the other 
person is better than being for oneself, but it is only temporary, always only 
temporary.  To fall into correspondence would be to fall out of responding.  To 
presume any response to be adequate would be to reduce the other to the same again, 
not respond to the other.  Therefore, responding is always reabsorbed.  Every new 
instant calls for a new response.  The other changes, calls for a new response at every 
instant.  Only a new response, at every instant, from just behind the time of the other 
interrupts anonymous existence again.  Time does not cease.  Existence does not 
cease.  The self responds to another who is constantly pulled back into the world.  
The self is constantly pulled back into the world behind the other.  In the film, the 
barriers that fill the screen at the end remind us of the temporary nature and 
immediate reabsorbtion of Claudia’s response.  Although Claudia reaches out to 
caress Sandro, this gesture cannot overcome being.  This gesture can only interrupt 
being.  As Claudia opens toward Sandro at the end, she is also confronted by a 
railing, a brick wall from the top to the bottom of the screen on the right and Mount 
Etna in the distance on the left.  At the same moment as her caress responds to the 
other person, the world around her returns her to the crisis.  There is no settled 
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escape, only a continual l’avenir that calls for a new response, that calls us to respond 
with horror or hope.  With horror comes ontology and interpretation.  With hope 
comes ethics and response.
The jeopardy of the final shot of the film magnifies the challenge of 
responding because the final image opens toward spectators and calls them to 
respond to the caress and its reabsorbtion.  At the end, L’avventura denies spectators 
direct access to Claudia and Sandro.  The back of the bench partially obstructing our 
view and the fact that we do not see Claudia and Sandro’s faces cautions against too 
quickly responding and thinking our response adequate.  Just as the film reinforces 
the problems of authenticity through the traces of Anna, it also reinforces the false 
community of safe answers by refusing to let us see for sure at the end.
A Return to Anna?
This chapter reposes Anna at the center of L’avventura.  Seeing the film, 
though, brings to light the violence of my own interpretation.  Just as the end of the 
film refuses to give spectators a final, secure view of things, this chapter refuses to 
rest secure in its interpretation of the film.  Responding to L’avventura, and to Anna, 
cannot come to a close.  In the moment of responding to Anna, I have also 
interpreted her, spoken for her, returned her to the situation of anonymous existence.  
This is the effect of remaining settled in one’s accounting of the film.  Arguing that 
Claudia fills in the space Anna vacates denies Anna’s unique existence and returns 
her to the same of anonymous existence.  Just as much, though, recentering Anna 
denies Anna’s unique existence and returns her to the same of anonymous existence.  
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Both return to interpretation in the end.  Anna haunts this film as the absent center of 
the story.  She is and is not the center of this film.
This is the lesson of the ethical and the avenir of the opening toward the other 
person, that it is better than the ontological or epistemological.  Between the Seen of 
Anna’s nothingness and the Seen of Anna’s centeredness, the ethical evokes Seeing 
Anna’s absence, between nothingness (a lack to be filled) and centeredness (a filled 
lack).  Claudia’s caress opens toward the other but is consumed by the walls this new 
relation faces.  The absence of Anna demands spectators respond to her without 
totalizing her, yet this demarcation of the very nature of this demand returns her to 
the same.  This is what Levinas will eventually term the difficult freedom of ethics, 
being called to respond without ever being certain of the appropriateness of your 
response.  This, too, is where I think L’avventura takes us in the end—not to a final 
freedom as seen in L’eclisse or even a complex ambiguity as in Blow-Up.  Rather, I 
would argue that the arc of Anna leads to the non-totalizing scenes in Zabriskie Point
and The Passenger, not just stopping at L’eclisse or Blow-Up, precisely because the 
later scenes in Zabriskie and The Passenger bring uncertainty to the fore and yet 
undercut that uncertainty at the same time.  Even if we are certain we do not 
understand the final chapters of the “trilogy,” Antonioni’s later films make that 
uncertainty even more uncertain.  In L’avventura any statement about Anna after she 
disappears is a speculation about Anna.  In the later films we are not even certain if 
we are uncertain when we respond to the exploding house at the end of Zabriskie, 
and we cannot respond to the David Locke / spy character at the end of The 
Passenger because we are never sure if he even existed in the film in the first place.  
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Where we are left in these films is between decisions, a between which challenges us 
to respond to the avenir without ontological or epistemological touchstones.
If “to be or not to be” is the unethical question par excellance for Levinas, 
then, Antonioni’s reworking of the existentialist situation, “to see or not to see” must 
also fall short.  It must also fall short unless “to see or not to see” connotes a different 
kind of seeing, one reconstituted to Seeing as responding to the Seen and the not 
Seen.  It would be better, ethical, to ask how one can “see and not see,” where not 
seeing interrupts the dominance of the seen at each step along the way in the cinema.  
In fact, is it not the oscillation between seeing and not seeing that is Seeing?  Here, 
responding to cinema takes place in the flicker between the dark and light rhythm of 
the Maltese cross in the projector.  To see and not to see is Seeing, where Seeing 
interrupts the Seen at every step along the way to deny the Seen its dominant position 
in an interpretation.  We guess but must never know what happens to Anna.  This is 
one aspect of the cinema of Pedro Almodóvar, at least as that cinema responds to the 
difficult relation between the pornographic and the non-pornographic cinema 
discussed in the next chapter.
75
Chapter Three:
On the Verge of the Pornographic1
Male and female created He them
—Genesis 1:27
Very schematically: an opposition of 
metaphysical concepts . . .is never the 
face-to-face of two terms, but a hierarchy 
and an order of subordination.  
Deconstruction cannot limit itself or 
proceed immediately to a neutralization: 
it must, by means of a double gesture, a 
double science, a double writing, 
practice an overturning of the classical 
opposition and a general displacement of 
the system.
—Jacques Derrida
Hard-core pornography demands the certain belief of its spectators more than 
any other cinematic genre.  As Linda Williams writes in Hard Core: Power, Pleasure, 
and the “Frenzy of the Visible”, “the genre of pornography…works hard to convince 
us of its realism.”2 In fact, “the very conventions of pornography work to enforce a 
1 An earlier version of this chapter, with a different focus, appeared as “Pedro Almodóvar On the 
Verge of a Pornographic Space,” Cineaction 47 (1998): 36-44.
2 Linda Williams, Hard Core: Power, Pleasure, and the “Frenzy of the Visible” (Berkeley: U of 
California P, 1999 (1989)) 185.
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realism similar to that of documentary film.”3  Pornography’s constitution is tied to 
showing what cannot be shown—the uncontrolled reaction of sexual pleasure—what 
Williams terms the “frenzy of the visible,” and to confirming spectators’ certainty in 
what it shows.  In order to refute its own uncertainty and instability, hard-core 
pornography demands the absolute disavowal of spectatorial skepticism by binding 
itself to a supposed mimetic display.  Pornography shows us real, live sex (or, at 
least, real, filmed sex).  Like pornography, Western philosophy also demands the 
certain belief of its thinkers.  As Emmanuel Levinas asserts in Otherwise Than Being 
or Beyond Essence, “A philosopher seeks, and expresses, truth.”4  In fact, “for the 
philosophical tradition of the West, all spirituality lies in consciousness, thematic 
exposition of being, knowing.”5  Philosophy’s constitution is tied to showing the 
truth behind being—the essence of what is—what Levinas terms the “totality” which 
reduces difference to sameness, and to confirming thinkers’ certainty in what it 
knows.  In order to refute its own uncertainty and instability, logocentric philosophy 
also demands the absolute disavowal of skepticism by binding itself to the certainty 
of the epistemological drive.  Such philosophy shows us the real, live truth (or, at 
least, the real, written truth).  Both pornography and philosophy must refute 
skepticism because it challenges the constitutions of their truth claims.  Both 
3 Williams 203. In addition to linking pornography’s constitution and display to that of documentary 
film, Williams also describes the connections between pornography and two other cinematic genres.  
She links the sexual numbers and narrative structure of early feature-length pornography to the song 
and dance numbers of modern era musicals and compares the fluidity of spectatorial identification in 
horror films to that of contemporary sadie-max pornography.




pornography and philosophy work against the radical doubt of skepticism.  
Therefore, the pornographic and the philosophic are bound to one another in this 
opposition to skepticism.  However, this relationship only begins to describe the full 
import of the pornographic.
This link between the pornographic and the philosophic, by their mutual 
denial of skepticism, also allows for reviewing the relation of the pornographic to the 
non-pornographic.  Despite an accepted hierarchy, drawn out in public debate in 
favor of the non-pornographic, it is the relation between the two genres that has 
dominated definitions of each.  The interdependence of these genres is made explicit 
by a survey of Hollywood production code battles, studies pointing to the negative 
social effects of pornography, and “moral” documents which invoke the 
pornographic against itself—such as the now infamous Meese report (described by 
some as sufficiently pornographic to be a paperback bestseller).6  While increasing 
the amount of pornography in the public sphere by openly discussing the content of 
6 The Production Code Administration (the Hays Office) was the first Hollywood regulatory code.  
Established in 1922, the Hays office was the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors Association of 
America’s attempt at self-censorship in the hopes of averting outside intervention.  The revised 
Production Code (overseen by Martin Quigley and Joseph Breen from 17 February 1930) led to 
further restrictions on sex and sexual innuendo, but not violence, in motion pictures.  In 1968 
Hollywood dismantled the Production Code Administration in favor of the MPPDA ratings system—a 
variation of which is in current use.
A recent study of the negative effects of pornography, Pornography: The Production and 
Consumption of Inequality by Gail Dines, Robert Jensen, and Ann Russo (New York: Routledge, 
1998), directly confronts studies such as Williams’s which argue that the contemporary mainstreaming 
of pornography may have positive effects on how men and women view sexuality.  Against Williams 
and others, Pornography asserts that pornographic films are invading the suburbs and bringing with 
them more social inequality by exacerbating the relationship between pornography and sexual violence 
and abuse.  Pornography does not supply a close reading of the content or context of any pornographic 
print or non-print text to support these claims.
The Meese Report, published in 1986, which stated bluntly that “pornography is degrading to 
women” supplied volumes of explicit data without considering the full context for a single image or 
depiction it included.
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“obscene” films, these battles, studies, and documents also demonstrate the 
impossibility of separating the two genres of the pornographic from the non-
pornographic.  These studies quote the pornographic to show how close the non-
pornographic has come to its other and how this infection has degraded the non-
pornographic.  Ironically, though, these presentations repeatedly demonstrate the very 
quotableness of the pornographic, and, thus, its link to the non-pornographic, while 
also reinscribing the non-pornographic’s higher position by a displacement of what it 
is not.
The cinematic non-pornographic is more acceptable in the public sphere as 
long as it either denies the pornographic out right or is obvious in presenting a moral 
tale that reveals sexual deviancy and that deviancy’s solely negative consequences.  
Non-pornographic films on the verge of the pornographic punish their sexually 
“liberated” characters (especially women) for their liberation in order to justify their 
sexual displays after the fact.  Such non-pornographic cinema as “road to ruin” films 
and “sex hygiene” movies from the 1930s are two examples of cinemas which cling 
to the verge by, in the end, showing the disastrous effects of unbridled sexuality.  
Red Lights (1930?) displays mad youth trapped by the pitfalls of sin.  Fools of Desire
(1930? (1919?)) tells the tale of secret passions leading to the sickness and shame of 
venereal disease.  High School Girl (1935) depicts the taboo subject of teen 
pregnancy outside of marriage.  Obsession films are the current inheritors of this 
display, with such films as Fatal Attraction (1987) and Basic Instinct (1992) 
presenting two of the most popular examples.  In such cases, by showing and then 
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warning against deviant displays, the non-pornographic quotes the pornographic 
while disavowing it.
The non-pornographic needs the pornographic in order to gain its own 
legitimacy by always being able to “show” that it is not the pornographic.  In fact, it 
has even been suggested that if the pornographic appears more explicit and more 
violent than previously (a debatable consideration), it is in direct response to the 
encroachment of various production codes and the production of the non-
pornographic.7  As the non-pornographic incorporates more of the pornographic, the 
distance must be kept.  Thus, the pornographic must display something more deviant 
from the non-pornographic as the non-pornographic encroaches.  As well, to meet 
certain censorship codes, the pornographic must remain obvious.  To do so, it must 
incorporate, at times, the sexist and abusive elements it is charged with exploiting.  
So that it must never be accused of trying to “pass” for the non-pornographic, the 
pornographic must make its display (and advertisement) intentionally and explicitly 
indecent.  Indeed, it is possible to argue that the pornographic is pushed by the non-
pornographic and the production codes toward its “violent” and “degrading” 
depictions.  In the end, the pornographic and the non-pornographic remain disrupted 
and disruptable due to their very dependence upon one another.  Neither concept 
exists without the other.  They are interdependent, and one always has to be defined 
in terms of the other.
7 Eddie Muller and Daniel Faris, Grindhouse: The Forbidden World of “Adults Only” Cinema (New 
York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1996) 14.
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In this way, the relation between the non-pornographic and the pornographic 
mirrors the relation between philosophy (as the quest for truth) and skepticism (as the 
disavowal of the possibility that quest).  In the end, the pornographic is not so closely 
linked to philosophy and knowing, but to skepticism and the disruption of certainty.  
The pornographic refutes the truth claims of the non-pornographic as the skeptical 
refutes the truth claims of the philosophic.  This relation shows how the non-
pornographic, despite its position of social authority, is contained as the negative 
opposite of the pornographic.  The non-pornographic lacks a name of its own.  At the 
most complex, the pornographic is the absence of the non-pornographic, and the non-
pornographic is the absence of the pornographic.  At the bare minimum, the name of 
the non-pornographic is absent, and this absence highlights the non-pornographic’s 
dependence upon the pornographic.  This interdependence opens the space for 
pornography as counter cinema.
We are only on the verge of describing the full import of the pornographic, 
though.  For, as interdependent as the pornographic and non-pornographic are, they 
are never face-to-face.  The pornographic and non-pornographic are never, as Derrida 
writes, two oppositional concepts facing one another—never in an ethical relation of 
response but, rather, always, as Levinas writes, in the rhythm of the return to the 
same in the guise of truth.  The pornographic and the non-pornographic are always 
on the verge of returning to their “proper” places in the hierarchy, where the 
pornographic is assimilated under the non-pornographic.  While the uncertain 
interdependence between them remains open, though, the cinematic remains open to 
Seeing, to questions of the ethical within skepticism.  The non-pornographic’s 
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authority comes from its separation from the pornographic.  However, this separation 
is always fluid and uncertain because both sides gain something from this 
relationship.  And this uncertainty opens the very space for an ethical relation 
between the pornographic and the non-pornographic that refuses to return them to 
their proper hierarchy in the guise of the truth.  This uncertainty refuses assimilating 
the pornographic under the totality of the non-pornographic.
The pornographic tropes the titles of the non-pornographic in films such as 
Field of Wet Dreams, Planet of the Babes, or Beach Blanket Bango for many 
reasons, including name (mis)recognition and comedic distraction.  Hardly is this 
ever a one-way street, though, as films such as Peeping Tom (1960), The Postman 
Always Rings Twice (1946 and 1981), 9 1/2 Weeks (1986), Bound (1996), Exotica
(1994), and Secretary (2002) trope the explicit display (or the promise of it) and the 
narrative structure of the pornographic.  Through their own exploitation / exploration 
of the pornographic, the non-pornographic gains publicity, notoriety, and auteur 
status for their composers.  Exhibiting and hiding the tropes of sado-masochism, 
pornography, and voyeurism has always been a part of the non-pornographic / 
pornographic relation.  Put another way, the interdependence of these two has always 
found itself marked by what Marcia Pally calls “the pornographic process” of “illicit 
viewing.”8  In this study, though, we can begin Seeing this pornographic process of 
illicit viewing as an ethical, non-totalizing response to the totalizing force of the non-
pornographic.  Seeing is this illicit viewing.
8 “I Witness, Eye Confess,” Film Comment, March-April 1985.
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As Derrida warns, that there are “two” genres legitimates (or is used to 
legitimate) the existence of two hierarchalized genres.  However, the instant of 
uncertainty in the pornographic calls the divide between the pornographic and non-
pornographic into question.  The skepticism in questions such as “How can they do 
that?” or “That can’t possibly work,” and the confrontation “That’s gotta be painful” 
in the light of performed pleasure tropes opens the certainty of the pornographic and 
the certainty of the divide between the two genres into question.  The pornographic 
demands the certain belief of its spectators, but its tropes of pleasure and surplus 
deny that certainty.  The pornographic demands the absolute disavowal of 
spectatorial skepticism, yet its constitution makes that disavowal impossible.
For example, Rocco’s Reverse Gang Bang confronts spectators with the 
improbability (if not physiological impossibility) of numbers as one man copulates to 
climax with ten women partners in one gang bang, as both male leads do in this 
film.9  Amateur performances over twenty or thirty minutes appear unbelievable.  
Subgenres focused on gigantic breasts and penises always generate discomfort.  The 
banal pleasure of perversity becomes overwhelming as oral, anal, fetish, and bizarre 
sex become the most commonplace and expected pleasure on the screen in films such 
as Fetish: 2001.  The very constitution of the display of sex in these films produces 
uncertainty because of the fact that it is “right there in front of viewers.”  The 
9 Most pornographic actors are paid per “money shot,” at a rate of $500-$1000 each for 1-2 shots per 
film each day.
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impossible confronts spectators because it is happening at every moment along the 
way.10
The pornographic opens to spectatorial skepticism the moment it confronts 
sexual or physical limits (real or imagined) within its supposed mimesis.11  Because 
it depends so totally on denying uncertainty, the slightest gap in its mimesis opens 
wide.  The displayed mimesis of the pornographic recalls the problem of filmic 
display espoused by Pepi in Pedro Almodóvar’s first feature, Pepi, Luci, Bom, y 
otras chicas del montón (Pepi, Luci, Bom and Other Girls on the Heap12, 1980): “In 
addition to being yourselves, you’ll have to act yourselves.  Reality always looks 
artificial.”  The impossible is put on display at every moment in pornography.  At 
least it is in a certain “modern porn” dated from the publication of three books in the 
1650s or since the beginnings of modern cinematic pornography since the invention 
of cinema in the late nineteenth century.13  This study takes up from the different but 
10  This uncertainty regarding fantastic and improbable (if not impossible) sexual displays and 
performances increases with the recognition that they are, indeed, displays and performances.  Hard-
core pornographic movies are movies, despite their objections otherwise.  They are edited and 
manipulated representations, complete with personnel and technologies to heighten their realism.  
“Stunt dicks” are actors who stand in when primary performers cannot maintain their erections or 
ejaculate on cue.  Of course, only the erect or ejaculation penis is edited into the scene.  Fluffers are 
male or female crewmembers who help actors maintain erections between takes.  Camera angle, 
makeup, and strategic shaving is employed to highlight and exaggerate penis or breast size.  Artificial 
lubricants, oils, and ejaculate (often a mixture of egg whites and dish soap) are commonly put to use 
on sets, especially in close-ups.  Of course, post-synchronized sound (and parodies of it) has been on 
the mainstays of pornographic (and non-pornographic) production from its first feature-length 
ventures.
11 This is related as well to our uncertainty of fantastic choreographic and performance scenes in 
musicals or extraordinary physical accomplishments in sporting events.  The fact that some studies, 
such as Hard Core,  have linked pornographic and musical narrative structures is in no way gratuitous 
since in so many ways both genres rely on the fantastic in their narrative compositions.
12 Sometimes translated as Pepi, Luci, Bom and Other Girls Like Mom.
13 In A History of X: 100 Years of Sex in Films (Amherst, New York: Prometheus, 1999), Luke Ford 
summarizes the sociologist Berl Kutchinsky’s remarks that little has changed since the first modern 
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related writings of Linda Williams and Luke Ford and the filmmaking of Annie 
Sprinkle (especially her 1999 Herstory of Porn: Reel to Reel).  It examines what this 
pornography does, not to define it as a separate genre, but to show how its production 
has always functioned alongside its other.  It does so to show how they both have 
been defined in opposition, particularly an opposition in regard to certainty and 
uncertainty.
To ask, as Derrida does in Memoirs of the Blind “Do you believe this [vous 
croyez]?”14 is to set the opposition tumbling and to open spectators to Seeing, to the 
non-assimilative ethics the opposition works to film over.  Once the question is 
asked, the spectre of uncertainty is let back out of the box to show up the uncertainty 
pornography.  According to Ford, “themes of lesbianism, sodomy, seduction, multiple copulation, 
flagellation, and sadism dominate” (12).  As well, the earliest pornographic films from the turn of the 
twentieth century display sex acts arranged via narrative tropes highly recognizable today.  There is 
little difference outside of the fact that, as with non-pornographic films, the length of features and the 
use of sound has increased as technology has allowed.  Despite calls for separating pornography into 
distinct taxonomic periods, thorough historical surveys reveal that, other than in length of film, earliest 
pornographic films differ little from contemporary ones in what they display and how their narratives 
are arranged.
For one such call for separating periods of pornographic production see, for example, Eric 
Schaefer, “Gauging a Revolution: 16mm Film and the Rise of the Pornographic Feature,” Cinema 
Journal 41.3 (2002) 3-26.  Schaefer carefully describes the feature films of the late 1960s through the 
early 1970s, and his premise that the rise of 16mm film technology led to changes in the production of 
pornographic feature films by reducing the costs of such productions.  However, Schaefer’s assertion, 
like that of other critics, that earlier film was either less explicit in its display or developed in its 
narrative (always flimsy but present) does not correspond to the sexually explicit films from the early 
1900s. Like Schaefer, Williams also draws out distinct differences between periods of pornographic 
production: photo series and primitive cinema establishing early display codes and images of female 
nudity, stag films focusing on “the meat shot” of female penetration, feature-length pornography of the 
1970s-1980s concentrating on “the money shot” of male ejaculation, and the more recent “interactive” 
pornography of CD-ROM and the internet.  Williams, too, summarizes the genealogy of pornography 
in a way that brackets more connections between early and later films than it allows.  Yet, it does 
provide a substantial study of the “use” of pornography and where sexually explicit film has been tied 
to the sex industry and where it has not.  While citing the use of stag films to excite potential 
customers at brothels, Williams also notes how feature-length films have much less relation to the sex 
industry because they are constructed more for mixed public consumption or home use.  Although 
there have been different historical movements within pornographic cinema, as there have been in 
non-pornographic cinema, taxonomic differences are not as clear and definite as some have declared.
14 Jacques Derrida, Memoirs of the Blind: The Self Portrait and Other Ruins (Chicago: U of Chicago 
P, 1993) 1.
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of the divide between pornographic and non-pornographic.  Here, in a reading of 
several “between films” directed by Pedro Almodóvar the ghosts are let back into the 
forefront, at least for an instant, on the verge of the import of the pornographic.
Forewarn
The dry thesis of this essay is that Pedro Almodóvar’s cinema refuses to play 
by the rules. Rather, it enacts a Derridean double writing, a double filming, by its 
repetition of pornographic tropes in non-pornographic films (if we continue to allow 
these uncertain categories founded on instability to stand separate for the moment).15
In this process of context switching or border crossing, Almodóvar’s cinema 
challenges the role of the tropes in the first context as well as the second.  By this 
double gesture of refilming and erasing Almodóvar’s cinema remains on the verge of 
the pornographic and the verge of the non-pornographic.  Thus, by inhabiting this 
space between the pornographic and its other, the non-pornographic, Almodóvar’s 
cinema questions the opposition of the concepts of the pornographic and the non-
pornographic and opens the space of uncertainty between the two.  What is at stake 
here is that this blurring between the pornographic and non-pornographic incites 
spectators to a form of skepticism rather than identification.  How are we to believe?  
In what are we to believe?  At least, it evokes a skepticism otherwise than an 
identification that still takes place but is not allowed to remain fixed in place.  This is 
15 This is a transplanting, not unlike the organ donor issues his later films draw up.  See, for example, 
La flor de me secreto (The Flower of My Secret, 1995) and Todo sobre mi madre (All About My 
Mother, 1999).  Although much less concerned with direct references to the pornographic, both films 
deal conspicuously with mistranslation, transplantability, partial sexual reassignment, and issues of 
authenticity.  As one character, La Agrado, puts it in Todo, “It costs a lot to be authentic,” mocking 
any claim to natural authenticity.
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a spectatorship that responds to cinema in terms of doubt as much as in terms of 
certainty.  This is ethical spectatorship of response other than identification and 
epistemological grasping which would return the other to the same under the guise of 
truth.  Otherwise than its representational mimesis, cinema functions as well in terms 
of its failure to represent convincingly.  This failure is the opening of an ethics of the 
cinematic.
Doubt and certainty dance a non-dialectical jig here that I have termed the 
relation between Seeing and the Seen.  Otherwise than the Seen of the fixed 
epistemological search for an answer that returns difference to the boundaries of the 
original question, Seeing puts the original question under investigation through a 
skeptical response evoked by the gaps in the cinema.  The Seen evokes Seeing 
through the gaps as Seeing questions the assimilative intent of the questions of the
Seen.  They are interdependent, as Seeing arises out of the gaps in the Seen, and is 
assimilated again by the Seen at every instant.  Seeing interrupts the Seen, if only for 
an instant, and then recedes into the background as epistemological drive of the Seen 
returns.  “Will they save the planet?” is answered epistemologically by the end of the 
film in terms of the outcome in regard to the planet.  The skepticism of Seeing denies 
the questions from the start, only to then be denied itself by the visual and aural 
display presented before it.  Seeing is opening to believing but never arrives there 
because Seeing always already doubts what it sees.  Thus, believing is suspending 
Seeing.
Films such as Matador (1985-86), Mujeres al borde de un ataque de nervios
(Women on the Verge of a Nervous Breakdown, 1987), ¡Atame! (Tie Me Up! Tie 
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Me Down!, 1989), and Kika (1993) reproduce specific, highly recognizable (even 
stereotypical) tropes from feature-length mainstream heterosexual pornographic 
cinema precisely to demonstrate the very cinematicality of these tropes.16  These 
films display the “disembodied” female voice in sex scenes, the closure of 
“pornotopic” space, the separation of narrative and numbers, fetishization, and the 
“money shot” to emphasize the very fact that they are visual and aural cinematic 
communication not unlike the iterable “‘written communication’“ Derrida describes 
in his essay “Signature Event Context.”  Their very portability and transference 
emphasizes not their essentiality but their cinematicality.
In reproducing and demonstrating the cinematicality of these representative elements, 
Almodóvar’s films disallow any easy, monocular reading in terms of an 
epistemological investigation of the real or their mimetic competency.17  Mimetic 
16 These elements are in no way defining instances of the essence of the pornographic but accepted 
and in some ways exaggerated instances from an imagined pornography--especially that tied to the 
“Golden Age” of pornography from the 1970s through the early 1980s.  These are common links 
between films marked as pornographic, which continue to hold sway in discussions concerning what 
pornography was and is.  However, these lists are always problematic because of they assume a causal 
relationship which does not apply.  See, for example, even sympathetic lists from Ford, Williams, 
Eithne Johnson, “Excess and Ecstasy: Constructing Female Pleasure in Porn Movies,” Velvet Light 
Trap 1993: 30-49, and photographic survey Women by Women: Erotic Photography edited by Peter 
Delius and Jacek Slaski with an introduction by Sophie Hack and Stephanie Kuhnen (New York: 
Prestel, 2003).
The history of these elements is made especially complicated by the fact that the most 
recognizable ones are those which have been most delineated and attacked by different censors of 
pornography.  In fact, it is not at all certain that these elements were ever dominant or primary before 
censors began delineating them.  Some books on pornography describe these now key tropes as 
necessary to the production of pornography, but most of these analyses come late to the conversation.  
In fact, Walter Kendrick, in The Secret Museum: Pornography and Modern Culture (New York: 
Viking, 1987), suggests that pornography has no essential qualities.  Pornography may never have 
relied on these particular constructions had censors not highlighted them in the first place.  Indeed, it is 
possible to speculate that these tropes might have disappeared without so much attention.  The 
question returns: what might pornography look and sound like had it never been censored?
17 This reproduction is also related to the reproduction of body part transplants in his later films and 
the reproduction of the organ-donor training films that inhabit spaces in both La flor and Todo.  That 
almost the exact same scene of preparing an organ donor training film occurs in both films is a further 
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theses, in terms of spectatorship founded in representation and epistemology, fail 
here because the question focuses on the cinematic function of the tropes of the 
pornographic.  It is no longer a question of the veracity of the images presented but 
of the cinematicality of the tropes involved in producing cinema that demands while 
denying skepticism.  This study responds to textuality and cinematicality and to acts 
of writing and filming rather than representations and characterizations.  In so doing, 
this study pushes the critical boundaries in another direction as well by emphasizing 
the relation between cinematic genre and the epistemological and the cinematic and 
the ethical.
For Derrida, iterability, with its possible etymological link to the Sanskrit 
itara (other), has always been one of the connections between repetition and alterity 
that is capable of producing an overturning of the metaphysics of presence and its 
hierarchical oppositions.18  Iterability and repeatability play an essential role in this 
undoing of reified essences because they demonstrate inherent linkages rather than 
separations.  One of the crucial elements of these films is that the reproductions are 
never simple citations that quote their other genre identically; rather, they are 
refilmings of those elements that further demonstrate the constructed filming of 
pornographic as well as non-pornographic elements.  Thus, they enact a displacement 
of not only the hierarchy but also the system.  Seeing cinema questions the system as 
well as the immediate hierarchy.  In questioning the systematization which would 
cover it over in the Seen, this cinema calls us to encounter Seeing behind the Seen, 
mark of Almodóvar’s concern with cinematic iteration and its opening up of questions regarding 
cinematic display.
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but only through the gaps which fail to fully erase Seeing within the realm of the 
Seen.
Pornography as Counter-Cinema
Throughout the last twenty years, writing on pornography has effectively 
contested the dominant spectator theories of the 1970’s and 80’s.  More recent 
theories argue against the binary opposition of the active male gaze working on the 
passive female object of photography and cinema.  Such work as Laura Kipnis’s19
reading of Hustler magazine as politically subversive, Linda Williams’s discussion of 
the links between the genres of pornography, musicals, and horror films, and 
Berkeley Kaite’s20 discussions of the link between pornographic tropes and 
difference, and the arguments against the monocular vision of pornographic tropes in 
the July, 1997 special issue of Wide Angle on pornography all challenge the earlier 
premises of the pornographic as simplistically exploitative in its representative and 
non-representative moments.  In fact, as these arguments continue to demonstrate, 
the very rhetoric of representation is quite removed from the staged, complex cinema 
of pornography.
Kaite especially considers the problematic that female porn models are almost 
never shown completely undressed.  Thus, they are never simply bare bodies 
objectified.  By examining their costuming and placement as props in the space of 
18 Derrida, “Signature” 315.
19 Laura Kipnis, Ecstasy Unlimited: On Sex, Capital, Gender, and Aesthetics, foreword Paul Smith 
(Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1993).  See especially her essay “(Male) Desire and (Female) 
Disgust: Reading Hustler” (219-242).  This essay was later retitled as “Disgust and Desire: Hustler
Magazine” in her 1996 book Bound and Gagged: Pornography and the Politics of Fantasy in America
(New York: Grove) 122-160.
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the visual field, Kaite argues from the position that “pornography is about textual, 
transgressive bodies” and that these bodies are “set into discourses of seduction and 
difference, although the boundaries of difference are continually transgressed.”21
These bodies are always more like La Agrado’s body in Todo sobre me madre (All 
About My Mother, dir. Pedro Almodóvar, 1999).  La Agrado, a name that crosses 
simple linguistic gender guidelines with its masculine ending but feminine article, is 
so named for “her” ability to make everyone agreeable, by possessing both breasts 
and a penis.
Kaite’s rendering of the visual language of pornographic images in linguistic 
terms is a study of fetishization in contemporary pornographic photographs (with 
some film commentary) conspiring to seduce through a dressing up of models “in the 
fabric of culture’s desire”22 and shows that desire working in complex and 
paradoxical ways.  Kaite asserts that a close reading of the actual photographs—and 
their contents of photographic breasts, anality, the gaze, and the shoe and jewelry—
(in series or individually) shows how “the pornographic body confounds the 
boundaries of sexual difference.”23  In a way, what is represented back to the 
supposedly masculine viewer of heteroerotic photographs of women is the 
construction of those photographic bodies into markers of masculine desire.  
Masculine desire, thus, is represented back to masculine desire under the garb of 
feminine desire.  The pornographic body displays the singularity of phallic desire 




rather than a differently associated duality or multiplicity.  Hence, in terms borrowed 
from Luce Irigaray, it recreates the sex which is one by framing and editing the sex 
which is not one.
This argument focuses on the construction of the “pornographic body” as 
something that is not real and does not give immediate visual access to the real.  
Rather, Kaite’s analysis shows, the pornographic body is most often “an ambisexual 
masquerade”24 in which feminine and masculine desire are exchanged precisely in 
the manufacture of the photographic pornographic body.  The photographed female 
model is visually the full revelation of the feminine at first glance.  However, its 
seemingly full revelation also possesses qualities that undo that first glance.  It 
transgresses femininity.  Pornographic photography links the unity of the single, erect 
breast, stiletto heel, or emitting anus to the unity of the penis.  It assigns the power of 
the gaze to the female or feminized model who looks back and “wants it” from the 
supposed masculine spectator.  Thus argues Kaite, the pornographic body “flirts with 
a dissolve around the ‘sexual fix’; it teases the critical edge of the great gender 
divide. . . .  A simulated ambisexuality threatens the anatomy of binary structures 
which proportion gender identity on one side or the other.”25  This simulated moment 
simulates the movement between the image and the referent to reveal the “referent 
has gone missing.”26  Indeed Kaite’s study directly challenges the assertions of 





representations in pornographic film and their attempts to refer in a unitary, static 
manner.  Finally, Kaite’s study also offers a reading of the inscription of 
pornographic bodies that proposes pornography as a textual challenge to 
oversimplification of any codification of gender and sexuality in general.
These complicated relations are drawn out in Almodóvar’s universe filled 
with transvestites, female impersonators, and characters that deny simple naming 
along gender lines.  Leocadia (feminine) goes by the name Leo (masculine) through 
most of La flor and writes under the pseudonym Amanda Gris.  That name, Amanda 
Gris, is then taken over by Angel, editor of the Culture section of El País when Leo is 
no longer able to write the Gris romance novels.  In Tacones lejanos (High Heels, 
1991) Femme Lethal, the female impersonator who claims to be the “real” Becky on 
posters refuses to state whether “he” is male or female when questioned.  Judge 
Domínguez later reveals that he has played Femme Lethal and Hugo in order to play 
his own informants in cases he has handled.
Thus, mimesis and verisimilitude are less important, and statements such as 
“the feminist critique [of pornography] focuses on the role of pornography in a 
system of sexual subordination and the oppression of women” miss the point.27
Arguments founded in representation of an exploited woman’s body cannot easily 
locate what exactly is being represented since Kaite argues that it is the very rhetoric 
of the pornographic on the screen, rather than bodies, that correspond to the extra-
filmic universe.  In other words, the theories of pornography grounded in 
26 Kaite 44.
27 Dines, Jensen, and Russo 5.
93
explanations of women objectified and subordinated assume too much when they 
assume these are women on the screen.  What is represented is the pornographic 
body in all its photographicality or cinematicality, all its challenge to epistemological 
measures of mimesis.  Likewise, in Kipnis’s terms, it is the fantasy of the 
pornographic genre that is represented, and answering “where exactly is the subject 
(the fantasizer) within the fantasy?” is never easy but always erroneously 
simplistically assumed.28  It is always an erroneous assumption because fantastic 
desire does not function this simplistically, argues Kipnis (and Kaite in different 
terms).  Fantasy, desire, and representation may set scenes, but do not function along 
straightforward, direct, or literal paths.
The pornographic body challenges all levels of definition and delimitation of 
the body, whether medical, political, or cultural.  It even could be seen as a reopening 
of debates around the very creation stories as told in the book of Genesis and the 
difficulty in translating, understanding, and responding to Western “foundational” 
definitions of male and female bodies.  The pornographic, as Kaite describes it may 
very well be a response to Genesis 1:27:
God created humankind in his image,
in the image of God did he create it,
male and female did he create them.29
In all these places, the body is more complicated due to the very repeatability of its 
presentation, its iterability, its cinematicality, than its mimetic presentation.
28 Kipnis, Bound and Gagged 196.
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In one way at least, this turn toward the pornographic body recalls Emmanuel 
Levinas’s discussion of eros.  Eros is a break from the Same, from the structure of 
knowledge, and is one instance of the relation to the other that breaks with the 
structure of the subject comprehending the other as an object of knowledge.  
Contrary to the tropes which suggest love is knowledge—a suppression of alterity—
Levinas offers that the erotic “is a relationship with what forever slips away.”30  It is 
neither direct nor straightforwardly encompassing.  Loving my partner is not 
“having” him or her.  The erotic, then, is the relation with the feminine, not only, 
because the feminine is other to a masculine being because of a different nature but 
also because alterity is in some way its nature.  Alterity is not an attribute of the 
Other but is the relation in regard to the other.
According to Levinas, this ethical relation the feminine calls for is a relation 
with alterity and mystery founded on a withdrawing, not a grasping.  It is founded on 
an absence in opposition to the movement of consciousness that does not invoke 
fixed, monocular images of fixed, monocular sexual bodies.  Perhaps, here too, the 
referent has gone missing.
Perhaps, on the other hand, all these allusions to the ontological 
differences between the masculine and the feminine would appear less 
archaic if, instead of dividing humanity into two species (or into two 
genders), they would signify that the participation in the masculine 
and the feminine were the attribute of every human being.  Could this 
29 Genesis and Exodus: A New English Rendition, trans., with commentary and notes by Everett Fox, 
(New York: Schocken, 1990) 14.
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be the meaning of the enigmatic verse of Genesis 1.27: “male and 
female created He them”?31
Like Kaite’s thesis away from fixed boundaries around pornographic desire and 
pornographic bodies, Levinas’s point here is to break with the Seen image of the 
female as the other.  Otherwise than the possession, power, and relation of 
knowledge of the Seen, Seeing enacts a movement between masculine and feminine 
like he describes here.  The uncertainty of the fixed structure, the skepticism at what 
we are seeing is not a relation to knowledge, not an epistemological dead-end.  
Rather, this ambisexuality, like this attribute of every human being oscillating 
between the masculine and feminine, enacts the folding of the skeptical within the 
philosophical, reiterating, repositioning, reproducing through the cinematic, the 
ethical within the spectatorial.
Seeing is disbelieving in the Seen.  The Seen disregards that uncertainty at 
every step along the way, overwhelming Seeing and returning it to the other side of 
the relation.  Every moment of recognition, then, is also always a moment of 
skepticism.  The cinematic reproduction that makes recognition possible marks the 
very uniqueness of each prior / succeeding cinematic instance.  The recognition of 
the Seen depends upon a play of the same.  The unique would not correspond; thus, it 
would be unrecognizable.  Therefore, never wholly unique nor separate, or else 
unrecognizable, each cinematic instance opens to this very relation between Seeing 
and the Seen.
30 Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo, trans. Richard A. Cohen 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP) 67.
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A Pornographic Romantic Fairy-Tale
In speaking to the question of the pornographic in ¡Atame!, which some have 
argued is his most directly pornographic film, Almodóvar (who has written at least 
one adult audience book32) stated that, “Tie Me Up! Tie Me Down! is almost a 
romantic fairy-tale, but many people attacked it because they took it for precisely the 
kind of sado-masochist movie it isn’t.”33  Here Almodóvar speaks directly to the 
binary opposition between a romantic fairy-tale and a kind of sado-masochist movie, 
challenging viewers who place ¡Atame! easily into one category or the other.  In fact, 
this film works precisely at that verge between the romantic and the pornographic—
the divide so often evoked in definitions of one genre against the other.  It is, very 
often, the lack of romance and surplus of sex that is cited as the primary 
characteristic of pornography while it is the lack of sex and surplus of romance that 
is seen as definitive of the romantic comedy.
¡Atame!, however, is a refilming of both genres, blurring the concepts of 
defining either category as it reproduces the pornographic within the romantic, and 
vice versa.  In so doing, it opens the between, showing the divide between genres to 
be much more permeable than sometimes argued.  What is held as steadfast is 
opened to doubt here as the spectator is asked to disbelieve in the Seen for the sake 
of Seeing.  This is especially shown through the scenes involving Marina in the 
bathtub with the toy scuba diver, the pornographic film of Marina’s earlier career as a 
31 Levinas 68.
32 Patty Diphusa y otros textos (Barcelona: Editorial Anagrama, 1991).  Patty Diphusa and Other 
Writings, trans. Kirk Anderson (Boston: Faber and Faber, 1992).
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“porno actress” watched by Maximo Espejo, the director of the horror film within the 
film, and the sex scene between Ricky and Marina after Ricky returns from the failed 
drug deal.  At a glance, ¡Atame! suggests it will follow the logic and epistemological 
structure—a structure founded in teaching and revealing the truth that cannot be 
shown—of the mainstream pornographic film in two ways.
First, from the early, shielded, scene between Ricky and his woman 
psychiatrist its narrative is established in terms of sex as exchange for other actions.  
Here, giving sex is a way of thanking and / or rewarding others which quotes a good 
number of pornographic films where goods or services, especially groceries and other 
deliveries, are bought and paid for with fellatio, cunnilingus, or some other sexual 
activity.
Like the larger topic of the pornographic body, this pornographic economy of 
exchange is not tied to simple active / passive roles in these scenes.  Often the case is 
that the seller is paid off by allowing him or her to perform oral sex on the buyer, 
thus rewriting fulfillment away from any simplistic definition based on achieving 
sexual climax, away from epistemological discoveries of showing what must not be 
shown.  An economics of ejaculate is not necessarily invoked.  Giving oral sex is 
often tied to the pleasure of giving goods or services.  For example, in “delivery boy” 
scenes, the groceries are often paid for by offering the boy a female roommate to 
perform cunnilingus on.  And in the film Traci Takes Tokyo (1986), Traci Lords 
plays a consultant to the Japanese adult film industry who is paid for her expertise in 
producing sexually arousing pornography.  Her payment for her active education of 
33 Frédéric Strauss, ed., Almodóvar on Almodóvar, trans. Yves Baignères (London: Faber and Faber, 
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the director and cast of the film is that the “virgin boy” is allowed to lose his virginity 
in a scene with her—a scene which in itself struggles to hold to simple demarcations 
of active / passive roles, who gives / receives sex, and who has / takes virginity.  
These separations become even more difficult to assign as Lords pushes the “virgin 
boy” out of the frame at the end of the number and finishes the scene playing with his 
ejaculate.  This film and many others work along this refusal of even simple 
economies of exchange.
Second, ¡Atame! also appears to turn toward the pornographic structure of an 
initiation narrative, starting with the scene of Marina in the bathtub, with its full 
frontal nudity and implications that she is enjoying the scuba diver toy swimming 
against her pudendum and then vibrating between her breasts.  If ¡Atame! were to 
follow this pornographic logic, it would move from this view of the lonely, frustrated 
woman masturbating alone because she is too inhibited to expose her self to another 
person, to her encounter with a surprise mentor who serves as her sexually “mature” 
initiator, to ever more complicated and taboo experiences with larger numbers of 
partners, to a final orgy event which would serve as her coming out party where she 
takes over as the initiator of some newly discovered ingénue.  Thus, if it followed 
this pornographic narrative line, ¡Atame! would be a window on the world of 
Marina’s rise in sexual and psychic power as she overcomes her earlier inhibitions 
and eventually sees all the pleasure they had kept her from attaining.
This narrative strand is left off by the film, however, when Marina exits the 
bath, leaving the scuba diver toy to bang against the side of the tub.  This marina
1996) 102.
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(shore, seacoast; marina) is well endowed with and knowledgeable of marina
(seamanship, nautical art, marine, sea affairs).  She is not simply a port of call but is 
also capable of taking the helm in sexual acts and in relationships, as we see later in 
the film.  As well, this narrative has already been undercut by our being told 
previously, through the dialogue between the director of the film within the film, 
Maximo Espejo, and an interviewer, that Marina has been a drug addict and a porno 
actress.  Despite Maximo’s demand that neither of these facts be spoken of again by 
the interviewer, this revelation has undercut the premise that Marina is an uninitiated 
sexual ingénue—a requirement for the narrative logic of growing knowledge and the 
accumulation of partners described above.  Furthermore, as Marina later states to 
Ricky, she is not alone and lonely, as he would have it.  Despite what he claims to be 
the reality, she has two families (a biological one and a movie industry one) which 
chase after her throughout most of the film.  The situation actually appears to be 
more that Marina is too surrounded, suffocated at times, by her admirers as well as 
her families (not necessarily two distinct categories, of course).  Therefore, as certain 
pornographic premises are reproduced in the film they are also edited from it.  The 
hints and set-ups are there on one hand but just as quickly removed by the other.
On a narrative level, then, ¡Atame! breaks with an epistemological structure 
while refilming the tropes underlying it.  In this story, Marina appears on one side of 
a fixed opposition, only to break with that mold.  She participates as a pornographic 
body, ambisexual in her portrayal and desire, as well as in the masculine and 
feminine.  Thus, her play between enacts the play of Seeing and the Seen.  Between 
certainty and uncertainty, between easy categorization and ambiguity, Marina’s 
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character calls for an ethics through her disavowal of the fixity of the oppositions 
founding the structure.
Where the pornographic does come into ¡Atame! most pointedly and 
seemingly fixedly is in the mise-en-abyme scene where Maximo Espejo sits watching 
a segment from one of Marina’s earlier porno films.  Despite his wife’s requests that 
he do something with her (his wife), Maximo sits in a room alone, entranced by the 
image of Marina having sex on the screen.  Here, too, though, the pornographic is 
shown and not shown at the same time.  Viewers of ¡Atame! do not see more than 
the face and upper torso of Marina on the small screen; however, spectators’ full 
view is of the spectator within the film and his fixation on the visual image of the 
porno film.  This maximo (great, chief) espejo (looking glass, mirror; a glass which 
shows forms reflected) in this scene inscribed with the aural track and partial image 
of a pornographic video reveals not only the iconography of the pornographic actress 
as pornographic body miming the tropes of sexual ecstasy while she fondles her own 
breasts but also an image of a pornographic spectator.
In Hard Core, Linda Williams argues that one of the difficulties of 
pornography has been how exactly to show pleasure and especially the pleasure of 
the female characters.  One of the important elements here is inscribed in the aural 
track, according to Williams.  It is the aural track and the disembodied female voice 
moaning and crying out during the sexual scenes which
may stand as the most prominent signifier of female pleasure in the 
absence of other, more visual assurances.  Sounds of pleasure…seem 
almost to flout the realist function of anchoring body to image, 
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halfway becoming aural fetishes of the female pleasures we cannot 
see.”34
Indeed, it is arguable that this aural element signifies the pornographic in general 
more than any visual image of penetration, engulfment, or male or female 
ejaculation.35  Therefore, as much as this scene in ¡Atame! refuses full disclosure of 
the visual elements of the pornographic video Maximo watches, it fills the aural 
space with the pornographic “aural fetish of female pleasures we cannot see.”36  The 
pornographic imposition of the moans from the video challenges here the speech of 
Maximo and his wife, who are not having sexual intercourse in the scene, for aural 
priority in a radical juxtaposition of the visual and the aural.  Thus, the scene further 
challenges the monocular privilege of the fixed (obvious) visual in the film by setting 
this competition into play.
By placing the spectator and the porno video in the film while at the same 
time denying those pornographic tropes the domination of the scene, ¡Atame! further 
challenges the conceptual divide between the pornographic and non-pornographic.  
At its most pornographically obvious, it is difficult to judge what to believe or where 
to pay attention.  Here, ¡Atame! is the most open to the movements of Seeing rather 
than the monocular stasis of the Seen
34 Williams 122-3.
35 For one instance of this privileged trope of pornography see the X-Files television show episode 
where the character Mulder is seen watching a video with a soundtrack filled with moans and cries.  It 
is supposed that he is watching a pornographic video—a habit often alluded to for this character.  Yet, 
when spectators see the image on the television screen, the video displays killer bees attacking 
screaming and moaning victims.
36 Williams 123.
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As well, the image of Marina in the video is made more complicated by 
Kaite’s reading of the image of the female breast in pornographic photographs.  Here, 
as Kaite’s survey notes of other pornographic films, while Marina fondles her breasts 
only one breast is visible at a time.  While Marina is lying on her back, the first 
breast with erect nipple is shown as the second is covered by her partially open 
blouse.  Then, the first is covered by her hand as she rolls on her side, showing the 
second.  These separated breasts in the diegetic space, argues Kaite, are a 
construction of the pornographic ambisexuality of the female model.  The singular 
breast is “part of a spectacular articulation of the body which re-presents femininity 
in partially phallic terms.”37  The singular breast with its erect nipple is coded away 
from the femininity of breasts, a history of which Kaite discusses, and toward the 
phallic in an economy which transforms “natural flesh to fetish.”38  This 
transformation, then, is a partial phallic endowment of the breast, argues Kaite.  This 
scene is not simply a revealing of the female body but is a pornographic refilming of 
the female breast into new terms—terms which, according to Kaite, question the very 
simplistic bifurcation of genders.  From the earlier scuba diver toy to the single, erect 
nipple, then the phallic is picked up and discarded, only to be picked up again, as 
Marina continues to participate in this ambisexual movement of the pornographic 
body.  Therefore, what the scene questions is the position of the spectator here.  
Kipnis’s question regarding the undecidability of identification returns.  Where 
exactly is the subject (the fantasizer) within the fantasy? 
37 Kaite 40.
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Unable to move from his wheelchair and unable to reach Marina, due to her 
refusal of his advances as well as to her kidnapping by Ricky, Maximo is restrained 
to a space where he is only allowed access to Marina’s image and voice.  (His wife 
does not enter this space as she speaks to him from the doorway only.)  Furthermore, 
since the image from the porno video questions the very gender role of sexual 
initiator Maximo strives to put himself into, it challenges Maximo’s position as 
director of anything, let alone his sexuality.  Confronted by the image of Marina’s 
erect nipple and his own inabilities, Maximo’s isolated space signifies what Maximo 
is not in comparison to Marina.  It is in the “most pornographic” moment of the film, 
then, that the gender-power nexus is most problematic, most breaking with the Seen 
put under pressure by Seeing.
This looking glass, as well, is thrown up against the spectator of ¡Atame! and 
works to return the gaze on Marina’s body in the tub, slightly distorted by the screen 
of the water, and the presumed pleasure of Marina’s face as she laughs while taking 
the bath.  As much as that earlier scene hints at the possibility of a pornographic 
narrative line, this scene reflects that presumption back at the spectator of ¡Atame!, 
placing, after the fact, the spectator in a space adjacent to Maximo.  If the earlier 
scene sutures the spectator into the logic of the pornographic narrative, this later 
scene of Maximo watching unravels that first suture.  The possible suture of the first 
scene functions through the pornographic trope of, first, the scuba diver toy against 
the pudendum and then between the breasts of Marina and then, second, the signifier 
of Marina’s sexual pleasure in using the toy—her face with its growing smile and 
38 Kaite 40.
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eventual laughter.  The “guarantee” to the spectator is not only in the image of the 
sexual contact, but also in the codified image of the woman’s face and the sound of 
her voice.
This later video scene doubly questions the pornographic trope of the earlier 
one, however.  On one level, by showing the spectator, Maximo, watching the porno 
video, by revealing that there is a spectator to that film and, thus, to the earlier scene 
by correlation, it reveals the cinematic reproducibility of the pornographic scene and 
its possible spectator positioning.  By revealing the spectator later, it alludes to a 
spectator sooner.  As well, the disjuncture of the soundtrack of the porno video, the 
disjuncture of the tonal quality of the Marina’s moans with the rest of the video’s 
soundtrack, effectively reveals the post-synchronous recording of the sound and the 
illusion of that particular sound as a signifier of pleasure.  Thus, it introduces the 
problematic that if Marina’s pleasure in this scene is a pornographic trope, then her 
pleasure in the earlier one might be one also.39  In this way, the earlier scene’s 
pornographic inscription of a textual body is put under erasure by the latter’s 
pornographic filming and unfilming of a cinematic body.  Therefore, the filming of 
the second body draws out the filming of the first body while at the same time 
refilming the pornographic troping of the first body by reproducing it in the video.  
Marina’s body is both the pornographic body and its other, underwriting and erasing 
39 Post-synchronous sound and the play it allows are common tropes of Almodóvar’s films.  As well, 
this joke is carried over to such non-pornographic films as The Favor, the Watch, and the Very Big 
Fish (1991), where two characters meet and fall in love while dubbing the sound for a pornographic 
film.
105
the structure of the pornographic tropes throughout the film, opening the film to a 
radical uncertainty of Seeing.
This filming and unfilming of the signifiers of cinematic pleasure also comes 
into play in the scene between Marina and Ricky after Ricky’s failed drug deal (a 
scene which almost earned the film an X rating, and thus distribution problems, in 
the United States).40  While being the main sex scene of the film, in terms of the 
romantic narrative of the two lovers eventually recognizing their emotions for one 
another, it is also a subversion of the codes or pornographic tropes, from within a sex 
scene.  As has already been noted, Marina is not the uninitiated and is more than 
capable of taking control of the sex act as she is the one who says she will insert the 
penis into her vagina and eventually takes the “top” position.  As well, the pain of her 
being penetrated does not guide the care that must be taken.  Rather, it is the pain of 
Ricky, who has been beaten by the drug dealers, and his sore-covered body, which 
dictates the position and pace of their act.  In further refilming cinematic signifiers of 
pleasure, the typical domination of the female voice on the soundtrack41 is reversed 
as it is Marina who speaks most of the dialogue in subdued tones, while Ricky 
screams and moans out loud in pleasure and pain.  And, against the realm of visual 
assurances of pleasure, both male and female, it is when she feels Ricky inside of her 
that Marina states she remembers him and recognizes him.  As he has commented, 
his “cock” is the only thing his assailants left alone, yet his “cock,” either 
penetrating-being engulfed or ejaculating, is not what is shown (neither in the 
40 Strauss 102.
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opening shots nor in the shots of the mirrors over the bed) to signify pleasure.  
Rather, pleasure is re-inscribed in the pleasure of tactile contact and expressed via the 
dialogue of recognition on the soundtrack.  At each point along the list of 
pornographic signifiers of pleasure, then, this scene refilms the trope.  The scene 
quotes (mirrors) the pornographic almost trope for trope but reworks each trope 
almost to the point of erasing the pornographic in this scene.  As Almodóvar has 
said, many people took this film “for precisely the kind of sado-masochist movie it 
isn’t.”  This statement does not deny the sado-masochist movie it is.  It corrects those 
who saw it and believed it could be easily placed in a seemingly known category 
while it was all along rewriting the very conventions that work to define such 
categorization.
Do you believe this?  Yes.  No.  The minute the question is raised, the 
structure opens toward an infinity at play between these two answers.  Uncertainty is 
precisely what cannot be allowed.  Or is it?  Perhaps the very definition of alterity as 
the distance in time between these two answers, is the definition of the skeptical 
question.  Perhaps the very question should be situated between the poles of the 
pornographic and non-pornographic as these genres participate in this infinite 
questioning.  They are in need of one another’s difference, in need of the continued 
asking of the question.  Perhaps it is on this very doubt that these genres are founded, 
and this is what Almodóvar teaches us.  Perhaps this is what the cinematic teaches 
the ethical and the ethical teaches the cinematic.  This is a foundational uncertainty, 
then, never permanent, but always at play.  Not only the pornographic is uncertain, is 
41 Williams 123.
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ambisexual and refuses the monocular.  Rather, the cinematic founded in this regard 
(gaze / care) it demands of spectators, depends upon this unsettling questioning.
Breaking the Binding
Along with these internal reflections, ¡Atame! also turns the looking glass to 
other Almodóvar films and other considerations of the linking of the pornographic 
and the non-pornographic.  The porno video scene in ¡Atame! also returns to the 
opening sequence of Matador where Diego, a torrero who has been prematurely 
retired from bullfighting because he was gored, masturbates while watching slasher 
videos.  In ¡Atame!, Maximo is the director of low-budget horror films similar to the 
ones Diego, the director of a bullfighting school, is watching.  Here, these films 
highly concerned with mirror images intersect.  Like almost all of Almodóvar’s male 
characters, both men are wounded, Maximo by his stroke and Diego by being 
penetrated by a bull’s horn, and both men are shown as the spectators of videos 
within the films, mirroring the spectatorship of the films.  Like the porno video scene 
in ¡Atame!, this slasher video scene also challenges monocular cinematic gender 
alignment.  Both video scenes open both films to further questions concerning 
spectatorship that Carolyn Clover asks in Men, Women, and Chainsaws: Gender in 
the Modern Horror Film and Paul Julian Smith does in “Pornography, Masculinity, 
Homosexuality: Almodóvar’s Matador and La ley del deseo.”
¡Atame! refilms Almodóvar’s immediately preceding Mujeres al borde de un 
ataque de nervios, challenging any monocular interpretation of Almodóvar’s work in 
general.  If, in part, Mujeres displays the story of Pepa’s apartment as a woman’s 
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space of renewal and transformation once men are removed from it,42 then ¡Atame!
comments on the solitude and danger of such a space which can be easily invaded by 
a kidnapper—although the kidnapping also becomes complicated by Marina’s 
statements to her sister, Lola, that she has fallen in love with her kidnapper, Ricky.  
Being tied to a position is never an easy situation with Almodóvar.  Unlike Pepa’s 
apartment, Marina’s is the space of her attack and confinement in a way that mirrors 
how Mujeres, by its very success, is the film which led to a binding of Almodóvar by 
interpretations which tried to resolve the dilemma of whether he was a “woman’s 
director” or a “misogynist.”  By challenging the very elements of Mujeres’s seeming 
empathy for women’s lives in a Spain disbanding more barriers as it moves past its 
dictatorial history after Franco’s death, ¡Atame! works to return viewers to Mujeres
for another interpretation, reopening that “first” film and the seeming opposition 
between the two.43
Of course, women on the verge of a nervous breakdown are always just that, 
women on the verge.  As in the Spanish title, they are women “at the border.”  They 
remain at the limit, never quite crossing out of the bounds of the social, cultural, and 
42 See Peter William Evans, Women on the Verge of a Nervous Breakdown (Mujeres al borde de un 
ataque de nervios, BFI Modern Classics (London: British Film Institute, 1996).  It might be more 
accurate even to refer to the Spain of Almodóvar’s cinema as “post-Warhol.”  In the introduction to 
his adult audience book, Patty Diphusa, Almodóvar remarks that it was Warhol’s visit to Madrid in the 
early eighties that made the first cracks in repressive Spain’s armor.  After hosting Warhol, Madrid, or 
at least Almodóvar’s segment of Madrid, could not go back.
43 For Almodóvar, this period might be described as “post-Warhol,” rather than “post-Franco,” as he 
writes in the introduction to Patty Diphusa that the early 1980s were, for him, a period linked to Andy 
Warhol’s time in Madrid and Almodóvar’s life “in a permanent Warhol factory” (x).  Almodóvar, who 
was often introduced as “the Spanish Warhol,” asserts that his own female characters, especially Patty, 
are cousins to the misled women in Warhol’s films and share much with these and other American 
creations: Divine, Holly Golightly, and Fran Lebowitz, for example.  Interestingly, it is now possible 
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personal breakdowns surrounding them.  As well, according to Peter William Evans, 
the men also inhabit this space “if not of nervous breakdown then at least of 
structural fatigue”44 as they now (after Franco and the influence of Warhol and with 
the rise of feminism, socialism, and psychoanalysis in Spain) face a society unwilling 
to accept a continuation of unquestioned patriarchal hegemony.  The point here is 
that in Mujeres, as in other Almodóvar films, the space of the challenges comes at 
the limit, at the outer margin.  Its confrontations with codifications touch at the edges 
or boundaries of the system it works to displace in a never permanent overturning 
that would return to the logic of the system.
Pepa, the central woman of Mujeres, is a character abused by men in the film, 
and the film’s comical portrayal of that abuse would seem to leave the film open to 
attacks of misogyny.  At the same time, however, it can be argued that the women in 
Mujeres are “presented as warm, attractive, feeling, sympathetic individuals, 
infinitely superior to the cold and calculating men who take advantage of them.”45
The difficulty does not end with the narrative, though, as the cinematography and
visual portrayal of Pepa also breaks with monocular closure.  One scene, especially, 
highlights this play between Seeing and the Seen.  While she is changing outfits, 
Pepa asks her admirer Carlos to avert his eyes.  At first, the camera is tied to Carlos’s 
point of view as he looks at her before she undresses.  However, as he turns away as 
she disrobes, the camera moves to a longer shot with no specified internal point of 
to speak of a growing post-Almodóvar cinema arising in such films as Y tu mamá también (2001) and 
Lucía y el sexo (2001), which combine such misled and misleading female characters.
44 Evans 36.
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view of a semi-nude Pepa changing clothes.  The gaze denied in the narrative 
becomes immediately the gaze enacted by the camera position.  Spectators see what 
Carlos does not when the camera shows the spectator what, for propriety’s sake, 
must not be shown.  This is the oscillation between poles that Almodóvar’s cinema 
plays at, opening toward the alterity between the pornographic and the non-
pornographic.
A Farcical Pornographic Tale
Four years after ¡Atame!, and following the production of Tacones lejanos, 
Kika marks a return to investigating the disruption pornography causes when placed
beside the non-pornographic.  Although Almodóvar’s cinema is not considered hard-
core pornography by most, it has learned a good deal from the pornographic and has 
integrated that difference to question non-pornographic cinema, most notably in the 
“money shot” in Kika.
The dual-pathed story of this film is quite traditional (and related to the 
romance narrative of ¡Atame!) with its separate protagonists finally meeting in the 
end.  One story line follows the adventures of a tabloid television show host, Andrea, 
who travels around Madrid with a camera mounted on her head so that she can shoot 
any scenes which may be of use.  The other traces the police search after an escaped 
male pornography star / rapist, Paul Bazzo.  Both these story lines circulate around, 
Kika, a make-up artist who lives with Ramón, a lingerie photographer, and whose 
cleaning lady, Juana, is really Paul Bazzo’s sister.  The stories arcs collide when the 
television host arrives on the scene of the attempted police capture of the 
45 Gwynne Edwards, Indecent Exposures: Buñuel, Saura, Erice & Almodóvar (London: Marion 
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pornography star / rapist while he is attacking Kika.  Two of the tropes Almodóvar 
refilms here are the text-spectator positioning of the subjective camera and the 
“pornotopic” space of the “money shot” in pornography.
Since he shows us portions of selected scenes through the head-mounted 
camera, Almodóvar makes literal the notion that camera placement and image is 
often located in imagined character position and hence viewer positioning.  Here, 
Kika displays the supposed suturing that takes place in the spectator’s head.  Like the 
video-viewing scenes in ¡Atame! and Matador, these mounted-camera scenes in Kika
challenge any simple reading of the cinematic (spectator-film) relationship.  By 
displaying shots taken through this camera and then displaying the woman with the 
camera mounted on her head, this film makes the machinations of the suture system 
plain while at the same time revealing within the film a portion of the physical 
apparatus and the symbolic link that has dominated classical mainstream cinema.  
According to traditional suture theory, shot one gets its meaning from shot two as 
shot two reveals who was looking in shot one.  However, in addition to making this 
ideological suturing of the classical style literal, Kika also problematizes suturing by 
often reversing the order of the signification of the shots.  By sometimes showing the 
woman with her camera first and then showing the shot through the camera, the film 
questions the temporal logic of the suture sequencing.
As with other examples, though, this play is always at the verge of the 
structure, always an oscillation that never works simply to replace that prior logic 
with a “new” opposition under the same logic.  Rather than return to this same, 
Boyars, 1995) 191.
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Almodóvar’s cinema suspends the system, if only for an instant, in the way 
skepticism suspends philosophy and ethics suspends ontology.  The Seen always 
returns while Seeing suspects its dominance and makes it suspect.
In addition to this play with traditional identification, there is also a play with 
the pornographic through Kika both reproducing and altering the pornographic 
within it.  The sequence in which the police fail to apprehend the escaped 
pornography star / rapist46 while the camerawoman arrives at the apartment building 
is telling.  In one section of her book The Future Of an Illusion: Film, Feminism, and 
Psychoanalysis (1989) Constance Penley discusses the visual iconography of 
pornography and especially “the closed world of the typical pornographic scene”47
where all else is removed and where the space of the frame becomes tighter and 
tighter as the sex scene continues, usually ending in the close-up on the ejaculating 
penis or (and sometimes as well as) on the face of the moaning woman, signifying 
her pleasure in the “money shot.”48
One example of this “pornotopic” closure of space, in another film on the 
verge of the pornographic, comes in the fellatio scene in Nagisa Oshima’s Ai no 
korida (In the Realm of the Senses, 1976).  Here Yoshizo (a.k.a. Kichizo) Ishida lies 
46 This split persona of the character recalls the entire double handedness of Almodóvar’s cinema as 
well as the debate over his position as a “woman’s filmmaker” or misogynist.  It is precisely this 
treatment of the rape scene in the film that earned it an NC-17 and then an Open rating from the 
MPPDA, severely limiting its distributions and almost financially ruining the film.
47 Constance Penley, The Future Of an Illusion: Film, Feminism, and Psychoanalysis (Minneapolis: U 
of Minnesota P, 1989) 84. Walter Kendrick and Linda Williams also discuss this closure of 
pornographic space in some films as an image of sexual utopia in pornography or “pornotopia,” where 
the problems of the world, which are problems of sex, can be resolved through better, uninterrupted 
sex (Williams 147).
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on the couch smoking as his lover Sada Abe fellates him until he ejaculates.  As a 
part of its attempt to push “obscenity” beyond itself, Korida follows the inscribed 
structure that as the pornographic narrative logic is followed toward the horizon of 
the signification of the ejaculating penis, space is further and further limited to a 
concentration upon the contact of organs or mouth and organs.  All outside the world 
of the bodily contact is seemingly removed, as the close-up is followed until the 
frame is filled with the image of ejaculate flowing out of the mouth of the woman 
and back onto the penis, reproducing the pornographic logic.  Like the opening 
scenes of ¡Atame!, one of the folds of Kika is its reproduction of this iconography 
until the very moment of the money shot itself, challenging the definition of the 
money shot as well as assumptions about the logic of pornographic space.
In the sequence of the money shot, the pornography star / rapist arrives at the 
apartment where his sister, Juana, is working as a housekeeper.  Since he is desperate 
for food, money, and sex with a woman, Juana makes a deal for him to leave in the 
promise of sex, twice, later.  Recalling differently Marina’s statement to Ricky in 
¡Atame!, Juana demands, “tie me up,” and knock me out while you rob the place.  
Once he has restrained her in the kitchen and knocked her unconscious in this 
Spanish farce, though, he cannot resist the other woman, Kika, sleeping in the 
bedroom.  Almodóvar’s focus on being bound and the possibilities as well as 
limitations that can come from bondage reappear here.  As well, his filmmaking’s 
internal referencing and undoing is signaled again as Juana speaks the same words, 
“tie me up,” to her brother as Marina did to Ricky.  In the “second” film, though, 
48 See Linda Williams’s discussion of the money shot as attempted signifier of female pleasure in 
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Juana’s desire is to produce a scene for Paul and the police, so that Paul can escape, 
and she can maintain her position in society.  In the first, Marina’s request / demand 
to be bound by Ricky comes late in the film, after she claims to have fallen in love 
with him.  She says she cannot control herself and asks to be tied down to insure that 
she will not leave while he is out of the apartment that has served as her cell.  In this 
way, Marina asks to be held in her position precisely so that she can maintain her 
position.
The camera follows the pornography star / rapist into the smaller spaces of 
the apartment and into the bedroom where he fondles and then mounts Kika (asleep 
beneath a painting of a nude) while she remains asleep.  Still a farce and a 
pornographic scene, the close-ups continue until Kika is awakened by the rapist on 
top of her.  She resists, but he threatens her with silverware (recalling the pocket 
knife Angel “wields” in his attempted rape of Eva in Matador) and tells her that he is 
trying to beat his own record of coming four times without pulling out.  The camera 
closes in on her face as she asks him please to hurry.
In order precisely to hurry him along, Kika begins to moan and reproduce the 
aural and visual tropes of arousal.  Through the scene, then, her actions oscillate 
between directly resisting the rapist by hitting him and yelling at him and performing 
the pornographic arousal in order to end the ordeal.  Kika oscillates between directly 
resisting the assault and turning her body into the pornographic body to produce in 
the rapist the codified, predicted result of the male ejaculation which would end the 
scene.  The film’s cinematic deconstruction of the pornographic, then, challenges the 
Hard Core.
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role of the pornographic by refilming the pornographic scene, revealing its 
underlying construction of the signification of pleasure.  The cinematic body can be 
copied precisely because it is filmed.  Kika’s performance reproduces the trope of the 
naturally always ready and able male pornography star, the illusion of the sexually 
potent rapist, the always aroused and desirous female sexual partner, and the 
seemingly transparent link of sexual activity and woman’s pleasure in pornographic 
cinema.
The sequence also raises questions about this relationship between the filmic 
and the real as Kika challenges the rapist’s deluded statements about his sexual 
ability and irresistibility.  The rapist asks Kika if he is any good, explaining to her 
that he is always highly complimented on the sets of his pornographic films.  
However, Kika responds, “This is not a film . . .this is an authentic rape.”  Recalling 
the Belgian artist René Magritte’s painting, L’usage de la parole I (1928-9), this 
statement, within the film dialogue, questions the logic of non-contradiction by being 
nonsensical and sensical simultaneously.  For the spectator this is another filmic rape 
and not an authentic one, therefore, a filmed sex scene the same as in any 
pornographic film.  However, for the speaker of the lines of dialogue, it is not a film 
but an authentic rape, and, thus, not the same as any pornographic film.  Both on the 
level of the signification of pleasure and on that of differentiating the cinematic from 
the non-cinematic, Kika challenges any monocular judgments, calling for a response 
that is otherwise.
While cinematically reproducing the pornographic here (and questioning the 
separation of the pornographic from the non-pornographic), Kika also refuses its 
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tropes by expanding the space of the money shot.  While the rape continues in the 
bedroom, the camera leaves the space, revealing the voyeur (the spectator within the 
film again, like Maximo) on the balcony across from Kika’s and his telephone call to 
the police at the station.  The film cuts to that station and an extended conversation 
concerning feeling time and killing time.  The sex scene continues as Paul Bazzo is 
still raping Kika, but the camera is not closed in on Kika’s face or any small space in 
the room.  Rather, the simultaneous inactions of the police station fill the screen.  
The police do arrive at the apartment to rescue Kika from the rapist, and after some 
effort they manage to pull the actor / rapist off her.  He runs to the balcony ejaculates 
over the railing.  The sequence then cuts to the street below and the arriving 
camerawoman who looks up toward the sixth-floor balcony and the commotion only 
to be struck in the face by the ejaculate from above.  The pornographic logic of the 
closure of space is shattered as the money shot takes place across a cut which 
signifies a space of seven stories between the penis and the face of the woman.  
Through this farce the film is able to both reproduce pornographic iconography of the 
closure of space and the money shot while also undoing both at the same time.  The 
actor in this film ejaculates onto the face of a woman; however, the spacing and 
editing involved are different from the pornographic trope.  Here reproduction and 
dissimilitude come simultaneously.
Cinematic Displacement
Because it challenges spectator positioning, reproduces and undoes the suture 
system, and refilms the tropes and iconography of pornography the cinema of Pedro 
Almodóvar challenges and displaces the pornographic and the non-pornographic, 
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showing how both genres are bound in a relationship of difference.  The above 
comparison with Oshima and Korida is by no means neutral.  Oshima himself 
claimed with Korida to be producing a pornographic film, “a film of sexual organs 
and sexual intercourse”49 which would challenge hierarchic systems of division and 
classification.  Like Almodóvar, Oshima has been a director questioned by censors 
and critics for his treatment of sexuality and pornography. 50  And, like Almodóvar, 
Oshima’s stated intention for reproducing the pornographic has been to overturn the 
binary opposition between “obscenity” and “art” to show that “‘obscenity’ does not 
exist to begin with.  Both directors in Derridean fashion, then, practice an 
overturning of their confronted opposition.  However, it is in their second steps that 
they differ.
Oshima’s practice during the production of Korida was concerned with 
pushing obscenity to the limit of its definition.  This film, according to his accounts, 
is a challenge to the definition of obscenity by producing something more obscene 
than anything yet produced.  Korida is a film that broke taboos, and as he states, “A 
film that broke taboos was, to me, a pornographic film.”51  By pushing the limits ever 
further with each production, Oshima implies a testing and eventual overturning of 
obscenity so that pornographic film can be taken seriously: “Only thus can 
‘obscenity’ be rendered essentially meaningless.”52  Oshima’s intention then, while 
49 Nagisa Oshima, Cinema, Censorship, and the State: The Writings of Nagisa Oshima 1956-1978, 
trans. Dawn Lawson, ed. and intro. Annette Michelson (Cambridge: MIT P, 1992) 260.
50 See Edwards’s discussion of the influence of Korida on Matador on page 165.
51 Oshima 260.
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overturning the opposition between art and obscenity, leaves the system—the logic 
of oppositional binaries—intact.  His pushing of obscenity to its limit does not 
counter the actual separation and hierarchization between art and obscenity, but 
rather attempts a neutralization of “obscenity” by making it (and the taboo associated 
with “obscenity”) disappear.53  However, with the system still intact, as soon as 
obscenity is pushed to its limit, defined through its history, that history changes to 
incorporate the new limit as a moment within its limit and thus calls for yet another 
pushing of the limit.  Oshima’s strategy can push the limit continually or exit the 
debate completely, but both strategies result in leaving the original system in place.
One way of responding to Almodóvar’s cinema, though, (as I am proposing) 
is that it works toward a general displacement of the system through an opening 
toward alterity.  This opening comes by confusing the boundaries between art and 
obscenity, between uncertainty and certainty (if we can allow these terms to stand for 
the moment), by producing the one within the other and vice versa.  Thus, this 
cinema opens toward alterity by destabilizing the binary opposition of the aesthetics 
of art and the ethics of obscenity.  By demonstrating the cinematicality of both the 
artistic and the obscene through their quoting, Kika, ¡Atame!, and other films by 
Almodóvar show the interdependence of both.  By misquoting, these films also 
perform an undoing of the very constructs of these tropes and thus show the 
construction at their origin.  These films do more than they show on the surface.  




opposition which relies upon its other in order to formulate itself.  Seeing between 
the Seens remains bound between them as it binds them to one another.  Thus, the 
general system of this production of the artistic and the obscene opens around this 
boundary which rigorously refutes conclusion—the conclusion of the film or auteur 
in Kika, for example, or the conclusion of the spectator in ¡Atame! or Mujeres, for 
example.  Thus, this suspension of conclusions in general signals displacement of the 
cinematic conclusion in general in a rigorous non-allergic reaction to the other, a 
relation of not inscribing the suspension of conclusion under the rubric of the same 
and, thereby, bringing it to its conclusion.
Almodóvar, like Derrida, then works against certain models of certainty, 
through a different mode.  He marks the cinematic tradition in a fashion not unlike 
Gregory L. Ulmer writes that Derrida marks the philosophic tradition.  As Ulmer 
remarks about Derrida’s writing other than Lacan in response to Poe’s “Purloined 
Letter,”
Against the transcendental reduction’s ideal of tradition as the 
“repetition of the same,” of history as a transparent medium and 
translation as univocity, Derrida proposes to capitalize on the 
equivocity and consequent errors and accidents that send all 
dispatches on a possible detour to the dead letter office.54
What we see here, then, is how the cinema of Almodóvar strategically 
inhabits the space between the pornographic and non-pornographic to expose the 
54 Applied Grammatology: Post(e)-Pedagogy from Jacques Derrida to Joseph Beuys.  Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins UP, 1985.  150.
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very difficulty in separating them and how reliant upon one another they are.  It is not 
that far from the way that Derrida will explain the relation between competing 
metaphysical concepts and Levinas will explain the relation between skepticism and 
philosophy.  The relationship between the pornographic and the non-pornographic 
runs parallel to that between skepticism and philosophy.  As skepticism is the gadfly 
to philosophy, so is the pornographic the gadfly to the non-pornographic precisely 
because the first term in each is the non-founding ground to the second.
This relationship recalls discussions of what is often deemed as the very birth 
of film (in regard to Eadweard Muybridge’s series photography from 1877-1885) in 
series images of nude women in motion.55  Its earliest birth pangs, outlined in work 
such as McNair, Muller and Faris, Slade, and a recent article by Douglas Keesey, 
which takes a decidedly different tack from that given here, are not so far from us 
today.  Historically one might look at the most recent releases of non-pornographic 
(?) films dedicated to telling tales of facets of the pornographic (?): Porn Star: The 
Legend of Ron Jeremy (2001), The Fluffer (2001), or Boogie Nights (1997) and 
Shooting Porn (1997).  Or one might consider the rise of the pornographic (?) within 
non-pornographic film (?) highly influenced by Almodóvar’s project from the start: 
the Mexican Y tu mamá también (dir. Alfonso Cuarón, 2001) or the Spanish Lucía y 
el Sexo (Sex and Lucia, dir. Julio Medem, 2001). The two have always danced, but 
55 The latest printing of Linda Williams’s book on pornography has for its cover a section of one of 
Muybridge’s series.  On this cover, the classic birth of cinema is marked to stand in for that which 
must never be shown, the pornographic.  The pornographic on the cover of a book on pornography is 
impossible; thus, the pornographic from a text generally considered for its historical rather than 
pornographic place is reiterated in its stead.
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the lead has changed with each set and sometimes from tune to tune.  To misquote 
Levinas here
The non-pornographic is not separable from the pornographic, which 
follows it like a shadow it drives off by refuting it again at once on its 
footsteps.  Does not the last word belong to the non-pornographic?  
Yes, in a certain sense, since for cinema Seeing is exhausted in things 
seen.  But the pornographic in fact makes a difference, and puts an 
interval between Seeing and the Seen.  Pornography is refutable, but it 
returns.56
56 The original Levinas quote from Otherwise Than Being reads, “Philosophy is not separable from 
skepticism, which follows it like a shadow it drives off by refuting it again at once on its footsteps.  
Does not the last word belong to philosophy?  Yes, in a certain sense, since for Western philosophy 
the saying is exhausted in things said.  But skepticism in fact makes a difference, and puts an interval 
between saying and the said.  Skepticism is refutable, but it returns.” (168).
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Chapter Four:
Coda: Oshima Nagisa, Ethics, Justice, and the (Un)Frozen Face
It is extremely important to know if society in the 
current sense of the term is the result of a limitation of 
the principle that men are predators of one another, or 
if to the contrary it results from the limitation of the 
principle that men are for one another.  Does the social, 
with its institutions, universal forms and laws, result 
from limiting the consequences of the war between 
men, or from limiting the infinity which opens in the 
ethical relationship of man to man?
—Emmanuel Levinas1
Should we allow the perversion which fabricates a 
criminal in the absence of a crime?
—Oshima Nagisa2
How are we to reconcile the act of justice that must 
always concern singularity, individuals, irreplaceable 
groups and lives, the other or myself as other, in a 
unique situation, with rule, norm, value or the 
1 Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, trams.  Richard Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP, 1985) 80.
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imperative of justice which necessarily have a general 
form, even if this generality prescribes a singular 
application in each case?
—Jacques Derrida3
The question here is the question concerning the law.  What is the relation of 
the law in regard to cinema spectatorship?  Does the law limit the presupposed war 
of all against all, or does it limit the possibility of a difficult peace of all for all?4
The question of the law is the question of the film Merry Christmas, Mr. Lawrence
(Senjô no Merry Christmas, dir. Nagisa Oshima, 1982) and its reading of the law.  
We can state plainly the themes of this film.  It is about cultures in conflict.  Or, a 
World War II prisoner of war camp.  Or, more general imprisonment, torture, and 
2 Oshima Nagisa, Cinema, Censorship, and the State: The Writings of Nagisa Oshima, 1956-1978, ed. 
and intro.  Annette Michelson, trans. Dawn Lawson (Cambridge: MIT P, 1992) 283.
3 Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The ‘Mythical Foundation of Authority,’” Deconstruction and the 
Possibility of Justice, eds.  Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld, and David Gray Carlson (New York: 
Routledge) 17.
4 I refer to the enactment of the social responsive to the ethical as “difficult peace” to signify its 
dynamic and uncertain character.  To assume we know what “peace” is, from the start, and that it is a 
goal we can achieve, is precisely to fall back into the epistemological ground Levinas asks us to leave.  
Following Levinas, peace is difficult because it is founded in each instance of the ethical encounter 
and not prior to it.  Peace is difficult because it does not signify an absence of war but an opening 
toward the call of the other as the non-ground, the unknown to come in each encounter, that Levinas 
argues must be the first philosophy upon which social relations are thought.  As Levinas states in 
“Peace and Proximity” from Alterity and Transcendence (New York: Columbia UP, 1999) 131-144, 
this peace is not “the peace of a humanity that . . . has already decided in favor of the Greek wisdom, 
which is to await human peace on the basis of Truth (131).  The peace Levinas asks us to consider is 
not “peace preferred to violence” (131), “peace as tranquility or rest” (132), nor peace “consisting in 
the absorption or the disappearance of alterity” (137), where we agree to disagree and all just get 
along.  Rather, a difficult peace is one which functions “as awakening to the precariousness of the 
other” (140), consists in “the fraternal way of a proximity to the other, which would not be simply the 
failure of coincidence with the other, but which would signify precisely the excess of sociality over all 
solitude—excess of sociality and love” (137).  Difficult peace is peace “independent of all 
appurtenance to a system, irreducible to a totality and as if refractory to synthesis” (137).  Difficult 
peace rejects the primacy of the war of all against all and begins with responding to the unique 
responsibility of one for the other.
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cruelty.  Or, more specifically, the reinterpretation of the tale of T. E. Lawrence in 
the 1962 spectacle Lawrence of Arabia (dir. David Lean).  Or, Japanese racism 
toward Koreans and other groups.  Or, death sentences.  Or, homoerotic and 
homosexual relations between men at war.  Or, the impossibility of translating one 
culture to another.  Or, the existential angst and personal failures that haunt human 
beings in an absurd world.  Or, the tensions between the “samurai honor 
consciousness” and “samurai honor culture” still holding sway over Japanese society 
in the modern period.5  The film is about all of these ideas, and discussions of each 
of them would be worthy of some effort.
However, as rich as these topics may be by themselves, they all turn around 
the relation this film builds with the law (as culture and statute) and the difficult 
relation between the law and the ethical.  They all lead to investigations of right and 
wrong and further investigations of legal, social, and moral paradigms which 
question the role of Japanese militarism in the abuse of others.6 Merry Christmas is a 
film, which from its opening scene of the rape trial of a Korean guard and Dutch 
5 Eiko Ikegami, The Taming of the Samurai: Honorific Individualism and the Making of Modern 
Japan (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1995) 6.  Especially interesting might be to read the film’s characters’ 
many contradictory statements through the lens of Ikegami’s sociological study.  Considering, for 
example, the complex role of homoeroticism and homosexuality in the film benefits from Ikegami’s 
judgment that
The fact that the samurai’s honor culture cannot be reduced to a neatly codified 
formula does not mean that no social code existed.  The living form of any honor 
culture always remains in an indeterminate intermediate position between formula 
and formlessness.  In part, it was socially determined; in part, individually defined.  
More specifically, though there was always a tacit social agreement on the definition 
of samurai honor, it could be reinterpreted by a particular individual’s will, physical 
strength, and strategies in the game of honor. (8, Ikegami’s italics)
6 Here, the legal, social, and moral are viewed as codes that can be followed and verified.  For this 
reason, they are grouped with the epistemological as rule-governed structures. Morality and the moral 
are treated separately from the ethical.  Morality, viewed as a moral code or a set of rules such as the 
Decalogue, is associated with legal systems and the epistemological, where right and wrong behavior 
can be judged in terms of truth claims.  This separation will become more refined later in the chapter.
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prisoner to its coda when the condemned Sergeant Hara reminds Colonel Lawrence 
of their Christmas together in the camp, demands judgment from characters and 
spectators.  At every level, the question of Merry Christmas is the question of law 
precisely because the film always returns to calls for judgments based in 
epistemological verifiability and the struggle between legal and moral judgments and 
the ethical.
This question of the law moves in at least two directions.  First, what is the 
relation between Merry Christmas (as an example of director Nagisa Oshima’s 
cinema) and the law in terms of specific legal codes and battles, including early 
studio struggles and Oshima’s latter censorship battles?  Here, issues of censorship 
and the studio and state controls of filmic production are key.  Second, and on a 
broader scale, what is the relation of Merry Christmas to the concept of law (or 
morality) and law’s (or morality’s) foundations in epistemological or ethical 
concerns?  How does responding to Merry Christmas help to answer the question 
concerning the law (or morality) in regard to human relations?
In the end, these two directions converge, and their meeting at a common 
point reveals the difficulty in separating laws from the law (as a concept).  It is at this 
point that the questions regarding the law raised by Merry Christmas converge with 
questions of the ethical and the law raised by Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques 
Derrida.7
7 Discussions of the relation between law and repression are in no way limited to the work of Levinas 
and Derrida, of course.  Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Sigmund Freud, Michel Foucault, Luce 
Irigaray, Stanley Fish, and Drucilla Cornell are a short list of thinkers who have also contributed much 
to discussions of this relation.  However, the work of Derrida and Levinas, especially, allows for a 
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Responding to Merry Christmas, especially the coda of the film, demonstrates 
how the law functions in regard to the epistemological by way of an incomplete 
erasure of the ethical.  It is precisely in the coda that this erasure’s incompleteness is 
put on display through the filmic apparatus of the freeze frame of Sergeant Hara’s 
face on the eve before Hara’s impending execution by the Allied forces.  It is in this 
way that this freeze frame, as a significant specific example, highlights the force of 
freeze frames in cinema, as openings in the epistemological through which the 
ethical is enacted.  By their effect of denying epistemological certainty, by denying 
comprehension, freeze frames open a space for spectators to respond to cinema rather 
than understand it.
The law is necessary but limited.  It is limited by its dependence on the 
epistemological, by its need to pursue knowledge, rather than the human relation, in 
order to reach its verdict.  According to Levinas, “For the philosophical tradition of 
the West, all spirituality lies in consciousness, thematic exposition of being, 
knowing.”8  Within traditional philosophy, with the subject at the center and the 
world assimilated to that subject, the epistemological death drive, the quest for a 
comprehensive, acquisitive, assimilative truth, collapses the personal, the social, the 
singular, and the universal under the law through its quest for positive knowledge 
movement from law and repression to ethics and a significant discussion of a post-phenomenological 
ethics that obtains to the cinema.
8 Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991) 99.  
Levinas continues in Otherwise:
Western philosophy, which perhaps is reification itself, remains faithful to the order 
of things and does not know the absolute passivity, beneath the level of activity and 
passivity, which is contributed by the idea of creation.  Philosophers have always 
wished to think of creation in ontological terms, that is, in function of a preexisting 
and indestructible matter (110).
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and its demand that judgment be made first in regard to the epistemological, effecting 
an erasure of the ethical.  This erasure, which is the foundation of the 
epistemological, is the endeavor to grasp the nature of the world, to possess the 
world through knowing it, rather than to be responsible for it.  Within the 
philosophical tradition, the ethical (this being responsible for the other) occupies a 
secondary or derivative place in regard to the epistemological (the quest to possess 
the world through knowing it, the concern with acquiring knowledge).
Questions of ethics are not independent of other philosophical inquiry.  They 
depend upon answers to metaphysical, ontological, and epistemological inquiries.  
And questions of these latter areas of inquiry depend upon the acquisition of 
knowledge, comprehension—with its root in “prehension” (grasping).9  Within the 
tradition, I grasp the totality of the universe in order to understand what it is for me.  
I hold on to the world; I do not respond to the world with an open handedness.  The 
search for a grand theory of the universe, inaugurated within the tradition, can only 
be a search for a grand theory of the universe as it exists for me.  This totalizing 
search for what the universe means for me has always occupied the primary position 
within philosophy while questions of responsibility for the other have had to come 
after, under erasure.
That erasure is never complete, however, as this film displays, and Derrida 
and Levinas argue.  The erasure of the ethical asymmetrical, nonassimilating relation 
of the self responsible for the other is marked by a trace in the form of the failure of 
9 “Comprehension” from the Latin “comprehendere” (to bind together, unite, hold together, to take 
hold of, grasp, to catch, to attack, to capture) from “prehendere” (to take hold of, grasp, seize).
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the epistemological in the face of its own obligations.  The law (or morality) as a 
social structure for all in relation to all must be based in the epistemological.  The 
epistemological, in order to fulfill its obligation to the law, must found a truth claim 
upon which the law may judge.  However, when the epistemological is shown up to 
have no truth claim, the absence of this truth marks the space of the ethical which 
founds the law prior to the epistemological and to which the epistemological is 
always answerable, yet never able to answer.  The ethical, repositioned as the 
primary area of inquiry, calls the epistemological into question.  Questions of the 
epistemological are no longer independent of other philosophical inquiry.  Now, 
questions of the epistemological depend upon answers to ethical inquiries.  And 
questions of the ethical depend upon the non-totalizing, non-thematizing relation of 
the self responsible for the other.
This chapter responds to Merry Christmas and its aporia by questioning the 
epistemological (as ground for morality and law) by way of the ethical.  In so doing, 
it highlights the traditional erasure of the ethical in the film and this erasure in regard 
to the film / spectator relation.  When, at the film’s close, all certainty is no longer 
certain (and even the certainty that “all certainty is not longer certain” is called into 
question), leaving behind an active skepticism, the law collapses, for an instant, and 
two characters face each other, on unequal terms: the one the victorious soldier, the 
other the condemned prisoner.10  This facing then turns toward the spectator in the 
10 This “active skepticism” is characterized by a radical doubt, which doubts even its own doubting.  
This skepticism radicalizes the philosophical doctrine that absolute knowledge is impossible and that 
inquiry must be a process of doubting in order to acquire approximate or relative certainty.  Its 
radicalization comes from doubting the impossibility of absolute knowledge and from doubting the 
teleological and assimilative structure of the “acquisition” of knowledge.
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final freeze frame of the film, underlining the need and impossibility of an ethical 
response otherwise than the law.  Under the weight of an ethical query, the 
epistemological enfolding of the interdependence of ethics and law as it functions in 
the film’s narrative, visual, and spectatorial relations is brought back into play, 
signifying the possibility the law attempts to write out of human relationships.  The 
law must have its place, but it is impossible for that place to be fixed and remain 
intact because the very freezing contradicts, and therefore highlights, the law’s 
irreconcilable need to remain fixed and also always be in motion.
In the films directed by Oshima Nagisa, battles over questions concerning the 
law and human relationships are most often fought on the ground of the 
epistemological.  This battle is most often displayed as the relation between 
repression and liberation, where repression is always cruel and liberation is freedom 
from repression and its inherent cruelty.11  In these films, the law is something to 
rebel against, and the squelching of that rebellion is what shows up the ultimate 
cruelty of the law.  As necessary and powerful as these issues and films are, they too 
often remain within the realm of the tradition they would challenge.  In the end, they 
offer a “total criticism” that is politically powerful and sometimes persuasive, but 
that does not fundamentally challenge the primacy of the epistemological by 
questioning how it can address the subject’s responsibility toward the other.  This 
primacy of the epistemological is also the realm of Merry Christmas, which does not 
fundamentally break with the concerns of other films directed by Oshima, but 
11 As noted earlier, repression is a term problematized by a number of different thinkers.  However, 
the concentration here on Derridian and Levinasian critiques of the law and repression allow for a 
response to Oshima in specifically ethical terms.
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provides a space for a significantly different consideration of these relations.  As with 
these other films, Merry Christmas is primarily concerned with the law and the 
epistemological foundation of the law.  However, in the final moments of Merry 
Christmas, the film’s address changes in a fundamental way which questions the 
primacy of the epistemological.  As it calls spectators to directly face a condemned 
character in a freeze frame that will not resolve that call, it highlights the significance 
of the epistemological erasure of the ethical.  Merry Christmas does not break with 
total criticism but shows up the ultimate shortcomings of total criticism.
An investigation of the epistemological cannot come from simply opposing 
one verdict to another.  To propose liberation as the route out of repression means 
remaining in the realm of the epistemological.  Neither can an escape come, though, 
through proposing the ethical as the path out of the epistemological.  As much as the 
first route would be no step outside the grasping of the epistemological, the second 
path would be to step outside the epistemological and no longer be able to address 
this grasping.  The point here is to question the epistemological by way of the ethical 
through a rigorous response to the gaps left in the epistemological, such as with the 
freeze frame at the end of Merry Christmas.  These gaps signal the shortcomings of 




Total criticism.  I don’t criticize certain social aspects.  
I am critical of the whole thing.  Social phenomena are 
not the object of my criticism.12
Freedom is not realized outside of social and political 
institutions, which open to it the access to fresh air 
necessary for its expansion, its respiration, and even, 
perhaps, its spontaneous generation.13
Japanese director Oshima Nagisa asserts that he has never taken on specific 
social structures or specific instances of repression for the sole purpose of calling 
those structures or repressions into question.  His goal has been to investigate 
repression, in all its forms, at the largest and deepest levels possible.  This 
investigation, he has stated, has taken the form of a total criticism which seeks to 
argue for a total liberation from repression at every level of the system.
Oshima Nagisa graduated in law from Kyoto University in 1954 and soon 
thereafter joined Shochiku Ofuna studios, first as an assistant director and then as a 
director, with his debut Ai to kobo no machi (A Town of Love and Hope, originally 
The Boy Who Sells a Pigeon), produced in 1959.14  One year later, in a heated debate 
12 Oshima Nagisa, quoted in Joan Mellen, Voices From the Japanese Cinema (New York: Liveright, 
1975) 272.
13 Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne UP, 1969) 241.
14 Arne Svensson, Japan, Screen Ser. (London: Zwemmer, 1971) 78.  Svensson notes that Shochiku 
Ofuna, originally a theater production company, entered film production imitating the American style.  
During World War II, though, the military authorities accused their productions of failing to be 
sufficiently national.  Their postwar survival hinged on successful melodramas and the production of 
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over the release and cancellation of his fourth feature-length film, Nihon no Yoru to 
Kiri (Night and Fog in Japan), he left—or was fired by—Shochiku and began to 
work independently.15  In a certain way, Maureen Turim asserts in her 1998 study of 
Oshima, “All four [of Oshima’s studio] films can be read retrospectively from that 
moment of political censorship” when Nihon was pulled from theatrical release.16
That battle mirrors the very battles against repression displayed in all these films.  
Total criticism confronts repression, offering to replace it with a dynamic liberation 
from repression.
Why did he make this switch from the law to the cinema?  What did he see in 
cinematic production that pulled him away from the practice of law?  The move itself 
is not uncommon as many Japanese government and business officials have 
backgrounds in law without becoming lawyers.  But here Oshima’s relationship with 
the law is more complex.  As he has stated, his move to the cinema was in part to 
criticize the repression of the law from the outside.  By showing the destructive force 
of the law to the society that endorses the repressive law, he would be offering that 
society a route for liberating itself from that destructive force.  As well as having a 
background in law, Oshima also speaks of being active in drama groups and in the 
the first Japanese color film, both of which appealed to female audiences.  Shochiku aimed much of its 
production from that time on toward women (91).  This, at least perceived, lack of full nationalist 
fervor coupled with a post-war concentration on the production of “women’s films” would certainly 
provide a fitting first home for Oshima to hone his craft.  Oshima’s anti-nationalistic bent is prevalent 
in almost all his films.  As well, a question outside the scope of this study might consider whether or 
not it might be possible to consider Oshima a maker of “women’s pictures” in line with directors such 
as the American Douglas Sirk, the Spaniard Pedro Almodóvar, or the Japanese Kenji Mizoguchi.
15 Nihon no Yoru to Kiri is named after the holocaust essay-documentary Nuit et bruillard (Night and 
Fog, 1957) by Alain Resnais.
16 Maureen Turim, The Films of Oshima Nagisa: Images of a Japanese Iconoclast (Berkeley: U of 
California P, 1998) 60.
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student movement while at Kyoto.  That movement, he says in one interview, “was 
generally a political theme not only for the student movement, but for the political 
life in Japan as well.  There was anti-American xenophobia, a certain patriotism, and 
an inclination toward the ideas of official Marxism.”17  Certainly, prior to his 
graduation from Kyoto, he was actively engaged in studies of Marxism and served as 
an active officer in the jichikai (student self-government association), participating in 
at least some political rallies in the early and middle 1950s.18  Although always 
politically active, Oshima refused the politics of party dogmatism.  He has never 
joined a recognized political party and has railed against films and political 
movements he perceives as dogmatic.
His interest in the relation between politics and filmmaking circulates around 
the complex notion of liberation and displaying that liberation as an overturning of 
social and legal repression, as a freedom from that repression.  As Oshima states in 
“Perspective on the Japanese Film,”
The new film that I was thinking of at that time [the beginning of his 
career] consisted of overturning the notion of the “Japanese film” as 
having common elements that depended on homogeneity.  I hoped 
also to bring forward artists who would make individual films that 
would in some sense be directed toward the liberation of mankind.  
Because all of us would be making films in Japan, we would be able 
17 Mellen 261.
18 David Desser, Eros Plus Massacre: An Introduction to the Japanese New Wave Cinema
(Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1988) 32.
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to create a cutting edge of films directed toward the liberation of the 
Japanese people.19
The point here is Oshima’s drive toward liberation, a liberation founded on 
overthrowing the inherited tropes of Japanese “mood” and “atmosphere” as seen in 
the previous generation of filmmakers, such as Mizoguchi, Ozu, and Kurosawa.  
Also, this liberation is from the liberal-humanism of these filmmakers and their ties 
to traditional modes of thought in Japanese culture—irrespective of whether each 
agreed or disagreed with such traditional thought.  And, finally, this liberation is in 
regard to the legal and social fabric of modernizing Japan, especially where that 
modernization was tied directly to traditional (repressive) Japanese culture.
Using concrete instances, many gathered from newspaper stories, the films he 
has directed focus on exposing the cases that have come before social and 
institutional codes and laws and confronted the limits of those codes and laws.  
Repeatedly, he has attacked the law by displaying its shortcomings, its cruelty in 
regard to human relationships.  This drive to overcome this repressive cruelty 
through a liberating cinema is the thrust of total criticism.
In “Perspective on the Japanese Film” Oshima self-effacingly claims, “I 
wasn’t a film lover; it was just that no other company would hire me, so I happened 
to end up at a film company.  But I knew of the existence of the Japanese film based 
on the films I had seen up to that time.”20  On the one hand, he claims he ended up 
with the one company that would hire him, one of the three major film studios in 
19 Oshima, Cinema, Censorship, and the State 14.
20 Oshima 7.
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Japan at the time.21  However, later he states that his 1968 film Koshikei (Death by 
Hanging) “was suggested by a news story.  The real incident took place in 1958 and 
has been the subject of a lot of works, novels and such.  But none of them appeared 
to go into it deeply enough to reveal the core, the inside of the crime.”22  The inside 
of that crime, this film offers, is the cruelty of the Japanese police effort to convict an 
innocent Korean.  An effort, which results, in the filmic display in the police 
reenacting—almost to the point of recommitting—the very crime they accuse the 
young man of having committed.
Considering this statement and the 1968 production, with their central 
concern with delving into and revealing the core of a crime, and that the first four of 
his films were a cycle of “youth films” focused on juvenile crime, it becomes readily 
apparent that Oshima left law studies and yet continued to study the law.  His move 
was an attempt to critique the law from outside, a position he has sustained in his 
comments concerning censorship and the need to produce films that push against the 
limits of censorship in order to overcome it.  From the start, Oshima’s cinema relates 
to an attempt to overcome, to liberate the subject from its repression under the law.  
However, what this attempted liberation comes up against is the fact that by 
attempting to overcome the law, these films return to the boundaries established by 
the law.  They push the terms and definitions established by the law but only by 
returning to those terms to argue with the law according to its own rules.  Within the 
21 According to Oshima, the big three were Shochiku, Toho, and Toei (8).
22 Quoted in Donald Richie, Japanese Cinema: Film Style and National Character (Garden City: 
Anchor, 1971) 137-38.
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binary of repression and liberation, repression remains the master term, and 
liberation remains only non-repression.  Repression remains the key term for 
defining both terms.  And, total criticism remains totalizing.
The early “youth films” on which Oshima worked, and with which “most of 
the New Wave directors began their careers,”23 were concerned primarily with the 
relation between rebellion (liberation) and structure (repression).  The first three 
films he directed were Ai to kobo no machi, Seishun zankoku monogatari (Cruel 
Story of Youth, 1960), and Taiyo no hakaba (Tomb of the Sun / The Sun’s Burial, 
1960).  All three display stories of youth rebelling against older structures.  These 
films follow in the tracks of the French filmmakers active at the same time and their 
production of the nouvelle vague, such as François Truffaut’s Les quatre cents coups
(The Four Hundred Blows, 1959).  They are also linked to the late-fifties films 
directed by Alain Resnais: Nuit et bruillard (Night and Fog, 1957) and Hiroshima 
mon amour (1959).  As well, they follow the themes of several American films, such 
as A Place in the Sun (dir. George Stevens, 1951) and Rebel Without a Cause (dir. 
Nicholas Ray, 1955).  These are rebellion films, focused on young men who are 
“alienated, misunderstood, rebellious but ultimately powerless,…and young”24 and 
show how youth in rebellion are destroyed by the system as it recuperates their 
rebellions.  (This theme of the reassimilated rebel—through punishment and / or 




failure of the system to respond to large portions of its population and the failure of 
rebellions to overcome that initial failure of the system.
The gulf between affluence and impoverishment is always visible but never 
surmountable in these films.  The foreground of the stories are the waterfronts, 
slums, and ghettos of the created subaltern while the background, just visible in the 
mise-en-scène, is the industrial and economic growth of modernizing Japan.  
Spectators and the characters who are sacrificed to modernization can always see the 
new Japan on the horizon but never reach it.  The line between these two realms is 
the social code and the policing (literally or metaphorically) that keeps them apart.  
The police are always in the middle and embody the law (statute or custom) that 
separates the two realms.  In a manner that will be recalled in Merry Christmas, 
Taiyo no hakaba, for instance, displays a story in which the law denies the characters 
access to the larger economy.  Denied access, they must create their own economies, 
such as the buying and selling of human blood, in order to survive.  However, this 
underground economy is illegal, and its very illegality fuels the gang wars for control 
of the market which leads to the deaths of the rebels.  Taiyo’s critique of the system 
is its display of the law creating the crime which serves as the law’s justification for 
existing.  The system creates the criminality that its structures police.
Both Taiyo no hakaba and Seishun zankoku monogatari are juvenile 
delinquency films filled with bars, gangs, and the punishment that must follow on 
obsession and youthful desire for something more than the systems of repression will 
allow.  These youth are excessive in their desires to satisfy their individual 
aspirations rather than settle for what was traditionally offered but no longer 
138
available to them, but their excess must always be considered in the light of the 
excess of Japanese economic expansion on display in the too-far-off distance.  In 
other words, the rebellious—because they are repressed—youth (and spectators) see 
that the realm out of their reach mirrors the realm of their desires, yet demands that 
they stifle their own desires in the light of traditional codes.  The only economy open 
to these anti-heroic characters is the underground one that mirrors the opulence of the 
emerging modern Japan, which is built upon the lower-class labor.  These young 
Japanese buy and sell blood, prostitute and pimp, commit petty crimes, and, as in 
Seishun, work small grift in the form of extortion scams in the light of the larger grift 
they are denied by the system.  Denied access to the larger economic growth of 1950s 
Japan, the young couple in Seishun must extort money from would-be johns Makoto 
sets up in cars around Osaka and then accuses of rape when Kiyoshi arrives on the 
scene to “rescue” her.  They run their scam throughout the film, until after their arrest 
and release in the end, Kiyoshi is beaten to death by the gang he owes money, and 
Makoto is dragged to death behind a car she attempts to escape from after sensing 
that Kiyoshi, now dead, will not arrive to save her.
This mirroring displays the total criticism of the system on both levels.  These 
characters are not celebrated but displayed precisely to show the effects of the 
Occupation and its aftermath—monopoly capitalism’s brutality reinforced through 
the State apparatuses of law and order—in Japan.  By showing the violence on the 
“smaller” scale, these films reflect the violence on which the “larger” scale is 
founded.  What is called into question is not only the law’s culpability in the 
denigration of a large portion of Japanese society, but also the abuse of this lower 
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portion of society which must commit crimes at one level because it is kept from 
committing such crimes at another level.  Held at the bottom of the rigid social 
hierarchy by the law, the greed of these characters is not displayed in opposition to 
the greed of the wealthy, but as a mirror to that larger greed.  According to Turim, 
“Scams will become a trope in many of Oshima’s narratives.  They will become 
textual devices to display logical, if perverse, extensions of capitalist systems of 
exchange.”25 In order to erase this abuse, though, the law must assimilate this 
“underground” economy, through prison and death, so that the mirror of the 
“underground economy” does not reflect the proprietors of the abuse—the law of the 
modernizing Japanese economy.
This exploration of youth rebellion / violent social assimilation came to its 
apex in many ways with the production, release, and pulling of Nihon no yoru to kiri
in 1960.  The battle between Oshima and Shochiku Ofuna studios over the release of 
this film prefaces the famous later battles he would fight against the larger social and 
legal forces of Japan over the censorship of Ai no korida (In the Realm of the Senses, 
1976).  At first released by the studio in October 1960, Nihon was recalled and 
shelved after only three days for too directly confronting political issues in a 
supposedly commercial film.  As Turim notes, Oshima had kept the script a secret 
from the studio heads and was banking on their desires to profit from the emerging 




However, what the new wave of Oshima’s Nihon offered was too radical a political 
indictment for the studio to bear.
Centered on the youth movements in Japan in response to the student 
movements of 1952-1953 and 1959-1960, this film represents for some critics 
Oshima’s “most complete break with the past” of Japanese film production.27  It is 
the dual story of the 1952 Communist student revolt against the AMPO (United 
States-Japanese security treaty) and the 1960 student protest against the renewal of 
the treaty.  Both protests failed, and these two inter-cut wedding tales display that 
failure and a further tightening of systematic repression over movements to challenge 
its authority.  Old style communism is linked to the system in this film, and its 
collusion with the system’s return to a feudal repression of student movements and 
militarism displays how much imperialistic and expansionistic impulses have 
assimilated the previously rebellious voices.  Through the two weddings and their 
highly structured ceremonies, Nihon contrasts the earlier union of the communists 
with their later dissolution and eventual assimilation by the capitalist structures.  
With Nihon, the total criticism of the earlier three films is brought to bear on the very 
forces most often seen as a possible new future for Japan.  The modernization of 
monopoly capitalism, always out of reach in the background of the earlier films, is 
brought to the foreground in Nihon.  The film ends by displaying the failure of a 
more accessible modernizing monopoly capitalism to bring about a change in the 
repressive social structures.  Once the previously outside rebels gain access to the 
27 Desser 25.
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benefits of monopoly capitalism, they are assimilated by it and now have a stake in 
maintaining the repression they once struggled against.
Oshima prefaced the display of this film in his earlier Seishun, where 
Makoto’s older sister, Yuki, and her lover talk of meeting at the student protests of 
1952.  By 1960, though, these earlier rebels have become proprietors of an abortion 
clinic; they are drained of any political or sexual drives save minimal survival.  They 
have abandoned their earlier struggles against repression and become tools in the 
subaltern economy of Osaka’s poorest quarter rather than heroes of any struggle to 
elevate it.  If this disunity and failure of the left is the night that has enshrouded 
Japan, then the impotence it leaves in its place is the fog that lingers over the mise-
en-scène of the film.
Although there remains debate over which of the films Oshima directed is the 
most successful artistically and politically, his most notorious project (for better or 
worse) remains Ai no korida, some of the issues of which were then readdressed in 
its partner film Ai no borei  (Empire of Passion / The Ghost of Love, 1978).  Both 
films deal with a woman who kills her lover, arguably as a sign of the intensity of 
their love.  Ai no korida is based on the stories surrounding Sada Abe and her lover 
Yoshizo (Kichizo) Ishida and Sada’s arrest in May 1936.28  After a torrid affair, Sada 
strangled Kichi during a sado-masochistic sex scene.  When police later arrested her, 
they discovered she had severed Kichi’s penis and was wearing it next to her skin, 
28 Jitsuroku: Abe Sada (The True Story of Sada Abe), directed by Noburu Tanaka, was produced at 
Nikkatsu studio a year prior to Ai no Corrida, and is in some ways a superior treatment of the story in 
regard to its portrayal of Abe Sada, especially in its less deliberately stylized ending.
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wrapped in a “furoshiki (cloth for wrapping gifts).”29  Rosemary Hawley Jarman 
remarks that “The case became notorious, and remains something of a feminist cause 
célèbre with its implications that the stereotype of submissive Japanese women is not 
as accurate as the patriarchal structure of their society seems to suggest.”  
Discussions of the film have always circulated around the connections between 
sexual power and social power and around the explicit nudity and sexuality of the 
film itself.  On the simplest level, the notoriety of the film and its censorship is a 
result of the simple fact that the version of the story directed by Oshima violates the 
Japanese law against showing genitalia in a film.
Critical judgment on this film has been split in regard to its position vis-à-vis 
pornography.30  The film was banned in Japan, and Oshima was charged with 
violating the obscenity laws.  Oshima has stated that his intention in this film was to 
push the definition of pornography further than it has ever been pushed, precisely to 
challenge repressive tenets of the criminal code and censorship.  He defeated 
prosecution on the obscenity charges against him, but the ban on the film was not 
lifted.  According to Oshima, then, this film was a success precisely because it was 
banned; it is the perfect pornographic film because it cannot be shown.
Both Jarman and Donald Richie have disagreed with the charges (and 
Oshima’s claim), however.  “Oshima and producer Anatole Dauman had agreed to 
make a hardcore pornographic film….  In all but the strictly mechanical sense, they 
29 Rosemary Hawley Jarman, “Ai no Corrida: In the Realm of the Senses,” Eros in Hell: Sex, Blood 
and Madness in Japanese Cinema, ed. Jack Hunter, Creation Cinema Collection, vol. 9 (London: 
Creation Books ,1998) 105.
30 See Chapter Three of this study on Almodóvar and the ethics of the genre of pornography for more 
discussion of this issue.
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failed—Ai No korida is the least pornographic film possible,” argues Jarman.31  It is 
too ecstatic and filled with “deep sexual magic” for it to conform to Jarman’s 
definition of the pornographic, based in the Greek meaning of pornographos—”the 
writing of prostitutes”32—and the assumed negative connotation of that definition.  
Likewise, Richie asserts, “in this quite nonpornographic film, Oshima uses sexual 
scenes not to titillate but to show the naked human being in his pathetic nudity.”33
No crude pornography, this film is about the deep themes of the Japanese and human 
condition.  It is a film about the struggle between social obligations and personal 
aspirations, according to Richie.
The director is not concerned with the right or wrong of the situation.  
He is concerned only with the allegorization of the specifically 
Japanese character: the difference between Japanese personal and 
collective character, the ways in which monolithic Japanese society 
affects its individual members.34
This debate is at the center of total criticism.  It is the crux of the situation and the 
boundary against which it always returns.  In his forward to Eros in Hell: Sex, Blood 
and Madness in Japanese Cinema, Jack Hunter explains “Japanese censorship 
permits (virtually) anything except the depiction of genitalia.  Doubtless by default, 
31 Jarman 105.
32 Jarman 105.
33 Joseph I. Anderson and Donald Richie, The Japanese Film: Art and Industry, expanded edition 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1982) 466.
34 Anderson and Richie 466-67.
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this stringency has nonetheless provided what Western cinema has suffered from lack 
of: boundaries.”35  Thus, those boundaries have provided a site for Japanese 
directors, Oshima in particular, to resist.  Without the boundaries, there could be no 
resistance.  Certain directors have produced criticism of the system and challenged 
specific codes precisely because the system and the specific codes provide something 
to rebel against.
However, this is the difficulty of these boundaries and the resistance they 
produce.  Throughout these films directed by Oshima, the boundaries require the very 
resistance they create in order to exist.  They are heterogeneous, calling for one 
another; thus, they require one another.  Therefore, liberation from repression, from 
these boundaries would be a logical impossibility since the code creates the 
resistance in the first instance.  Repression and liberation arise together, like the two 
sides of a coin.  They are co-originary, like law and crime.  Law needs crime and 
crime needs law.  This is not to say that criminals need law, but that law creates 
crime.  Crime is a product of law.  Thus, pushing the boundary of the law code can 
only serve to produce a different version of the repression and liberation binary 
because it cannot function outside the definitions rendered by the law, the definitions 
of crime which first created the law.  Crime cannot overthrow law.
This is the necessary but totalizing return of total criticism as total criticism 
too shows itself to be totalizing and repressive in regard to the law because total 
criticism can function only in reaction to the epistemological boundaries erected by 
the law.  Total criticism must check itself against the law and verify whether it has 
35 Jack Hunter, forward, Eros in Hell 3.
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functioned with the law or against it.  The law remains the master term.  Despite the 
fact that epistemology can never answer the question of judgment, of decision 
making in the instance of the decision, the law always calls for such epistemological 
verification.  Thus, total criticism cannot overturn the law because it is bound to the 
law’s need for verification.  Because it is bound to the law in this relation, then, total 
criticism remains totalizing.  In these films, then, this totalizing of total criticism is 
ultimately put on display.
Remaining within the binary of law and crime allows the law to reassimilate 
any opposition because oppositionality functions as its binary foundation.  Oshima 
might not be concerned with the right or wrong of the situation of Sada and Kichi, 
but his cinema is certainly concerned with the right or wrong of the social and 
institutional codes governing that cinema.  By directly challenging those codes, 
though, Oshima is trapped within the definitions established by those codes.  The 
right and wrong of the social code remains the right and wrong of the 
epistemological, verified by the inclusion or exclusion of displayed genitalia in the 
film, for example.  Remaining on the level of showing or not showing fails to break 
from the edict’s leveling effect.
The politically motivated films Oshima has directed have always, however, as 
Richie points out, been “expressed through parable and allegory.”36  The goal has 
always been a total criticism overturning repression and not just a critique of the code 
immediately called into question.  The goal is total liberation from repression.  
36 Anderson and Richie 466.
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Perhaps the most allegorical, most powerful example of total criticism, and in the 
end the most totalizing of his films is the 1986 Max, Mon Amour (Max My Love).  
Max is a film which recalls Alain Resnais’s 1959 French / Japanese co-production 
Hiroshima, Mon Amour.  Hiroshima is set in Japan and criticizes codes against the 
taboo of inter-racial affairs.37  Set in Paris, Max, is a farce about a middle class 
diplomat family’s struggles over the wife’s affair with an orangutan.  The film is 
strange, and it is difficult to accept its premise at first.  However, through the 
narrative the tensions of the family become more apparent, and the larger issues of 
cultural divides and social stigmas come to the fore.  Max is certainly an allegorical 
tale about the trials and tribulations of the middle class, its ennui in an international 
setting, and the quest for liberation from the stifling repression of social codes and 
legal mandates.
As he has with so many other film categories, Oshima is working here 
beyond the acceptable realm of “affair films” and questioning the banality of their 
presentations by putting that very banality on display.  Affairs are so common in the 
world of the cinema that another film about an affair cannot push the boundaries of 
spectatorial response any further.  However powerful other affair films, even 
Hiroshima, might push against repressive boundaries, Max pushes that boundary 
even more by conjuring a story so unbelievable that the film maintains a distance 
37 Hiroshima, mon amour is concerned with an inter-racial extra-marital affair set against the 
occupation of France and the horrendous ordeal of surviving the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima.  
As well, it is interesting to note that Victoria Abril plays a supporting role in Max, who has starred in 
several Almodóvar films.  Oshima has stated his admiration for Almodóvar and has linked Ai no 
korida to Almodóvar’s Matador in several interviews.
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from spectators, demanding they question their already-too-easy judgments in regard 
to affairs in film.
No matter what taboo might be broached by other films dealing with such 
relationships, even in the best films dealing with “exotic” relationships since Max, 
setting the film around a story of bestiality pushes the boundaries broached by all 
films that remain cemented in human / human (even when the number of humans is 
multiplied) intimate / sexual relationships.
Despite its lack of sexually explicit display on the level of Ai no korida, this 
film may, indeed, be more shocking, if at the same time that it shocks it did not also 
undercut its seriousness by way of its comedic elements.38  This indirect, allegorical 
route may be getting at something deeper.  As Turim describes it, “While not played 
directly for the perverse pleasure of violating a sexual taboo, the film focuses 
obliquely, satirically, and intellectually on voyeurism and taboo violation.”39  It 
pushes certain social codes in precisely the same way as Ai no korida by going 
further than any of those codes could initially imagine, without literally violating 
them.  Max is not an attack against conservative values concerning bestiality, but is 
one thing in the guise of another, attacking conservative values in regard to 
homosexuality by going further than any conservative code could have imagined.  It 
leaps beyond homosexuality, to make homosexuality appear too tame from the start.  
Through this allegory the film displays a threat to middle class conservatism by 
warning just how far things could go.  Turim, along a similar line, argues “In a 
38 The ubiquitous nudity of the orangutan Max would require further complex responses outside the 
scope of this discussion.
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context in which right-wing advocates of repression link homosexuality to bestiality 
to condemn both, this film makes the daring move of humorously defending 
bestiality, using this defense to satirize, between the lines, homophobia.”40
In thus pushing the codes of social and cinematic acceptability, then, Max is a 
direct affront, like Ai no korida, against the repression of social and production 
codes.  Most notably, this “between the lines” comes in conversations / arguments 
between the husband and wife regarding her intimate / sexual relations with Max.  
Peter’s sustained doubt and denial in the face of the possibility of Margaret’s actually 
engaging in intercourse with Max echoes the incredulity of heterosexual partners 
who discover their significant others involved in homosexual affairs.  Peter insists 
that Max is only a pet and that Margaret simply sits and strokes his fur or cuddles 
with him.  He asks repeatedly if it is true that they engage in intercourse and what it 
is like.  Peter and Margaret have sex on one occasion, and Peter asks if Margaret 
enjoyed it.  She responds in the affirmative, and then he asks if it is better than with 
Max.  Margaret is outraged at his persisting in this line of interrogation.  Never 
satisfied with discourse, Peter seeks visual confirmation in regard to the reported 
interspecies sex.  Peter offers to pay a female prostitute to have sex with Max so that 
Peter can visually affirm or deny what he questions.  Max refuses the prostitute, and 
finally, Peter demands the visual evidence from Margaret herself and pleads for the 




Peter: I have to know.  I have to be sure.  You know what I would 
like… to see you while you’re making love to him.
Margaret: Why do you insist on watching us?
Peter: To be sure.  Because I can’t believe that you really do it.
Margaret:  Why?  Why don’t you believe me?
Margaret finally succumbs to Peter’s pleas, on the condition that he 
may only watch through the keyhole.  She then warns him again, “I 
swear to you that you’re wrong.”
The voyeur then has his question answered, although spectators are denied the 
display.  Spectators see Peter watching, but they do not see what Peter sees.
Peter’s epistemological death drive remains in full force until he can have his 
knowledge verified through a visual means.  He cannot believe until he sees.  Thus, 
he cannot believe.  He has no faith but only a trust in visual evidence.  Peter’s desire 
is for direct, visual evidence that interspecies sex is real.  Held to the 
epistemological, he must know, and he must know visually in order to determine his 
response.  The ethical question of how to respond is dependent upon the 
epistemological question of the truth or falsity of the evidence.  Peter learns the truth 
of the other, at least the truth of the other as it applies to his question.  After he 
discovers the evidence needed to justify his response, Peter attempts to kill Max.  In 
part, his hapless attempts are the frustrated responses of a bourgeois man almost at 
wit’s end.  In part, though, they are also allegorically linked to the overall critique of 
the film.  Like others directed by Oshima, Max displays the ruling power’s need to 
maintain control over the other, by naming it and deciding its place in the world.  
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Here, the critique may be even more scathing because that ruling power’s inability to 
rule is shown alongside its desire to maintain itself.
The effect of this bestial / homosexual mirror, though, is that it reflects both 
ways.  This parabolic mirror reflects back on itself precisely through its double 
signification of the bestial, as extreme taboo and caution concerning lesser taboos.  It 
renders homosexuality relatively acceptable by placing same sex relations beside 
inter-species relations.  However, at the same time as it liberates homosexual 
relations it returns to the logic of the taboo code through its parabolic structural link.  
It stands that code on its head, but it cannot stand outside the code, despite its 
attempts.  The only way for the trope of bestiality to stand in for the trope of 
homosexuality is for bestiality to mimic homosexuality, thus, relinking 
homosexuality to bestiality and returning to the very logic of the social code it first 
sought to challenge.  As it challenges the social code, then, it also reinforces it.  Like 
these other films directed by Oshima, it moves the borders of the definition of taboo, 
but it cannot overcome the structure of those definitions.  To be more pornographic is 
to remain in the realm of codified definitions of pornography.  To be more taboo is to 
remain in the realm of codified definitions of taboo.  In the final instant, this is the 
totalizing in which total criticism remains.
The difficulty with these films is precisely in their direct assault on the law, 
which returns them to the realm of the epistemological and fails in regard to the 
ethical.  These are “total criticism” at its best; yet, at its best, total criticism as in 
Max, results not in an overthrowing of the law but in a repositioning of the 
boundaries of the law.  In the end, they result in displaying the ultimate power of the 
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law to move its borders in order to contain the very rebellious instances contained 
within the films.  Defined in apposition to crime, law by its very nature is what 
recuperates itself in the face of new crime.  Thus, total criticism, at its best, results in 
a strengthening of the law it sets out to overcome.  Every liberation is a new 
repression.
This is something Oshima may well know.  Liberation itself, Oshima argues 
in one instance, “doesn’t mean the end of problem solving.  To me liberation is the 
momentary triumph you feel when you succeed in doing something in a liberated 
manner.  You must challenge the new and reach for another liberation right after.”41
Liberation is not a thing achieved, then; it is a movement that always demands 
another movement, a process.  This is a process brought out particularly in Merry 
Christmas, a process which also regards the epistemological but in the light of the 
ethical.  Merry Christmas is no fundamental break with Oshima’s earlier total 
criticism but a carrying forward of its attack on repression.  However, Merry 
Christmas is different because within its attempt at total criticism, the ethical breaks 
through in a way not seen in other films directed by Oshima.  Precisely for this point, 
Merry Christmas may signal the most important juncture in Oshima’s cinema 
because of its focus on a total criticism that slips into an inquiry of the 
epistemological by way of the ethical.  In the end, Merry Christmas is not a break 
with total criticism but the ultimate instance of its breakdown at the very moment 




Justice in itself, if such a thing exists, outside or 
beyond law, is not deconstructable.  No more than 
deconstruction itself, if such a thing exists.  
Deconstruction is justice.42
The third looks at me in the eyes of the Other—
language is justice.43
What links the cinema of Oshima Nagisa and the philosophies of Jacques 
Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas is a certain concern for the outside and for the 
ultimate, totalizing failure of total criticism to be able to speak for or from the 
outside.  Like Oshima, the questions of the possibility of speaking / writing from the 
outside and the relation between the epistemological and the ethical have been of the 
utmost concern for Derrida and Levinas from the beginnings of their careers.  
However, for Derrida and Levinas, it is not the outside which founds the ethical that 
interrogates the epistemological.  Rather, it is the relation between the inside and the 
outside that they will most often consider.  According to Derrida and Levinas it is the 
very heterogeneity linking the inside and the outside which provides the condition for 
the ethical which questions the epistemological.  It is the difference between the 
inside and the outside which opens the possibility for the ethical.  In the cinema, it is 
this heterogeneity which arises in the freeze frame which provides a space for a 
42 Derrida 14-15.
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different consideration of these relations.  By the freeze frame’s very failings from 
the standpoint of the epistemological, by its very uncertainty, it provokes an ethical 
response different from the epistemological.  The ethical is signaled through the 
epistemological precisely at this moment.  This is a key location for the relation 
between cinema and ethics.
For Derrida, concerning questions of justice and law, there is no justice 
outside of law.  Justice needs law, both in its conceptual and enforceable 
permutations.  Justice is bound to law in their heterogeneity precisely because justice 
requires the very boundaries law provides.  To decide is to decide between, in the 
heterogeneous space marked out by the boundaries of law.  To decide to kill is to 
decide between killing and not killing.  One cannot step outside these boundaries 
without stepping into another, different, decision between.  This is precisely the 
space in which total criticism falters, as it attempts to overcome the boundaries 
without acknowledging how it is recuperated by the boundaries.  Without such 
boundaries, there would be no decision, and without decision, there would be no 
justice.  Justice, always bound to decision making, to decision making in the realm of 
undecidability, is heterogeneous to the law, but it is precisely because of this 
heterogeneity that “one calls for the other: they are indissociable.”44  To decide is to 
struggle with the undecidable; otherwise, one is following a program or schedule, an 
43 Levinas, Totality 213.
44 Jacques Derrida, “Hospitality, Justice and Responsibility: A Dialogue with Jacques Derrida,” 
Questioning Ethics: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy, eds.  Richard Kearney and Mark Dooley 
(New York: Routledge, 1998) 73.
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algorithm, calculating and not deciding.  The moment of decision, then, is always a 
moment of madness, irrationality.  In a Kierkegaardian manner, Derrida asserts
Decision, an ethical or a political responsibility, is absolutely 
heterogeneous to knowledge.  Nevertheless, we have to know as much 
as possible in order to ground our decision.  But even if it is grounded 
in knowledge, the moment I take a decision it is a leap, I enter a 
heterogeneous space and that is the condition of responsibility.45
Judgment and epistemology are interwoven; however, their interweaving is what 
makes judgment founded in the epistemological impossible.  Knowing is necessary 
to decisions, but it is impossible to ground decisions in knowing.  This necessary 
impossibility, which Derrida argues is the condition of ethical response, is at the 
center of Derrida’s concern for the law in “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation 
of Authority.’”
In Derrida’s essay, one particular question concerning the relation between 
law and justice arises: how is general or universal law applicable to singular 
situations?  As well, this question of the relation between general and particular is 
central to Merry Christmas, and especially the character of Jack Celliers in the film.  
In The Sower and the Seed, the novel on which the film is based, the narrator states 
of Celliers “He felt the first necessity of life was to make the universal specific, the 
general particular, the collective individual and what was unconscious in us 
conscious.”46  Derrida asks,
45 Derrida 73.
46 Quoted in Turim 181.
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How are we to reconcile the act of justice that must always concern 
singularity, individuals, irreplaceable groups and lives, the other or 
myself as other, in a unique situation, with rule, norm, value or the 
imperative of justice which necessarily have a general form, even if 
this generality prescribes a singular application in each case?47
In answer to this question, Derrida states he is tempted to turn toward Levinas and 
the latter’s conception of infinite responsibility toward the face of the other.  Derrida 
is drawn especially to Levinas’s discussions of infinite responsibility without relief 
and the heteronomic relation to the other.  However, Derrida claims, the difficulties 
brought on by such conceptual grafting would overwhelm the discussion at hand.  
Rather, he states that even at this limited juncture between justice and law, we are 
faced with at least three aporias.
1.  A just and responsible decision must be “regulated and without 
regulation.”48  In order for law to reach the singular and the general, decisions under 
it must destroy and conserve it at the same instant.  Its general aspect must be 
destroyed in the face of the singular or it is not a particular decision.  Its singularity 
must not destroy its general aspect or it no longer exists as a code or future guarantee.
2.  A just and responsible decision must be undecidable and decidable.  If a 
decision is made by a calculus or program, then it is not a decision but the outcome 
of an algorithm, which functions by way of a finite number of steps and either / or 
logic.  Thus, the instant of deciding is always an ordeal without reference to certainty 
47 Derrida, “Force of Law” 17.
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for certainty would preclude the decision.  However, to be just, a decision must be 
made.  The instant of suspense is not just, only the decision is just.  Therefore, the 
decision must be made.
3.  A just and responsible decision is always immediate.  However, it must 
remain infinite.  A decision interrupts the “infinite information and unlimited 
knowledge of conditions” that would justify it.49  However, to defer a decision is not 
to decide.  Thus, the deliberative, epistemological, process which must precede the 
just decision must continue until all future evidence is exhausted.  However, to 
proceed in this manner would be never to decide, barring an absolute knowledge of 
the future and what it may bring that has never been imagined before.
Thus, following only these three aporias, Derrida states “Justice remains, is 
yet, to come, à venir, it has an, it is à-venir, the very dimension of events irreducibly 
to come.”50  Justice is bound to the law in the present and the future; thus, justice is 
always already to come, never exceeded.
With due regard to the sometimes vast conceptual differences between 
Derrida and Levinas and the ways in which these differences might overwhelm 
Derrida’s discussion of the relationship between law and justice, there is a link, a 
complement between them, what might be described as a trace of the other within the 
one.  The relation between “deconstruction” and “ethics” (if we allow for the 





is tied to the relation between undecidability and responsibility.  As Simon Critchley 
argues in The Ethics of Deconstruction, “Derridian deconstruction can, and indeed 
should, be understood as an ethical demand, provided that ethics is understood in the 
particular sense given to it in the work of Emmanuel Levinas.”51  Deconstruction 
signifies ethically when deconstruction and ethics are seen in the light of their 
emphases on the clotural relation between incongruous orders of discourse: being 
and otherwise than being.
According to Critchley, for Levinas, “Ethics signifies enigmatically, as a 
determinate pattern of oscillation, or alternation.  One might say that ethics signifies 
undecidably.”52  Responsibility for the other is non-thematizable: to be for the other 
is not to return, to resume, or to reduce.  Responsibility is not founded within the 
epistemological, yet the epistemological signifies the ethical through its very gaps.  
Responsibility cannot rely upon algorithms without redacting the other within the 
lines drawn by the self, without editing the scene of encounter.  Thus, responsibility 
remains ungoverned from the perspective of the self, except by the infinite call of the 
other, which can only be heard and answered, although never completely, between 
the self and the other.  These answers, always falling short, come through the realm 
of the epistemological as guesses are made, evidence is weighed, responses are 
offered.  However, these epistemological graspings are then immediately recalled by 
the ethical as each response is shown to fall short.  This relation of Saying to the Said 
51 Simon Critchley The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) xi.
52 Critchley 168.
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is “the interdependence of irreconcilable orders of discourse.”53  This relation is the 
relation between the ethical and the epistemological.  Irreconcilable orders of 
discourse, they remain interdependent.
Similarly, for Derrida deconstruction works by way of a thematization and 
dislocation of that thematization.  According to Critchley,
Two incompressible, yet inseparable, paths are breached by 
deconstruction: first, the path of ontological thematization, the order 
of the Said and synchrony, and second, the path of ethical non-
thematization, whereby the Said is reduced to its diachronic Saying.54
This is the way in which Derridian deconstruction signifies, by locating and 
dislocating borders between apparently irreconcilable (stable) conceptual 
frameworks.  By showing the absolute necessity of first principles and then 
displacing these first principles, the formal work of deconstruction relies upon this 
double movement between the algorithmic and the non-algorithmic.
In other terms, John Llewelyn in Appositions of Jacques Derrida and 
Emmanuel Levinas raises the specter that on the surface,
undecidability is prima facie incompatible with responsibility.  The 
one seems to exclude the other.  How can one respond responsibly to 
a question unless there is a criterion, rule, or law by reference to 
which the validity of the answer can be judged?55
53 Critchley 169.
54 Critchley 169.
55 John Llewelyn, Appositions of Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 
2002) 17.
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Here is the crux of the matter.  Traditional frameworks for decision making rely upon 
such devices as criteria, rules, or laws to justify themselves.  Utilitarianism would be 
the most overt example of such an algorithm.  For some, judgment should come as a 
perfect syllogism, denying uncertainty.56  Thus, just decisions must be made, in a 
traditional manner, in regard to a supposed outside touch-point.  Against this 
tradition, Derrida and Levinas would deny the possibility of such an outside touch-
point as they both demonstrate how that outside infects the inside from which it is 
supposed to remain distinct.  In other words, they both show how outside guides are 
never truly outside but, rather, come from one of the two terms engaged in the 
decision, the self.  Thus, the outside touch-point is a return to the self, a halting of the 
dislocation of the orders of the epistemological.
Therefore, focusing on Derrida’s many examples of paradox, Llewelyn argues 
that undecidability is not contrary to responsibility but inseparable from it.  
“Undecidability increases responsibility in that it obliges us to make finer and finer 
distinctions.”57  In the face of undecidability, these distinctions are always already to 
come, one after another.  To decide is to put a stop to these distinctions, to stop 
deciding.  The demand placed upon us by undecidability is what calls us to decide, 
without the certainty of justifying our actions as enough.  There always already 
56 See, for example, Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments trans. David Young (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1986).  In this 1764 text of criminology, Beccaria declares that the measure of a crime’s 
severity should be based in “the harm done to society” (17).  And the judgement of each criminal case
should come to a perfect syllogism: the major premise should be the general law; the 
minor premise, the act which does or does not conform to the law; and the 
conclusion, acquittal or condemnation.  If the judge were constrained to form even 




remains another distinction to make, an ever-widening circle of choices to encounter.  
Rather than leading to irresponsibility, undecidability opens the possibility of 
responding.  This undecidability is the gap in the epistemological which signals the 
ethical.
For the Levinas of the 1969 Totality and Infinity, the other comes before me, 
does not exist in the same time as me.  The relation between the other and the self is 
not one of two species who can trace their lineage to a common genus.  Rather, the 
other is radically other, separated from me by its absolute difference.  This 
difference, however, is not to be thought of as a characteristic or trait the other 
possesses.  Rather, it is the very alterity separating the other from the self which 
brings the I into existence as responsible for the other.  
The difference between the other and the self cannot be subsumed under a 
common category, such as we are both human beings.  Such a reduction can only be 
an assumption originating from the self, which reduces the other to the same by 
eradicating the difference which separates us.  Rather this difference remains an 
infinite difference, “inconceivable in terms of formal logic,” according to Levinas.58
Levinas traces the path from the self to the I through the encounter with the 
other.
The I, which we have seen arise in enjoyment as a separated being 
having apart, in itself, the center around which it gravitates, is 
confirmed in its singularity by purging itself of this gravitation, purges 
58 Levinas, Totality 195.
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itself interminably, and is confirmed precisely in this incessant effort 
to purge itself.  This is termed goodness.  Perhaps the possibility of a 
point of the universe where such an overflow of responsibility is
produced ultimately defines the I.59
The other calls me to respond and in so doing, calls me into the I that gives.  This I is 
produced by the call of the other precisely because when called by the other, no one 
else can answer this call.  If I am called, then I, and only I can answer.  In this way, 
the subjectivity of the I is brought about by the relation between the other and the 
self.  In answering this call, I cannot be the other, I can only be for the other.  I must 
return to the epistemological assimilation in my answering as I respond; however, 
that answer falls short at the next gap in the epistemological and calls me to respond 
again.  Thus, the uncertainty of every answer calls me to respond again.
The question remains: what might cinema teach us about ethics and ethics 
teach us about cinema?  How might they complement one another?  To return to 
Oshima, if there is a moment in his cinema which works otherwise than the 
boundaries he has pushed against for so long it comes in the guise of a simple shot at 
the tail end of one of his more peripheral texts, Merry Christmas, Mr. Lawrence.  The 
gap in the epistemological which occurs in this final freeze frame signals an entry for 
the ethical in regard to this film, and the need for a more attentive response to such a 
gap might be what ethics teaches us about cinema.  Although linked with Oshima’s 
other films as total criticism, Merry Christmas remains apart because of its complex 
display of the law and its final shot which calls even its own complex display into 
59  Levinas, Totality 245.
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question.  As deconstruction is and is not totalization, Merry Christmas is and is not 
total criticism.  Merry Christmas is decidedly different but recognizable and so a 
potential site for learning more about the relation between total criticism and its 
other.
“To be or not to be”
Why does the other concern me?60
Metaphors for the other abound in Levinas.  They do not exhaust the 
otherness of the other but attempt to provoke the problematic of the ethical within the 
realm of the epistemological.  They are the product of the necessity of writing 
undecidable Saying in the decided language of the Said.  As much as they fail, they 
are the product of arriving too late to a system which is founded on a first philosophy 
60 Levinas, Otherwise 117.  This is the question for Levinas.  From his earliest work, this has been the 
question he has tried to answer: why, if the world as we think it in the philosophical tradition is self-
centered, do sacrifice and generosity exist.  What makes them possible?  For Levinas, the answer to 
this question comes through thinking ethics as first philosophy.  As he continues in Otherwise,
It is through the condition of being hostage that there can be in the world pity, 
compassion, pardon and proximity—even the little there is, even the simple “After 
you, sir.”  The unconditionality of being hostage is not the limit case of solidarity, 
but the condition for all solidarity.  Every accusation and persecution, as all 
interpersonal praise, recompense, and punishment presuppose the subjectivity of the 
ego, substitution, the possibility of putting oneself in the place of the other, which 
refers to the transference from the “by the other” into a “for the other,” and in 
persecution from the outrage inflicted by the other to the expiation for his fault by 
me.  But the absolute accusation, prior to freedom, constitutes freedom which, allied 
to the Good, situates beyond and outside of all essence. (117-118)
This is, Levinas, goes on to state, the condition of a possibility of communication without 
correspondence, without constantly seeking certainty or the “coincidence with oneself” (118).  In fact, 
he argues, communication would be impossible if this condition did not exist.  If all communication 
only returned to the certainty of correspondence with oneself, then this would be on the return of echo 
and no communication.  This is the thesis of Otherwise:
To communicate is indeed to open oneself, but the openness is not complete if it is 
on the watch for recognition.  It is complete not in opening to the spectacle of or the 
recognition of the other, but in becoming a responsibility for him.  The 
overemphasis of openness is responsibility for the other to the point of substitution, 
where the for-the-other proper to disclosure, to monstration to the other, turns into 
the for-the-other proper of responsibility.
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of the epistemological, thus, they are necessary failures.  According to Levinas, 
“Before all receptivity an already said before languages exposes or, in all the sense of 
the term, signifies (proposes and orders) experience, giving to historical languages 
spoken by people a locus, enabling them to orient or polarize the diversity of the 
thematized as they choose.”61  In a language which will only fail, precisely because 
of its thematizing of the non-thematizable, Levinas runs the fine risk of signaling the 
other while cautioning that the relation between Saying and the Said remains “on the 
hither side of being and of the nothingness which is thematizable like being.”62  In 
the language of the Said, the only language to which we have access, the other is the 
orphan, the widow, the homeless, the starved, the stranger, the poor.  Each inhabits 
the periphery of the social, is at the border between the social and the anti-social.  
With each of these metaphors, the other’s place as the impossible peripheral center of 
the ethical call marks its undecidability within the language of decidability.63  The 
other has power over me precisely because the other comes before me defenseless 
61 Levinas 36.
62 Levinas 109.
63 On more than one occasion, conversations about Levinas’s metaphors and his highly abstract 
thinking of ethics have led some to suggest that they are like attempts to describe the color “aldiffogh” 
(which can only be described “between” other colors people already know) or the musical note “go” 
which comes between fa and so.
To signal the place of the other is, of course, to risk thematizing the other, and in such terms 
as Levinas uses, apparently to valorize the other.  To say the other is anything, is to thematize the 
other, and to remain within the grasp of the realm of the ontological and the epistemological.  To say 
the other is a defenseless homeless octogenarian woman or is an African patriarch insisting on female 
circumcision are both thematizations of the other that fail to signal the place of the other.  The other 
does not exist, cannot be thematized, cannot be valorized; cannot be deprecated.  None of these 
statements denies the possibility of judging the other person or even killing the other person.  The 
other, however, is not marked out by any quality or essence of being.  Rather, the relation between the 
self and the other, the fact that the self and the other remain distanced in relation, is the alterity of the 
other, neither attribute nor property.  As Levinas reminds us in Otherwise, this relation “lies behind the 
distinction between rest and movement, between the being at home with oneself (chez soi) and 
wondering, between equality and difference” (108).
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and calls me to my responsibility, not because of any strength of its own.  This 
centering of the peripheral, of course, is not unrelated to the work of Derridian 
deconstruction as the movement of the marginal, excluded term to the center of its 
system while maintaining its marginal, excluded position.
This calling by the centered peripheral is at work as well in the relation 
between Seeing and the Seen, with their intended links to the ethical and the 
epistemological, respectively.  When considering what cinema might teach about 
ethics, it is possible to suggest a further metaphor for the other—the freeze frame.  
The instant of the freeze frame is the cinematic instant which evokes Seeing, which 
is always already before but covered over by the Seen, which questions the priority of 
the Seen.  As a general instance of the cinematic apparatus, I argue here that the 
freeze frame, precisely by its signaling of the failure of the epistemological, calls for 
an ethical response to cinema.  As a particular and highly charged instance of this 
call, I argue that the (un)frozen close-up of Sergeant Hara’s face which faces 
spectators at the end of Merry Christmas, Mr. Lawrence is an especially crucial 
example of this apparatus because it makes explicit what is at stake in almost all 
freeze frames.  Like these other metaphors for the other, the freeze frame inhabits a 
space at the periphery of discussions involving studies of cinema and yet remains 
crucial to many discussions of cinema.  As well, like these other metaphors, it signals 
the ethical without exhausting it.
The freeze frame is cinema and non-cinema.  From the start, the freeze frame 
is controversial.  In one way, its name denotes a framing of a shot and an editing of a 
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shot, while other forms of framing and editing separate framing into one category and 
editing into another.  The freeze frame is between framing and editing.  In a second 
way, the freeze frame, hold frame, or stop frame is simply absent from many 
prominent film glossaries and sparsely discussed when it is present.  Time and again 
this reportedly cliché ending device is mentioned only to be ignored.  Yet, it is a 
common topic of discussion for many moviegoers because its effect is so often so 
unexpected, especially if it comes elsewhere than at the end of a film.  The freeze 
frame is between the cliché and the unexpected.  Thirdly, when it is defined in 
standard film glossaries and textbooks, its location between concepts is made 
apparent.  A freeze frame is “a projected yet unmoving motion-picture image, which 
looks like a still photograph.”64  It can “dramatically punctuate or emphasize some 
idea or concept for the audience.”65  It can stop the action so a shot may be “studied 
at leisure.”66  Freeze frames can be used “at the end of a film to suggest a lack of 
closure.”67  Or, to sum up, freeze frames “can be used to lengthen a scene, to 
highlight a point, or for sheer dramatic effect.”68  In these definition and others, the 
essential point to the freeze frame is the confusing effect of the uncertainty it carries 
with it.  Its very definition as an unmoving motion picture is difficult enough, but the 
64 William H. Phillips, Film: An Introduction, 2nd ed. (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1999) 546.
65 Ira Kroningsberg, The Complete Film Dictionary (New York: New American Library, 1987).
66 Virginia Oakey, Dictionary of Film and Television Terms (New York: Harper, 1983)
67 Steve Blandford, Barry Keith Grant, and Jim Hillier, The Film Studies Dictionary (London: Arnold, 
2001).
68 Ephraim Katz, The Film Encyclopedia, 4th ed., revised by Fred Klein and Ronald Dean Nolen 
(New York: Harper Resource, 2001).
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contradictory descriptions of its effects point toward the questions it raises in regard 
to the epistemological.  It denies closure yet allows for further inspection and 
emphasis of certain points.  It offers dramatic effect and yet emphasizes leisured 
looking.  In every way, it remains between and it signals toward uncertainty.
As well, in a fourth way, the freeze frame recalls the proto-film of some 
histories which trace the birth of the cinema to the technical manipulation of 
photographic images in sequence.  Linked to both the still image of photography and 
the moving image of the cinema, the freeze frame is the missing link, a technological 
manipulation of the filmic apparatus between the cinematic and the non-cinematic, 
which recalls a, possibly older, filmic border shared between the two.  This final 
point is the controlling idea of the most sustained study of the freeze frame, Garrett 
Stewart’s Between Film and Screen, which argues that the freeze frame is one of two 
ways cinema highlights its ontology as “a synthesis of photograms.”69  Before 
anything else, film is a series of photographs in series on a strip of flexible medium, 
and the two extreme poles of its own referentiality are the filmed photograph, which 
turns back, and the freeze frame, which turns ahead.  According to Stewart, 
“Whereas in the photopan film may look back to its own origin (and potential 
cancellation) in the discrete image, working (as in another sense it always does) to 
contain the image in frame, in the freeze shot the photogrammatic undertext is cast 
up (cast forward) as the whole screen picture.”70  For Stewart, this casting forward is 
the radical power of the screen freeze, as it “ends up situated in a curious 
69 Garrett Stewart, Between Film and Screen: Modernism’s Photo Synthesis (Chicago: U of Chicago 
P, 1999) 24.
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interspace—or phenomenal hinterland—between Deleuze’s influential categories of 
movement and time.”71  Unlike the photopan, which works to cancel its origin, the 
freeze frame remains between on a phenomenological, ontological level.  Because of 
its “betweenness,” then, Stewart pronounces the radicality of the freeze frame for 
phenomenological considerations of cinema:
More than time lapse or slow motion, more than pixilation or colored 
filters, more than shifts of focus or tricks of editing, more than 
anything else the cameraman or the laboratory technician puts in the 
way of the normative kinesis of projected film, the freeze-frame—
precisely because frieze frame—remains the last frontier of film 
phenomenology, its ultimate affront and greatest challenge.72
Precisely because it remains at the edge, on the border, and between, argues Stewart, 
the freeze frame challenges all phenomenological responses to film and finds them 
all wanting.73  In all four ways, then, the freeze frame calls into question the binary 
between cinema and non-cinema by upsetting either / or divisions and classifications 
because it inhabits both and neither category simultaneously.  It calls for a response 
other than epistemological interpretation precisely because of its classification as 




73 Stewart points out that not one of the influential phenomenologists to have studied film has made 
any significant statement on the freeze frame: Arnheim, Kracauer, Deleuze, Sobchak, Bazin, Barthes, 
and Cavell have all avoided or relegated the freeze frame to footnotes, at best.
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“unmoving motion-picture image,” and challenge to film phenomenology as the 
ultimate “between” time and movement phenomena.
The specific freeze frame close-up of the condemned Hara’s face which ends 
Merry Christmas works between categories like other freeze frames.  However, when 
its content is taken into account, its effects are intensified as it makes overt the 
ethical covertly signaled by all freeze frames.  There is nothing spectacular to the 
final image of the film, and its very simplicity may well signal even more the import 
of what it displays.  In final minute of the film, Lawrence returns to visit Hara on the 
night before Hara is to be executed by the Allied armies.  When he is about to leave 
Hara’s cell, Lawrence begins to cry.  He turns to Hara, salutes, turns, and moves 
toward the door of the cell.  Hara snaps to attention and calls Lawrence to look at 
him one last time.  The camera cuts to Lawrence’s face as he stares back at Hara.  
The camera cuts back to an extreme close up of Hara’s evenly lit, smiling face, which 
now fills the screen.  Hara’s last words are “Merry Christmas.  Merry Christmas, Mr. 
Lawrence.”  The image freezes for four and a half seconds as the non-diegetic sound 
comes returns with the opening notes the film’s theme song.  Then the screen fades 
to black as the song continues into the credits.
Because of its focus on the face of the condemned man, more than others, this 
freeze frame makes plain what is at stake in all freeze frames.  Thus it is similar to all 
other freeze frames but remains separate in kind and degree.  This freeze frame is 
different in kind from other freeze frames, which may not even be considered freeze 
frames under certain definitions, because its freezing breaks it from diegetic space 
and time by breaking with the diegetic soundtrack.  The action of the story stops with 
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the freeze frame, and only the non-diegetic music of the soundtrack continues.  This 
break is different in kind from “freeze frames” which remain linked to the diegesis or 
narrative, such as the suitcase freeze frame in It’s a Wonderful Life (dir. Frank 
Capra, 1946) where the voice-over narration comments on the frozen George Bailey 
or the final instants of Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid (dir. George Roy Hill, 
1969) where the image freezes as the outlaws burst from the church doors, but the 
gunshots of the overwhelming Bolivian forces signal their deaths.  These freeze 
frames, and others which remain linked to their diegeses through the soundtrack, 
work to emphasize the metaphysics of a story told by angels or the mythology of a 
story told about outlaws, but they do not work in the same manner to signify the 
ethical through undecidability as does the freeze frame which ends the coda of Merry 
Christmas.  Linked to their diegeses as they are, these freeze frames cover over the 
undecidabilty of their images through their soundtracks.
However, the freeze frame at the end of Merry Christmas is similar in kind 
but differs in degree in regard to one of the most debated freeze frames in cinema, the 
close up of Antoine Dionel at the end of Les Quatre Cents Coups.  The close up 
freeze of Hara quotes from the earlier film, which had a significant influence on 
Oshima’s earlier career, while further emphasizing its own relation to uncertainty.  
Although individual critics have remarked on the final freeze frame of Dionel as 
quite definitive, they have rarely agreed on what that definitive meaning would be.  
For different critics, this freeze frame signals the bleak, indecisive, or uncertain 
future of the boy.  Pushed within the epistemological to apprehend the meaning of 
this final image of Dionel, at least in this first of four films to focus on his life, the 
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uncertain and un-ending of this shot is erased in these criticisms.  They label the boy 
a failure or condemn his future before it happens, assuming that this freeze frame 
must signal the beginning of the end for Dionel.  The freeze frame of Dionel differs 
in degree from the freeze frame of Hara because the former is not linked to the 
moment of the pronouncement of death.  Dionel’s story is certainly tragic, but only 
an assumption of what will come leads critics to align this freeze frame with his 
execution.  Hara’s story, though, directly links his freeze frame to the instant of his 
death, with the possibility that he will be executed very soon after we last see his 
face.  It is similar in kind in that both freeze frames signal the epistemological under 
investigation by the ethical as they both call for a response which cannot be justified 
within the epistemological, for Seeing within the Seen.  However, what is at stake in 
the latter is intensified by its story line.
Set in a Japanese Prisoner of War camp in Java in 1942, Merry Christmas
weaves together the complicated and complicating stories of the prisoners and 
guards.  Five men are at the center of the narrative: the Allied officers Major Jack 
“Strafer” Celliers (David Bowie), Colonel John Lawrence (Tom Conti), and Group 
Captain Hicksley (Jack Thompson), the Japanese camp commander Captain Yonoi 
(Sakamoto Riuichi), and the Japanese camp administrator Sergeant Gengo Hara 
(Takeshi).74  The interdependence of the strands of its story, including its complex 
flashbacks, makes it difficult to outline Merry Christmas, but some broad strokes will 
74 According to Turim, “In its casting of two superstars, the British David Bowie…and the Japanese 
Sakamoto Riuichi opposite each other, it might seem simply to be pandering to the global marketing 
practices that now dominate the film industry.”  However, this casting is part of the film’s overall 
strategy of working against expectations (169).  Casting the androgynous Bowie as the 
heteronormative soldier’s soldier and the sex symbol Riuichi as the ambiguous camp commander 
counters static agendas in regard to gender, sexual orientation, and epistemological certainty.
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serve here.  The story is also difficult to tell because it is a film which focuses more 
on the relationships among these five men than on their actions.  In part, this 
emphasis on relationships, rather than actions, intensifies the jeopardy of the freeze 
frame at the end of the film.  Broadly, though, the story circulates around Lawrence, 
the British liaison between the camp’s Japanese commanders and Korean guards and 
the Allied prisoners.  Lawrence lived and studied in Japan prior to the war and speaks 
Japanese.  These traits seem to make him the best candidate for the camp liaison.  
Because of his background and position, he develops a rigid but respectful 
relationship with the English-speaking camp commandant, Yonoi, and a genuinely 
friendly, if not loving and homoerotic, one with Hara.  The depth of Lawrence’s and 
Hara’s feelings for one another is expressed especially in the coda of the film, when 
Lawrence begins to cry when he visits the condemned Hara in the Allied prisoner of 
war camp.
Merry Christmas questions the relation between being and relating from the 
start.  Early in the film, Yonoi is called away from the camp to attend the espionage 
trial of a recently captured Allied officer, Celliers.  At the trial, Yonoi appears 
entranced by Celliers and attempts to connect with him during the interrogation.  
Yonoi quotes Hamlet’s soliloquy and questions Celliers in English.  In the end, 
Celliers is found guilty and sentenced to death by firing squad.  In one of the film’s 
scenes of indeterminacy, Celliers is both executed and not executed.  He is put before 
the firing squad, but the Japanese soldiers fire only blanks.  In shock, Celliers replies, 
“That’s a good one.”  Celliers is then transported to the prisoner of war camp on 
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Java, where Yonoi orders he be attended to and hints that Celliers may have been 
brought to Java to replace Hicksley as the prisoners’ commanding officer.  At the 
same time, Lawrence recognizes Celliers when he sees the Major arrive in the camp 
and is puzzled by Yonoi’s plans for Celliers.  Later, Lawrence explains to Yonoi and 
Hara that he fought with the Major in North Africa, and that Celliers was regarded by 
most of his comrades as a “soldier’s soldier.”
From here to the coda, Merry Christmas appears to be a battle of wills 
between Celliers and Yonoi, with Lawrence, Hara, and Hicksley caught between.  It 
appears to be such because no one is sure what exactly drives Yonoi to treat Celliers 
alternatively fiercely or with the utmost of care.  This questioning drives Lawrence 
and Hara to investigate their own relationship more closely as well.  Although there 
is no overt homosexual activity shown in the film, “the special relationships between 
men at war” is a key topic of the film from the start.  Homosexual feelings and 
activities are the primary topic of conversation and challenge among these men, and 
more than once phallic symbols of power (swords, staves, and bamboo sticks, etc.), 
stabbings, and debates over bravery and acts of hara kiri play important roles in the 
film.  The question of Yonoi’s intentions toward Celliers, especially, and the 
importance of human relations arises repeatedly as Yonoi asks why Celliers is so 
disappointing a rival and yet so enthralling a challenge.
The pivotal point of the plot comes when the guards discover a radio among 
the prisoners in the hospital, and Lawrence and Celliers are sentenced to death for 
bringing the radio into the hospital.  Despite their assertions of their innocence, they 
are condemned to die and isolated from the rest of the camp until their executions.  
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While locked up, both men tell stories of their past failings and how disappointing 
they have both been to family, friends, and lovers.  The soldier’s soldier betrayed his 
younger brother and has lived his adult life bent on self-destruction.  The camp 
liaison can only recall missed opportunities and an inability to understand why he 
cannot understand anything that’s happened to him.
On Christmas Day, both men are pulled from their cells and brought before 
Hara.  Rather than execute them, though, the drunken Hara plays the part of Father 
Christmas and allows the two men to return to the general population of the camp.  
Lawrence and Celliers are ecstatic at this gift, and the next day Hara explains to 
Yonoi that he had discovered a Chinese prisoner had smuggled the radio into the 
hospital.  That prisoner was executed, explains Hara, who is disciplined for his 
action.
While suppressing the freeze frame ending, some critics have located the 
question of Merry Christmas in the flashback scenes.  They have debated the 
strangeness of the positions within the seemingly realist narrative and concluded 
either that the flashbacks are the weakest or the strongest points of the film.  Arguing 
that the flashbacks are inconsistent and distracting, many reviews have dismissed this 
film as outside the usual force of Oshima’s filmmaking.  Arguing for the power of 
the flashbacks, Peter Bonitzer reads the flashbacks as ruptures which operate 
contrapuntally to the remainder of the narrative and visual fields and, thus, some of 
the very best of Oshima’s work.  According to Bonitzer, “the flashback overturns 
everything and we find in this moment of greatest disturbance, the greatest 
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Oshima….”75  According to Bonitzer’s reading, the greatest Oshima, the total 
criticism Oshima returns, as the flashbacks overturn the expected structure in favor 
of an unanticipated, rebellious one.  The flashbacks in Merry Christmas operate as 
total criticism within this film.  For Bonitzer, they overturn the larger body as they 
center themselves.  With this return to total criticism, though, comes the return to the 
failings of total criticism which must remain within the epistemological choice of 
either / or, precisely limiting the power of the flashbacks to a cyclical relation of 
repetition and return.  At every point where they overturn the primacy of the 
narrative, they return to the primacy of the narrative by repeating the oppositional 
structure of the narrative versus the flashbacks.
The freeze frame does not work to overturn the cinematic in general or the 
larger body of the film here.  Rather, it questions the priority of the epistemological.  
With this freeze frame of the face of the condemned man filling the screen before the 
spectators, the film alters the register of its criticism precisely by altering its address.  
In other words, the freeze frame at the end calls for a response (Seeing, linked to 
justice and the ethical) rather than a judgment (the Seen, linked to the law and 
understanding).  Through this freeze frame the cinematic apparatus calls for a 
spectatorial response which is otherwise than a judgment tied to a legal or moral 
code.  It calls for a response which does not follow an algorithm but remains without 
limits.  Rather than calling for verification and a judgment which can be verified 
through a totalizing, assimilative relation based in an outside system which can 
75 Quoted in Turim 180.
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justify limiting responses, it calls for a response from the non-thematizable relation 
to the other.
On the level of judgment, which always occurs within the epistemological, 
Merry Christmas certainly invokes a humanism.  If it were to remain within this 
humanism, as Turim asserts, Merry Christmas might be Oshima’s total criticism par 
excellence because this humanism would rely on centering the unified idealism 
Oshima has spent his career challenging.  This centering would strive to resolve the 
film’s undecidability and its call for a response.  The humanism of Oshima’s total 
criticism would react to the humanism of the unified idealism Oshima challenges, 
but both would remain bound within their humanist framework.  In Turim’s reading 
of the film, what emerges from the coda, is “clearly humanist” in its statement that 
both sides in the war faced the same ill-conceived ideology and the same blundering 
bellicose desires.76  Thus, the coda sets up an identifiable argument in favor of more 
and better knowledge of who we are as human beings and how cultural divides, such 
as between the Axis and Allied powers during World War II, need to be crossed if 
peace is to be possible.  Up to this point, then, the film holds out the possibility of 
peace and human understanding predicated precisely on a more thorough 
understanding of one another and the “truth.”  However, in the final moments of the 
film, its coda, that very humanism is undone precisely for not being sufficiently 
76 Turim 182.
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human, for returning to the same, for returning to something outside the human 
relation to judge the human relation.77
Instead of returning to a fixed relation with total criticism and a static 
humanism, Merry Christmas puts the epistemological death drive under the pressure 
of the ethical.  After the coda, the truth is no longer primary because the freeze frame 
at the end calls for a response to the human relation and not the human relation to 
judgment.  Through examples of several trials in the film and the visual and aural 
incongruencies it produces, the film questions that very search for the truth it sets up 
through one aspect of the narrative.  Then, this argument against the primacy of 
judgment, within the epistemological, is exemplified by its putting the law on trial in 
the final freeze frame of the film.
The law is the ultimate instant of judgment, and it is the film’s questioning of 
the law, under the ethical, which marks judgment necessary but insufficient.  One 
could argue that the entire film is made up of trials, each narrative segment focusing 
on redacting human conduct within a code or law.  However, no trial in the film 
appears just.  The film does not display any trial as a just measure of right or wrong 
or guilt or innocence.  Rather, all the trials remain on the level of redaction.  Each 
example of putting someone or some system on trial serves only to display the 
internal logic of the law governing the trial.  Judgments are made, always unjustly.
When he is brought before the Japanese military tribunal near the start of the 
film, Celliers, asks “Exactly what kind of a trial are you giving me?”  That question 
77 This is Levinas’s simple critique of humanism.  It is not that he would do away with humanism, but 
that he sees humanism in need of a relation with the ethical to make it more fully human.  As he states 
in Otherwise, “Humanism has to be denounced only because it is not sufficiently human” (128).
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questions all the trials in the film: the rape trial at the start of the film, Celliers before 
the Japanese tribunal, Lawrence with Yonoi and Hara after Yonoi’s butler commits 
hara kiri, and the elided Allied trial of Hara after the defeat of the Japanese forces.  
When Yonoi first speaks to Celliers at the tribunal, he quotes from Shakespeare, “To 
be or not to be, that is the question” and then begins questioning Celliers.  Hamlet’s 
existential dilemma is exactly the kind of trial that Yonoi gives Celliers.  This is the 
basis of all the trials of the film, and the failing of all the trials of the film.  They are 
all tied to the ontological and epistemological rather than to the ethical.78
“You’re wrong.  We’re all wrong,” Lawrence says to Yonoi after the 
Japanese Captain asks Lawrence to explain the ways of the Japanese to the Allied 
soldiers.  Japanese, British, Dutch, Chinese, American, Korean, we are all wrong.  
“You are the victim of men who think they are right,” Lawrence tells Hara at the end 
of the film.  “Just as one day you and Captain Yonoi believed you were right.”  And 
this, indeed, is the humanism of which Turim speaks.  What unites the human race is 
its being wrong.  National, historical specificity is beside the point in this humanist 
realm of the film as Lawrence distances himself from these divisions.  The quest and 
attainment of truth would resolve this situation.  If only no one were wrong, then 
Lawrence and Celliers would not have been sentenced to death earlier in the film, 
and Hara would not be awaiting execution at the end.  On the level of a humanist 
critique, this is, of course, in line with the standards of a theory of human morality 
based in a shared humanity, shared human knowledge which locates human 
78 See my earlier comments on the importance of Shakespeare for Levinas in Chapter Two: Seeing the 
Ethics of Alienation in Levinas and Antonioni of this study.
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understanding at the center of rational and autonomous social, political, and moral 
systems concerning the truth.  This humanism functions in relation to judgment 
bound to verifiability, within the epistemological, rather than the uncertain possibility 
of the ethical, of a response in regard to a difficult peace.  Such humanism is the best 
we can hope for under the epistemological but still insufficiently human.  In the coda 
of the film, as Lawrence is confronted by the limits of the epistemological again, 
spectators are confronted by the limits of the law, which question the 
epistemological.  The very shortcomings of the law, repeatedly throughout the film, 
show up the very shortcomings of the epistemological to provide sufficient ground 
for explaining why the other concerns me.
If there is a crime, must someone then be punished?  Yes.  The circulation 
around these two poles is made plain, here, in that the law must have its due, despite 
the epistemological boundaries of guilt and innocence.  They are no longer the poles 
by which the law operates.  Rather, it has its own logic, circulating around the binary 
crime and punishment.  If crime is what disturbs the order of the law, then 
punishment is what sets it right again.  However, as Levinas and Derrida both warn, 
what is at stake here is not the order of the law, but, rather, the law itself.  For crime 
is the necessary other to the law, not the primary term in the binary crime / 
punishment, but rather the secondary term of the binary law / crime.  If there were no 
crime, there would be no law, for law (in the form of positive or negative edicts) 
defines itself as the laying out of its other as a limited and knowable challenge to 
itself.  Law needs crime.
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Furthermore, it is not only at the level of the narrative tropes involving trials 
and putting the law on trial that Merry Christmas works to question the 
epistemological by way of the ethical.  On the narrative level the trials question the 
epistemological at every step along the way.  In addition, Celliers’s “mad” 
pantomime before his execution and the “mad” pantomime of his non-execution 
deny the primacy of the epistemological.  Understanding the pantomimed motions on 
screen does not help spectators understand what is taking place in these instances.  
Additionally, on the aural/ level, the constant image of David Bowie playing a man 
who sings off key, sometimes wildly, is disconcerting.  And, on the visual level, 
Merry Christmas mixes narrative and mise-en-scène elements incongruently, 
challenging spectatorial expectations of verisimilitude.  The film is beautifully shot, 
set on a tropical island resplendent with colors the opposite of military gray and army 
drab.  Waves lap the beaches during beatings, hara kiri scenes, and suicides.  Bright 
green leaves and orange flowers wrap the smuggled rations of the hospital prisoners.  
The white glow of a moth breaks the dark night as it lands on a condemned man’s 
head, as he is buried to his neck in sand and slowly dies.
Repeatedly, the target of the film is the priority of being right.  In the coda, 
Lawrence tells Hara, “You’re the victim of men who think they’re right.  And the 
truth is, of course, that nobody’s right.”  Here, Lawrence returns to the skeptical 
investigation of the epistemological.  Lawrence takes up the investigation Levinas 
links to the ethical and calls into question relying on right and wrong as the poles of 
human existence.  What makes this scene crucial cinematically is that it occurs at the 
end of the film.  In a way, it occurs after the film, as it takes place as the coda of the 
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film.79  It is the excess, the appendage, that puts the remainder of the film into 
question.  At least, it puts the epistemological quest of the rest of the film into 
question because Lawrence, too, is indicted by his own statement as the film has 
revealed his own failings to read the truth and the failings of striving for the truth 
throughout the film.
Lawrence has rarely, if ever, been right.  Even in the simplest of moments, his 
verdicts are proven incorrect by the next moment of the story.  When the guards 
come to the cells on Christmas Day, Lawrence reassures Celliers that they have come 
to take Lawrence to his death.  Yet, the guards come for both Celliers and Lawrence, 
and Celliers reminds Lawrence, “How is it, John, you’re always wrong.”  Again, at 
the final confrontation between Yonoi and Celliers, when Yonoi orders all the 
prisoners to assemble in the center of the camp, Celliers asks Lawrence what this 
assembly means.  Lawrence replies, “I don’t think this is anything.  Fairly routine 
stuff, this.  Don’t worry.”  If he is to be taken at his word, Lawrence is again wrong.  
He misreads the moment in the story which is wholly not “routine stuff” as the sick 
are ordered to walk to their deaths, the prisoners’ commander is about to be executed 
in front of them, and Celliers rescues the Group Captain by confronting Yonoi and 
kissing him in front of the entire camp.  Celliers is beaten and dragged away, later to 
be decapitated in reverse as he is executed in the sandpit.  Yonoi is replaced by a 
camp commander who claims he will be less lenient than Yonoi.  Finally, Hara, the 
Group Captain, and the bulk of the prisoners are death-marched off to build an 
79 In the driest sense, a coda is a concluding musical section that is formally distinct from the main 
structure; a concluding part of a literary or dramatic work; something that serves to round out, 
conclude, or summarize and that has an interest of its own; in Italian, literally, “tail.”
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airstrip.  What Lawrence judged would be “fairly routine” marks the utter unraveling 
of the structures that have governed the story line to this point.  Nothing is left intact 
after this “routine” scene.
Additionally, Lawrence’s verdict that nobody’s right suffers the anxiety of all 
skepticism.  It is impossible to pronounce if “nobody” is to include the speaker as 
well.  On the one hand, if Lawrence is leaving himself out of this judgment, then he 
is repeating the earlier epistemological flaw; he is wrong again and trapped within 
his own blind spot.  On the other hand, if Lawrence is including himself in “nobody,” 
then he too is wrong, again, and he is right.  “Nobody’s right” evokes the skeptical 
and the paradox that is the skeptical.  To say, “nobody’s right,” is to be caught in the 
oscillation of the skeptical which Levinas asserts opens the relation between Saying 
and the Said—and here Seeing and the Seen.  The aporia of the skeptical gives halt to 
the epistemological by way of the ethical.  The infinite feedback loop of the skeptical 
evokes the infinite responsibility of the self for the other.
This evoking is crucial.  This relation of Seeing and the Seen is precisely an 
evoking of Saying and the Said, not a documenting of it.  The relation between the 
spectator and the text by way of regarding the ethical questioning the epistemological 
is not the same as the ethical relation between the self and the other, but an evoking 
of the ethical that the cinematic relation generates.  The skeptical / ethical interrupts 
the flow of the epistemological.  It does not undo it as if it came from the outside to 
replace it.  Rather, it is the non-instant that gives pause to the certainty, or at least the 
quest for certainty within the epistemological.  What is left in the film is a statement 
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which may or may not contradict itself and the freeze frame of a condemned man 
which cannot answer that contradiction.
Pace Levinas’s theories of the aesthetic, especially the role of aesthetic 
immobilizing of the other, as in statuary, it is precisely the immobilizing of the image 
at the end of this film which best corresponds to his own arguments in regard to the 
ethical.  According to Levinas, it is the freezing of time in the instant that makes all 
art into a tragic caricature.  According to Levinas, by representing, art reduces the 
future of the other to the eternal present: a nightmare, prison, caricature, idol, empty 
interval.  He asserts, “Art brings about just this duration in the interval, in that sphere 
which a being is able to traverse, but in which its shadow is immobilized.  The 
eternal duration of the interval in which a statue is immobilized never finished, still 
enduring—something inhuman and monstrous.”80  Thus, at least in his earlier 
writings, all representational art, is totalizing because it condemns those who are 
represented to an eternal present with no future to come.  Levinas totalizes all 
representational art as totalizing; he succumbs to the totalizing impulse he so 
diligently critiques.
In this closing freeze-frame, though, the very freezing of the image is what 
opens the epistemological to questions of the ethical.  What challenges total criticism 
in the film also challenges the dominance of the totalizing impulse Levinas critiques.  
The relation between the self and the other can only remain non-thematizable as the 
ground of epistemology is worn away.  Hara will be assimilated; his execution in the 
80 Levinas, “Reality and its Shadow,” The Levinas Reader, ed. Seán Hand (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989) 
141.
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morning will serve that purpose, but at this instant, this frozen moment, he becomes 
a face confronting Lawrence and spectators as he smiles into the camera as the 
camera is sutured into the position of Lawrence exiting through the cell door.  
Because it would require us to assume, to assimilate all that would come after the 
freeze frame, the freeze frame signals the stutter step of the epistemological and 
Levinas’s totalization of art simultaneously.  Time is frozen, but its freezing opens 
the image to Seeing and the Seen, to a totalizing and untotalizing relation.  This 
might be what cinema teaches us about ethics.  Only by assuming an end to the 
oscillations of this freeze frame can spectators predict the future to come.  Only by 
assuming an end to the oscillations of this freeze frame can this freeze frame be 
reduced to the violence of thematization.
The Ambiguity of Evidence and the Aporia of Law
—The Certainty Hypothesis
The judgment of history is set forth in the visible.  
Historical events are the visible par excellence; their 
truth is produced in evidence.  The visible forms, or 
tends to form, a totality.81
Or tends to form.  Even for Levinas, this tendency within visible art to 
totalize is not total.  This has been my argument overall with regard to the visible 
formation of the freeze frame.  The visible “tends to form” but is not guaranteed to 
form, a totality.  From the earliest of his works, Levinas has denied a correlation 
between the ethical and the aesthetic.  With the freeze frame of this film and the 
81 Levinas, Totality 243.
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freeze frame in more general instances, that tendency is denied priority.  The freeze 
frame forms, or tends to form, an opening toward Seeing on the hither side of the 
Seen.
To widen the context of this discussion and sharpen the difference of the 
effect of Merry Christmas, I would like to conclude by comparing and contrasting 
Merry Christmas and the highly influential Japanese film Rashomon (dir. Akira 
Kurosawa, 1950).  The narratives of both films center on trials and issues of loyalty, 
rape, murder, and testimony.  In both films the mise-en-scène functions as 
contrapuntal beauty framing the pervasive ugliness of the violence of their story 
lines.  And, both Merry Christmas and Rashomon turn around questions of truth and 
the quest for the truth for characters and spectators.  It is in this last category, 
especially, that their similarity signals their difference.
The difference is key.  Rashomon is concerned with the relative perspectives 
of witnesses and the impossibility of an objective knowledge.  As such, it remains 
with in the realm of the epistemological as choices regarding interpretations of the 
film revolve around either / or distinctions.  As David Desser astutely notes, 
thematically, the film addresses the question, how do we live “in an existential 
world, a world rendered meaningless by the death of certainty, by the death, that is, 
of God.”82
82 David Desser, “Ikiru: Narration as a Moral Act,” Reframing Japanese Cinema: Authorship, Genre, 
History, eds.  Arthur Nolletti, Jr. and David Desser (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1992) 59.  For Desser 
the answer to this question comes through a close reading of the cinematic narrative structures of 
Kurosawa’s 1952 Ikiru (To Live) alongside those of Rashomon.  Both films give spectators a 
meaningless world, he states.  However, both also give us the moral answer that heroes in meaningless 
worlds still choose ethically, “to help others” (65).  This reading does not change the first premise, that 
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The death of certainty renders epistemological subjects uncertain as the 
ground for their judgment is swept from beneath them.  Already, though, the death of 
certainty signals a relativism which is not a skepticism.  At least, it cannot be easily 
linked to a traditional skepticism which asserts that (1) absolute knowledge is 
impossible and that (2) better knowledge is only acquired by degree.  This is not the 
relativism of Rashomon, though, not the aporia of Merry Christmas.  Following 
Desser, without epistemological certainty, knowing what is, it is impossible to have 
moral certainty, right action.  Returned to the realm of the “to be,” moral certainty is 
bound to epistemological certainty, subservient to it.  The epistemological retains its 
place of priority.  The simple relativity between one and the other truths of 
Rashomon does not signal a break with a system, the epistemological, with truth at 
its center.
In Rashomon, as soon as the testimonies begin to conflict, the film cautions 
spectators to doubt each of them and the actions they describe.  Since the testimonies 
do not verify one another, the world of the film eschews verifiability.  The events of 
the narrative are no longer certain.  However, this uncertainty is certain for the 
characters and spectators.  They know that no one answer will serve to suffice.  It is a 
difference of perspective and not a difference of alterity.  As Desser continues, “After 
being confronted by four conflicting tales, the audience has, it seems, to choose: it 
must select one story over the others as being true, or, correctly, must assume that all 
knowledge is relative; it adds the second point that there is still a knowable prescribed action for 
heroes in that world of relative knowledge.
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stories are equally true and false, that truth itself is uncertain.”83  For Desser, this 
initial set up is only the beginning of a moral tale, which asserts that heroes 
confronted by a relative world must still choose to act heroically by aiding others.  
They must choose to act heroically and not unheroically, where knowing which is 
which is essential.  For Desser, the woodcutter’s adoption of the infant orphan at the 
very end of the film is the evidence that heroes still act heroically by helping others.  
As Desser points out, Rashomon evokes a salient moral tale within an existential 
context.  Yet, even here, decisions regarding human relation fall prey to the 
epistemological in a manner similar to that of total criticism.  Rashomon reassures us 
by telling us that truth is relative but that right action is still possible and laudable.  
Rashomon’s total criticism returns to the totalizing impulse.
From the perspective of an ethics founded in the condition of the between of 
heterogeneous space, Rashomon’s morality is a further epistemological point to be 
made despite the fact that it argues against the seeming theme of undecidability in the 
narrative.  This is precisely the onus for Derrida and Levinas.  Moral codes of 
conduct are unethical because of their reliance on the epistemological as a ground for 
the ethical.  With their priority in the epistemological, such codes cannot avoid 
totalitarian codification.  Decisions are preempted by algorithms, as verdicts must be 
reached either / or.
Rashomon is a powerful movie that teaches us a good deal about relativity.  
Yet, in the end, it remains monocular, univocal.  There is no decision to be made 
because we are told from the start that no one version will suffice.  We know that we 
83 Desser 60.
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do not know.  In this way, Rashomon is where we are certain that we do not know 
which answer to choose, but we know there are answers to choose between.  Thus, 
Rashomon returns to total criticism, to overturning, rather than to than the work of 
certain films directed by Michelangelo Antonioni or Pedro Almodóvar.  Unlike Blow 
Up’s writing “NO WORDS” and L’avventura’s opening between narrative presence 
and absence and the ethics of alienation, the opening between the generic 
pornographic and non-pornographic of the cinema of Almodóvar, or Merry 
Christmas’s ethics of the law between the frozen and unfrozen frame of a face, 
Rashomon cuts short the infinity of the decision before the decision even has its start.  
We learn that the world is relative, and we are certain of this relativity.
The film is “an existential allegory: God is dead, there are no eternal 
verities.”84  Of this, the film is certain.  Yet, in making uncertainty and the death of 
eternal verities central to its narrative, mise-en-scène, and cinematography, 
Rashomon returns to the subject of the epistemological precisely by stating that there 
are no eternal verities.  Meaning is relative and evidence is ambiguous.  Yet, the film  
stops short of expressing the radical uncertainty of a skeptical, non-totalizing cinema.
The world is meaningless, and we know it.  It alerts spectators to the 
ambiguity of evidence and ambivalence of judging.  Being certain is called into 
question by “the state of having more than one meaning, with resultant uncertainty as 
to the intended significance of the statement” and “the existence of mutually 
84 Desser 65.
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conflicting feelings or attitudes.”85  Knowing the truth is impossible here, but 
knowing that it is impossible to know the truth is still knowing.  Conflicting feelings 
or attitudes but not mutually exclusive ones.  As complex as it is, this certainty that 
something is uncertain is precisely what is called into question by the skeptical.  In 
Rashomon, spectators can be certain they do not know.  This instance is filled with 
the ambiguity of the law, but not the aporia of what Derrida terms “justice” and 
Levinas “ethics.”  Rashomon asks us to read the sentence “She helped the man down 
the block.”  Either / or: A woman assisted a gentleman to travel to the end of the 
block or A woman gave assistance to a gentleman located at the end of the block.  
Merry Christmas asks us to read the sentence “This sentence is false.”  Impossible: If 
the content of this sentence is true, that the sentence is false, then the sentence is 
false, which would make it true.
The epistemological is not called into question as with the aporia opened in 
Merry Christmas.  Rather, with Merry Christmas, the impossible comes in the very 
absence of certainty in regard to knowing, not being able to label even knowing for 
certain.  This is the “point of undecidability.”86  Spectators are left not with 
conflicting testimonies but with the face of a condemned man and the inability to 
judge, while simultaneously called to judge, while called to judge precisely because 
of the impossibility of justifying judgment.  In Rashomon, we are certain we do not 
know.  In Merry Christmas, we cannot be certain what it means to know.  
Rashomon’s relativism returns all concerns to the realm of the epistemological.  
85 C. Hugh Holman and William Harmon, A Handbook to Literature, 6th ed. (New York: Macmillan, 
1992) 14-15.
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Conclusion: Seeing Terror and the Seen of Terrorism
We may come to look back on its [Fahrenheit 9/11] 
hugely successful first week the way we now think of 
the televised presidential debate between John 
Kennedy and Richard Nixon, as a moment when we 
grasped for the first time the potential of a mass 
medium—in this case, movies—to affect American 
politics in new ways.1
As I stated at the onset, the impetus behind my writing of this study was 
twofold: my general sense of something more to post-structuralism than I had 
considered and a seemingly unresolvable question concerning the character of Anna 
in L’avventura.  I could not decide what was missing from deconstruction.  I could 
not decide how to interpret Anna without her being there.  I’m not certain if I’ve 
resolved the second of these concerns, except to say that I no longer place as much 
value in interpretation—at least not interpretation grounded in epistemology.  And, in 
the end, that might be the influence of the ethics I have come to appreciate behind 
Derridean deconstruction linked to Levinasian ethics.  Post-structuralist ethics 
describes why I must respond to the undecidability of deciding, why uncertainty calls 
for something otherwise than certainty.  That ethics cautions me against the violence 
of certainty and final solutions (offered as origins or ends).  Anna remains a mystery 
for me.  “The other remains a mystery for me,” is something Levinas repeated 
1 Richard Corliss, “The World According to Michael” Time 12 July 2004.
191
frequently.  My regard for Anna remains uncertain.  For, at this point in 2004, I see 
certainty as the problem, not the solution to questions regarding cinema and the post-
phenomenological ethical subjectivity it can signal.  In fact, in a period defined by 
the ubiquity of images and the trauma of post-9/11 history, I find ever less 
satisfaction and consolation in certainty, especially the supposed certainty that seeing 
is believing.  Perhaps this is also the primary concern behind Michael Moore’s 
filmic inquiry into the politics and familial connections of President George W. 
Bush, Fahrenheit 9/11 (2004).  I find assertions of certainty, of good and evil 
oppositions in particular, to be the refuge of totalitarianism.  This is not to claim the 
high ground for an unexamined cynicism, though.  Rather, it is a claim in favor of a 
skepticism that runs a fine risk.  What remains is a healthy, critical, difficult 
skepticism.  This is why I continue to defend Fahrenheit—precisely because it “fails” 
to come to a certain conclusion.  Although the film has been attacked as rhetorically 
shallow and manipulative or didactic and predictably preaching to the converted, 
there remains a level at which it refuses to come to a closure around its own 
assertions.  “Was it all just a dream?” the narrator asks.  Do you believe this?
Levinas dedicated Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence
To the memory of those who were closest among the six million 
assassinated by the National Socialists, and of the millions on millions 
of all confessions and all nations, victims of the same hatred of the 
other man, the same anti-semitism.2
2 Levinas, Otherwise v.
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In the end, this study is a response to the memory of those who are among the 
closest to still suffer from the hatred of the other, to the victims who created the 
events of September 11, 2001 and those created by and yet to be created by the 
trauma of that event.  This study runs counter to such documents as HR 3162: 
“Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (the USA PATRIOT ACT of October 24, 
2001).  Such documents of certainty and closure, which as one legal scholar argues, 
by pretending to predict the future and predetermine which groups will act in which 
ways, is “sweeping legislature that (among other things) is supposed to insulate the 
United States against the possibility of terrorist attack.”3  I question the violence of 
that insulation, and, as well, the violence of a new world order that regards 
prevention and disruption of future acts (of any kind it cannot control) as its goal.4
Michael Moore ends Fahrenheit 9/11 by asking a series of questions about the future 
of the disenfranchised who enlist in the United States’s military, international 
relations, and the outcome of the second US / Iraq war.  Some have attacked his 
questions as empty rhetoric serving his sarcastic, self-righteous project of promoting 
himself and his agenda.  Some have attacked the film precisely for ending on a 
3 Jonathan K. Stubbs, “The Bottom Rung of America’s Race Ladder: After the September 11 
Catastrophe are American Muslims Becoming America’s new N….s?” The Journal of Law and 
Religion XIX (2003-4): 122.
4 See John G. Douglass, “Raiding Islam: Searches that Target Religious Institutions,” The Journal of 
Law and Religion XIX (2003-4): 111.  Douglass argues that the post-September 11 world has turned 
legal rationale on its head because the goal for law enforcement has become disrupting the future
rather than prosecuting the past.  Prosecuting the past still matters, but now less than disrupting the 
future of perceived terrorists, terrorist acts, and terrorist networks.
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question he refuses to answer.  How could a question about the future work in any 
other way and still be just?
Enclosed within the boundaries of an answer to such a question, an act like 
HR 3162, or the rhetoric of absolutism that now governs our age, how can we not 
call certainty into question?
* * *
She weeps bitterly in the night,
tears on her cheeks;
among all her lovers
she has none to comfort her;
all her friends have dealt
treacherously with her,
they have become her enemies5
Tears connect Levinas and Derrida.  For both thinkers, tears play a crucial 
role between blindness and sight, between vision and words, and between suffering 
and rejoicing.  For both, tears play between the lens and the lid of the eye, or come 
between the object and the organ of vision, even when the tears themselves represent 
the absolute closeness between people, as in supplication or mourning.  How can one 
see through tears?  Between tears?  How does Seeing interrupt the Seen always 
through tears?
In the end, Seeing is “a responsibility which, before the discourse revolving 
around what is said, is probably the essence of language.”6  It is the non-ground of 
5 Lamentations 1:2.
194
communication.  It is also, at least as far as I have been arguing here, the essence of 
cinema in regard to its engagement of me as a spectator, an an-archic essence that 
calls me to respond, thus interrupting the economy of the Seen persisting in Seeing in 
the world.
Beyond all else, ethical spectatorship is patient.  Seeing is patient.  To 
incorrectly paraphrase Levinas on patience, in Seeing a disengagement within 
engagement is effected—neither the impossibility of a contemplation hovering over 
history nor irrevocable engagement in its visible objectivity.  Between direct 
engagement and indirect disengagement, the two positions merge.  Seeing, the ethical 
interruption, the demand for judgment, engages spectatorship in this merger between 
interpellation and objectification.  Neither the gaze nor the glance obtains at one 
moment.  Neither is patient enough.  Rather, an infinite responsibility to answer, 
patient beyond any acceptable patience, invokes this difficult freedom I have termed 
Seeing.
In Memoirs of the Blind Derrida connects skepticism, patience, 
responsibility, and visual judgment from the start of a conversation that eventually 
comes to tears.  Tears of sorrow or tears of joy?  He does not answer, but explains 
that they are tears that see.  Derrida questions whether to believe in these tears, tears 
that see, and writes, “I don’t know, one has to believe. . .”7  Do these ellipses remind 
us of his teardrops?  Or, do they return us to the first page of his book to begin 
patiently again?  How do we respond to uncertain teardrops on the page?
6 Levinas, Beyond the Verse 128.
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* * *
Let me conclude with a note on one of the most important films ever made.  
Human Remains (dir. Jay Rosenblatt, 1998) is an archival documentary about the 
everyday, banal, human attributes of some of the most infamous dictators of the 
Twentieth Century: Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini, Mao, and Franco.  The film details a 
long list of the mundane and perverse habits of these men.  They are afflicted by 
testicular and stomach disorders.  They refuse to bathe.  They watch too much 
television.  They are chronically flatulent and molest young girls.  They execute 
others for being taller than themselves.  They pride themselves on being superior 
swimmers and sportsmen.  They order the murders of millions upon millions of other 
human beings.  They remain human, neither above nor below the fray.  Their 
connection to everyone of us brings questions of responsibility back into the light.  
And these questions remain questions.  Rosenblatt has stated plainly that “I don’t 
have answers, but hopefully my films can be catalysts for a deep discussion and a 
way of reflecting.”8  Seeing interrupts the Seen, and Rosenblatt focuses that 
interruption at us.
On many occasions, Levinas explained the ultimate implication of his 
description of ethics by stating that I am responsible even for the other’s 
responsibility.
I have previously said elsewhere—I do not like mentioning it for it 
should be completed by other considerations—that I am responsible 
7 Derrida, Memoirs 129.
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for the persecutions that I undergo.  But only me!  My “close 
relations” or “my people” are already others and, for them, I demand 
justice.9
The other calls me into my unique subjectivity. I am because I am responsible.  And, 
that responsibility goes so far to mean that I am responsible for what harm is done to 
me.  My responsibility comes first.  This does not disallow the context of other 
others.  For them, I can and do demand justice.  As soon as others come into the 
picture, I demand justice for them.  However, what makes me unique is that no one 
else can substitute for my responsibility, and, therefore, before questions of justice 
come questions of ethics.  Before I can demand anything I am responsible even to the 
point of answering that demand.  My own response must always remain open, always 
respond more, even when I feel justified otherwise.
Rosenblatt says of these too-human dictators,
There’s no sympathy for these people.  They are presented as 
disgusting individuals, but they are presented as human, and that’s 
difficult for some people.  It’s more comfortable to look at them as 
monsters and never go beyond the surface, never look at yourself and 
your own responsibility for the horrors that take place in the world.  
Until we take responsibility and accept that part of ourselves, that’s 
the only way we are going to raise our individual and collective 
consciousness so that we don’t give power to people like that.  When I 
8 Michael Fox, “Jay Rosenblatt’s Excavations of the Psyche” The Independent Film and Video 
Monthly December 2000, 37.
197
was a little kid, I asked my grandfather what happened to his relatives.  
He would say, “Hitler killed them.”  “What do you mean ‘Hitler killed 
them?’”  It could never [have been] just one person.  It’s the power 
that that one person gets vested from the collective.10
Perhaps the interruption of certain images can only come by way of uncertain 
images.  Then, the answer to the ubiquity of determined images would be more, less 
certain, images.  Perhaps this is the opening provided by the films in this study and 
by Fahrenheit 9/11 and Human Remains. Perhaps what Rosenblatt and Moore offer 
us in their documentaries are fine risks that are never pleased with themselves and 
the violence of guarantees against what is to come.  They are documentaries that call 
for responses against objective / subjective binaries, thus, opening a further space for 
more discussions of post-phenomenological ethics.  Thankfully, neither offers the 
certainty of a final solution.  Like moments in Antonioni, Almodóvar, and Oshima, 
these films also raise more questions than they can answer and continue the 
conversation by again calling spectators to respond no matter how difficult the 
response.
9 Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo, trans. Richard Cohen 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP, 1985) 99.




Pepi, Luci, Bom, y otras chicas del montón (Pepi, Luci, Bom . . ., 1980).  Director.  
Writer.
Laberinto de pasiones (Labyrinth of Passion, 1982).  Director.  Writer.  Producer.  
Composer.  Production Designer.
Entre tinieblas (Dark Habits, 1983).  Director.  Writer.
¿Qué he hecho yo para merecer esto? (What Have I Done to Deserve This?, 1984).  
Director.  Writer.
Matador (1986).  Director.  Writer (with Jesús Ferrero).
La ley del deseo (The Law of Desire, 1987).  Director.  Writer.  Composer.
Mujeres al borde de un ataque de nervios (Women on the Verge of a Nervous 
Breakdown, 1988).  Director.  Writer.  Producer.
¡Atame! (Tie Me Up!  Tie Me Down!, 1989).  Director.  Writer.  Composer.
Tacones lejanos (High Heels, 1991).  Director.  Writer.
Kika (1993).  Director.  Writer.
La flor de mi secreto (The Flower of My Secret, 1995).  Director.  Writer.
Carne trémula (Live Flesh, 1997).  Director.  Writer (with Ray Loriga and Jorge 
Guerricaechevarría).
Todo sobre me madre (All About My Mother, 1999).  Director.  Writer.
Hable con ella (Talk to Her, 2004).  Director.  Writer.
La mala educación (Bad Education, 2004).  Director.  Writer.  Producer.
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Michelangelo Antonioni
Cronaca di un amore (Story of a Love Affair, 1950).  Director.  Writer.
I vinti (1952).  Director.  Writer.
La signora senza camelie (The Lady Without Camelias, 1953).  Director.  Writer.
Tentato suicidio (episode of Amore in cittá (Love in the City), 1953).  Director.  
Writer.
Le amiche (The Girlfriends, 1955).  Director.  Writer.
Il grido (The Outcry, 1957).  Director.  Writer.
L’avventura (1959).  Director.  Writer.
La notte (The Night, 1960).  Director.  Writer.
L’eclisse (The Eclipse, 1962).  Director.  Writer.
Il deserto rosso (Red Desert, 1964).  Director.  Writer.
Prefazione (episode of I tre volti (Three Faces of a Woman), 1965).  Director.  
Writer.
Blow-Up (1966).  Director.  Writer.
Zabriskie Point (1969).  Director.  Writer.  Editor.
The Passenger (1975).  Director.  Writer.  Editor.
Il mistero di oberwald (The Mystery of Oberwald, 1980).  Director.  Writer.  Editor.
Identificazione di una donna (Identification of a Woman, 1982).  Director.  Writer.  
Editor.
Al di là delle nuvole (Beyond the Clouds, 1995).  Director.  Writer.  Editor.
Lo sguardo di Michelangelo (Michelangelo Eye to Eye, 2004).  Director.  Writer.
Il filo pericoloso delle cose (episode of Eros, 2004).  Director.  Writer.
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Oshima Nagisa
Ai to kobo no machi (A Town of Love and Hope (original title The Boy Who Sells a 
Pigeon, 1959).  Director.  Writer.
Seishun sankoku monogatari (Cruel Story of Youth (Cruel Tales of Youth), 1960).
Director.  Writer.
Taiyo no hakaba (Burial of the Sun (The Sun’s Grave), 1960).  Director.  Writer.
Nihon no yoru to kiri (Night and Fog in Japan, 1960).  Director.
Shiiku (The Catch, 1961).  Director.
Amakusa shiro tokisada (Shiro Tokisada (The Revolt), 1962).  Director.
Esturaku (Pleasures of the Flesh, 1964).  Director.  Writer.
Hakuchu no torima (Violence at Noon, 1966).  Director.
Nihon sunka-ko (A Treatise on Japanese Bawdy Song, 1967).  Director.  Writer.
Muri-shinju: Nihon no natsu (Japanese Summer: Double Suicide, 1967).  Director.
Koshikei (Death by Hanging, 1968).  Director.  Writer.
Kaette kita yopparai (Three Resurrected Drunkards, 1968).  Director.
Shinjuku dorobo nikki (Diary of a Shinjuku Thief (Diary of a Shinjuku Burglar), 
1968).  Director.  Writer.  Editor.
Shonen (Boy, 1969).  Writer.
Tokyo senso sengo hiwa: Eiga de isho o nokoshite shinda otoko no monogatari (The 
Battle of Tokyo, or the Story of the Young Man Who Left his Will on Film 
(He Died After the Tokyo War: Story of a Young Man Leaving a Film as 
Testament, 1970).  Director.  Writer.
Gishiki (Ceremonies (The Ceremony), 1971).  Director.  Writer.
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Natsu no imoto (Dear Summer Sister, 1972).  Director.  Writer.
Ai no korida (Realm of the Senses (In the Realm of the Senses, 1976).  Director.  
Writer.
Ai no borei (Empire of Passion, 1978).  Director.  Writer
Merry Christmas, Mr. Lawrence (Senjo no merii kurisumasu) (Furyo), 1982).  
Director.  Writer.
Max, Mon Amour (1986).  Director.  Writer.
Gohatto (Taboo, 1999).  Director.  Writer.
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